

CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST: AN ECONOMIST'S PERSPECTIVE

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In the last 10-12 years the problem of Chinese presence in the Russian Far East has been in the focus of public interest both in Russia and abroad. Russian mass media generally define this problem in widely ranging terms, but the most salient attempts to assess it are those that hit the public perception with alarmist political labels, such as China's "demographic expansion," "yellow peril," "Chinese threat," and "quiet occupation" of the Russian Far East by China.¹

It is necessary to provide a strictly academic, unbiased and balanced analysis of migration flows in Northeast Asia (NEA), including studies of the volume, dynamics, structure, reasons, motivations, consequences and other aspects of the Russian-Chinese cross-border interaction and escape the political speculations which characterize much of the debate on the issue in Russia, a country in transition and riddled with economic crises in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century. The growing interest in studies of cross-border human flows in Northeast Asia appears quite natural and logical in the general context of the challenges the globalizing world economy poses to each of the countries of this region.

General Approach to the Subject of Study

First, the activation of cross-border migration in Northeast Asia, particularly Chinese immigration in the Far East of Russia, should be considered in the general context of globalization and the problems it presents to the development of all affected societies. The phenomenon is related to the multi-level transformation of international relations, which manifests itself in the revolution of information and communications, intensification of the international movement of production factors (goods and services, capital, labor, and technologies), the end of the Cold War, the accelerated formation of one global order, and the gradual rooting of a security architecture which is based on national leaders' willingness to compromise. These developments expand the limits of the leaders' responsibility beyond their respective national borders.

Second, in analyzing the problem at hand, it is necessary to remember that economic globalization in the Asian-Pacific region (APR) takes place in the form of integration of countries that differ in many ways, in terms of the development of production forces, demographic and natural-resource potentials, the extent of democratization public relations, and political systems. While joining this process, Russia identifies itself as a Eurasian power, located at the intersection between the two regional integration centers of the world, i.e. the European Union (EU) and the Asia-Pacific. Restoring her own economic space and consolidating her presence in Asia, Russia finds itself facing a unique historical chance to become an actor and a mediator in the economic, political, and civilizational integration of Eurasia.

Third, while researching liberalization and laws that mark the cross-border flows of goods, labor resources, capital, and technologies in Asia-Pacific, one should not neglect the fact that economic integration in this region is realized through governmental cooperation as well as through direct interaction of corporations and other national and transnational business structures. Meanwhile the integration processes in the region are subject to the ever-growing impact of civil society development in Asian-Pacific countries and related democratic institutions, including various public movements and non-government organizations.

The problem of migration flows in Northeast Asia and, in many ways, the issue of Chinese presence in the Russian Far East are comprehensive problems, for which systemic and comparative as well as interdisciplinary analyses are required.

Chinese Migration in the Far East of Russia: Historic Precedents and Parallels

In the second half of the 19th century through the dawn of the 20th century the Chinese presence in the Russian Far East was changing under the influence of economic, political-legal, social-psychological, and ethno-cultural factors, which in a number of cases worked against one another. As far as economic factors are concerned, we should emphasize first and foremost Russia's objective interest in attracting foreign labor to explore and develop the Far East as part of the development of national industry and economy.

The first Chinese workers, several hundred in number, appeared in the gold mines of the Far East in the mid-1870s. About the same time Chinese labor started to be used in the construction of defense and transport facilities, such as bastions, barracks, the naval port in Vladivostok, and the Ussuriisk railroad.² At the juncture of the 19th and the 20th centuries Chinese labor migration was boosted by the aggravating imbalance between the demographic situations in the Far East of Russia and in Northeast of China. Despite the considerable spending by the Czarist Government for the resettlement of workers from the interior of Russia to the Far East, a marked deficit remain in the local labor market, with relatively high labor costs. On the other hand, in the border provinces of China, unemployment was growing due to the burgeoning domestic migration from the central, eastern, and southern regions of China,³ the increasing concentration of land ownership, and the increasing bankruptcy and loss of lands among the peasantry.

In 1893, the population of the southern regions of the Russian Far East—the Amur, Maritime, and Trans-Baikal territories—stood at 908,400, of which 35,500 were foreign nationals, including 28,900 Chinese (3.2% of the total population), 5,500 Koreans, over 700 Japanese, and about 500 Europeans. The population of the Chinese provinces bordering Russia already exceeded 13 million. That is, the population of the neighboring Russian and Chinese regions was approximately 1:15.⁴

In the 1900-1910 period, the size of Chinese migrants in the Russian Far East, including seasonal workers, ranged between 75,000 and 200,000 annually, and by the end of that period about 150,000 Chinese were considered permanently settled and accounted for at least 12 percent of total population in the region. That is, between 1893 and 1910, the number of Chinese residents in the Russian Far East had grown by 5.2 times.⁵

Before 1917 Chinese laborers were attracted to the growing economy of the Far East on a massive scale. They were used in the mining and refining industries, transport, communication, construction, trade, services, and agriculture. In 1913, Chinese workers

constituted 87.6 percent of the total labor force in the region's gold-production industry, 92.5 percent of the work force in the silicate industry of the Maritime Territory (in 1911), 57.8 percent of the worker population in port works, 53.3 percent in the Ussuriisk Railroad, and 32.8 percent on the workers on ships navigating in the Amur River basin.⁶ Chinese workers were employed both in the private and government sectors of the Russian economy. For example, in 1911 the government allowed to 24,000 Chinese contract workers in the construction of defense facilities in the border areas of the Maritime and Amur territories. By the beginning of the First World War (1914) the facilities, built with the help of Chinese labor, included powerful fortresses and defense structures on the Russian Island and in Vladivostok, the basis of the Amur military flotilla, and military settlements with brick-laid buildings in Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Razdol'noy, Novokievsk and other residential areas of the territory.⁷

In 1911, the total share of Chinese and Koreans in the work force at private companies of the region exceeded 75 percent. The major incentives for employing Chinese labor by both the private entrepreneurs and administrators of state-run companies included local labor shortage, as well as the cheaper cost of migrant labor (on an average 1.5-2.5 times less than for Russian workers), longer working day (13 hours against 10 for Russians), fewer days-off, generally good discipline, easy replacement, willingness to master related professions, better physical endurance, and modest if any demands in everyday life. On the negative side, researchers used to point critically to migrants' competition vis-à-vis Russian workers and traders, involvement in the "shadow" economy (illegal export of gold, trade in drugs and falsified vodka, etc.), and high crime rates in migrant communities.

Chinese migrants were also found in trade and businesses in Russia in the early 20th century. Entrepreneurs made the most active part of the emerging Chinese diaspora. By 1910, the number of enterprises with Chinese capital in the Far East was quite comparable to the number of Russian private enterprises (the proportion was 1:1.5 respectively).

The *political, administrative, and legal regulation* of Chinese migration to the Russian Far East in the pre-Soviet period was tightly connected with the economic factors and motives discussed above. However, this link sometimes was manifested in a rather contradictory form that reflected a conflict between the local administration with an interest in constraining migration on the one hand and, on the other, the ever stronger trade-and-industry circles and leaders of state-run enterprises interested in employing the Chinese labor.

The Regulations, enacted in 1861, set the initial rules for the resettlement of Russians from European Russia to the Far East and also confirmed the provisions of the Aigun and Peking Treaties between Russia and China (1858-1860), for allowing temporary residence in the Russian territory for the Chinese who had established regular residence in the territories concerned. In 1886, in the interests of security and border protection, foreign subjects, including Chinese, were prohibited from settling in the border areas and in 1892 from acquiring real-estate properties, including land plots, in such territories.⁸ In 1900, the free-port regime was *de jure* canceled for crossing the border and the customs procedures were organized in the Far East.

In 1909, the State Council of Russia rejected the draft law "On Measures Against the Influx of Chinese and Korean People to the Amur Territory" because in its view such

measures could increase the cost of and slow-down the construction of most important strategic facilities, in particular the Amur railroad and the Vladivostok fortress.⁹ An interim law was passed in 1910 and formally restricted the use of foreign citizens in public works, but at the same time allowed the hiring of foreign citizens when it was impossible to accomplish such works with Russian labor. Prior to the First World War all attempts by the Far Eastern administration to enact more severe restrictive measures with regard to Chinese workers without a Russian passport were blocked by the resistance of local industrialists and merchants who sent numerous petitions to central authorities asking for permission to continue employing Chinese labor. As a rule, all these petitions were granted.¹⁰

During the First World War the restrictive trends in Russia's migration policy vis-à-vis Chinese workers were replaced by encouragement and incentives, as Russia's able-bodied population was mobilized massively on the war fronts. Control of the market economy and the repressive political regime in the USSR resulted in massive deportation of Chinese population in 1937 and thus "put an end" to the problem of Chinese labor and business immigration in Russia up to the end of the Soviet period, i.e., 1991.

The New Wave of Chinese Migration in Russia: Challenges and Responses **Periods, Scale, and Dynamics of Migration**

The collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the political and economic liberalization in Russia served as an impetus for rapid activation of cross-border human flows between Russia and China. For example, the data of the Blagoveshchensk (Amur Region) Customs Office show that the number of foreign citizens' relocation cases across the Russian-Chinese border (entry and exit) grew from 6,233 in 1988 to 373,930 in 1993, nearly a 60-fold increase. In 1993, as many as 751,000 Chinese citizens visited China, including 410,000 who entered the country for business purposes, 237,000 as tourists, 33,400 under private invitations, and 57,100 as crews of transport vehicles.¹¹ The uncontrolled flow of immigrants in that period was predetermined at least by the following factors: the legal and economic climate of Russia favorable toward immigration; opening of borders with no proper regulations; imperfect legal regulation of various forms of business activities in Russia and similarly inadequate tax regime; growing unemployment in the border areas of the adjacent countries, including China; and, the enactment of a no-visa regime for PRC citizens in Russia without a sufficient socio-economic and political rationale.

In 1993, in response to the rapidly growing migration and related problems for the local population and administration, the federal authorities enacted a number of measures to tighten immigration control in Russia. The Russian Federation President's Edict of December 16, 1993, No. 1245, "On Measures for Enactment of Immigration Control," introduced immigration control for the first time in border crossing stations and was implemented by divisions of the Federal Migration Service (FMS). Following the government orders "On Approval of the Provision on Immigration Control" and "On Measures for Prevention of Uncontrolled Outer Migration," the posts of immigration control were established. The immigration control bodies were charged with the control of exit by foreign citizens and entry of persons without citizenship into Russian territory, implementation of migration-control measures, deportation of foreign nationals, and review of asylum applications.

In early 1994 the Russian government unilaterally discontinued the “open border” policy and enacted a visa regime for entry of Chinese citizens. In January 1994, Russia and China signed a consular agreement, which allowed for no-visa travel to China and Russia respectively only for holders of diplomatic and official-service passports but ruled out no-visa trips for individuals with ordinary passports. In March 1994, simultaneous with the stepped-up enforcement of border-crossing restrictions, new customs duties and excise fees were introduced. These measures curtailed the liberation of cross-border economic relations and facilitated the growth of the so-called “shuttle trade.” These measures resulted in a 250% reduction in border-crossings by Chinese citizens in 1994, and in a relative stabilization, in the 1995-98 period, of Chinese migration across the Russian border at the annual average of 300,000-400,000 man-times.

After the monetary-financial crisis of August 1998, which caused a devastating 400% devaluation of the Russian ruble vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, Chinese migration into Russia dropped again. In the first half of 1999, the Russian border was crossed by Chinese 235,000 times.¹² As Russia recovered from the immediate impact of the crisis, however, Chinese migration began to pick up gradually and has since continued to grow. The Chief of the Border Control Department at the FMS of Russia noted that in the period between January 1999 and June 2000, 1.5 million Chinese nationals entered Russia for official reasons, and only 237,000 of them were legally registered in the territorial bodies of the Ministry of the Interior in the Far East, while the rest, as he put it, “dissolved themselves” in Russian territory.¹³

Notwithstanding the tighter passport-visa regime in place since 1993, quite a few Chinese citizens who arrived in Russian territory as tourists or for official business chose not to return to China and settle permanently legally or illegally. In the absence of official statistics on the Chinese who have settled in Russia permanently, mass media estimates range widely. Minimum estimates put the Chinese “settlers” in Russia and other CIS countries in the mid-1990s at 300,000, or 1 percent of the total Chinese population in the world.¹⁴ Maximum estimates reach 5-7 million. The highest estimates seem to be an exaggeration, a kind of political speculation, reflecting the interests of certain political groups. More realistic and reasonable estimates, offered by some Russian demographers and Sinologists, suggest that by 2000 the number of Chinese in Russia did not exceed 500,000.¹⁵

As far as the Russian Far East is concerned, the estimated number of permanent Chinese residents has grown from 1,742 in 1989 to 15,000 in 1990, 100,000 in 1993, and 237,000 in 2001.¹⁶ Other sources give different estimates, e.g., 80,000 or 200,000-300,000 as of 1996.¹⁷ The scale of China’s current “demographic expansion” into Russia should not be overestimated. Indeed, the permanent Chinese presence in the Far East accounts for only 3.3 percent of the total local population—250,000 Chinese and 7.2 million Russians as of 2000. In comparison, the above discussion noted that in the early 20th century the Chinese and Korean residents in the Far Eastern territories reached more than 12 percent of the total local population, but at that time there was no talk of Chinese “expansion” into the Russian Far East.

We can agree with some foreign observers who have conducted case studies of the dynamics of Chinese presence in the Russian Far East. For example, M. Alexeev of San Diego State University suggests that the number of Chinese residents in Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Ussuriisk, and other cities of the Maritime Territory is not yet that large and

in no way can be compared to the number of Chinese population in some American states and cities, for example, 430,000 Chinese in San-Francisco.¹⁸ Finally, while estimating the scale of Chinese presence in Russia and its Far Eastern territories, one should not neglect to mention that in Russia there are only 31.25 Chinese per 10,000 Russians, in comparison with 259 Chinese per 10,000 Canadians in Canada, 178.5 Chinese per 10,000 Australians in Australia, and 65.9 Chinese per 10,000 Americans in the United States.¹⁹

The major official channels for Chinese migration to the Far East of Russia in the current period are non-visa tourism, attraction of foreign labor, and student exchanges. The determination of the maximal allowed term for tourists' stay in Russian territory is a prerogative of the local administrations. In the 1990s-early 2000s, the term ranged from region to region and from territory to territory in the Far East—from 3 days in the Amur Region to 3 months in the Khabarovsk Territory. The vast majority of Chinese citizens who arrived as tourists were short-term visitors, coming to Russia for one to two months, most of them selling consumer goods.

As far as the prospects for Russia's integration in the Asian-Pacific economy, the most important channel of migration is Chinese labor. Russia has instituted a number of measures for attracting foreign labor on the basis of quotas and licenses. In the 1990, the Russian and Chinese governments concluded several agreements on bilateral cooperation in this sphere. For example, the Russian Federation-People's Republic of China agreement of 1992, "On the Principles for Delegating and Receiving Citizens by Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations of Russia," established a regime for Chinese labor in Russia. The Presidential Edict "Provision on Attraction and Use of Foreign Labor in the Russian Federation," issued in 1993, laid down the general principles governing the Russian policy on foreign labor. In 1996, the State Duma of Russia passed the law "On the Order of Entry in the Russian Federation and Exit from the Russian Federation." Together, these orders have played an important role in the legitimization and regulation of migration flows between Russia and other countries, including China.

In the 1990s, through officially sanctioned contracts of labor services the number of Chinese workers in Russia grew from 10,000 persons in 1990 to 17,000-18,000 (according to other sources, to 30,000) in 1992-1993, with 46 percent of the Chinese workers employed in construction, and 47 percent hired as seasonal agriculture workers. The largest portions of workers were concentrated in the Chita Region (about 10,000 in 1993), the Primorskii (Maritime) Territory and Amur Region (1,000-2,000), as well as in the Khabarovsk Territory (707 persons in 1991, 1,175 in 1992, and 1,560 in 1993).²⁰

In 1994, acting in conformity with the above-mentioned presidential edict, the Federal Migration Service started to issue permits to attract foreign labor. By April of that year the agency had issued 251 permits to attract 15,000 workers from China, including 8,500 in the Far East, and 4,000 in West and East Siberia. According to the FMS, the total number of Chinese workers invited to Russia on the basis of labor licenses amounted to 20,301 in 1994, including 9,126 construction workers and 6,506 vegetable growers, 26,528 in 1995, 24,043 in 1996, and 22,227 persons in 1997. In 2000-01, 35,000 Chinese citizens were invited annually to work in Russia, for a maximum term of two years.²¹ In earlier years, the term of contracts for other than agricultural Chinese workers in Russia did not exceed ten months on average.

In order to control the flow of Chinese migrant workers, territorial and regional administrative bodies used quotas. For example, in 1997-1998 upon the initiative of the

FMS the Khabarovsk Territorial Administration enacted and applied the following quotas for foreign workers in various sectors: up to 500 in construction, up to 853 in gold production, and up to 950 workers in the forestry industry.

Northeast China, including the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, is the major source of Chinese labor for the Russian Far East. According to Chinese statistics, as early as in 1988-1993 China sent to 80,000 workers to Russia, and 65,000 of them from Heilongjiang Province.²² In 1999, Heilongjiang provided 1,609 workers and specialists in just one sphere of agriculture in the Far East, and in 2000 they worked on 43 rented plots and planted and grew vegetables, watermelons, soybeans, potatoes, rice, corn, and fodder. The Russian side provided land, agricultural machinery, equipment, transport vehicles, and fuels and received a part of the products as rent, and the Chinese contractors sold the remaining part of the products in the local market. In the first ten months of 2000, Heilongjiang signed 51 contracts for construction works in Russia and 81 contracts for supply of Chinese construction labor. The gross value of these contracts amounted to \$63.39 million, i.e. a 57% increase from the same period of 1999.²³

The share of Chinese labor in the total foreign labor in the Russian Far East has grown—from 9.1 percent in 1995 to 20.9 percent in 1998 in the Amur Region.²⁴ However, in the second half of 1990s the rates of labor flow from China slowed down due to the more strict immigration laws and requirements local control agencies set for employers.

As for difficulties, the Chinese side has referred to what it considers excessively strict procedures in Russia, which actually limited the influx of Chinese workers. In particular, all licenses for entry of foreign nationals must be processed in Moscow, and because of this requirement the transport and overhead expenses have grown considerably. The maximum term of licenses for agricultural workers is three months, which does not correspond to the seasonal duration of fieldwork. Another complaint is related to the increase of processing fees for Chinese agricultural workers in the Primorski Territory (from \$100 to \$260).²⁵

Russia has become one of the largest markets for Chinese labor. In 1999, for example, a total of 302,600 workers and specialists from China worked under labor contracts in foreign countries, and 12 percent of them worked in Russia.²⁶

The future prospects for labor imports from China are currently in the focus of attention of many Russian scholars, policy-makers, as well as directors of major corporations, which are interested in accelerating the development of natural resources in Siberia and the Far East. To illustrate this point, I will quote from a report issued in June 2001 by the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP).²⁷ The report, “Siberia and the Far East of Russia in the 21st Century: New Assessments, New Priorities, and New Solutions,” stated:

The stable and progressive combination of the aging of population and its outflow forms the conditions in which the depopulation of the huge space of Siberia and the Far East might be mitigated only through foreign migration, as the latter is the only factor that can improve the sex/age structure of the population. Because such migration is really feasible and has already started from the Asian-Pacific countries, first and foremost from China, it must be appraised as socially significant and welcomed by the government.

As the Chinese (and in future, other Eastern [Asian]) migration is unavoidable, it is necessary to organize a mission-oriented elucidation and propaganda to change public opinion so that it would be relieved of the apprehensive perceptions of “yellow peril” and form [instead] a positive image of Eastern [Asian] migrants.²⁸

Interestingly, various resource-extractive companies of Russia, such as Norilsk Nickel, SIDANCO, and Alliance were mentioned among the “sponsors” of the report. In this context, Sergei Karaganov, President of the CFDP and Deputy-Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of European Studies stated:

Immigration is usually a huge benefit for any country. Germany and the United States are ample cases in point. We, too, should think of how to stimulate the influx of foreign labor rather than to fear immigrants from Asian countries like the plague. It is also important for the state is to create a special investment climate for Siberia and the Far East so as to attract capital from the United States, Japan, Korea, and China as soon as possible. Unless we do this, we shall very soon find ourselves in a difficult geostrategic situation. This is proven by the fact that there are currently a wave of studies in the United States discussing what would happen to Russia should Siberia and the Far East “break away.”²⁹

A. Piontkovsky, a political scientist who opposes encouragement of labor migration to Russia, in advocating his anti-Chinese position, refers to Thomas Graham, a renowned American analyst in a high position at the Office of Strategic Planning of the U.S. Department of State. According to Graham, as quoted by Piontkovsky, “one thing is absolutely evident: stability in the Pacific region will be under jeopardy if Russia’s presence in Asia will become the ever weaker. The presence of a strong and economically prosperous Russia in East Asia would correspond to the long-term strategic interests of the United States and most of Asian countries. If this is the case, why then would our two countries, proceeding from our evident common interests, not think together on how Russia might restore its economy in the Far East so that to consolidate its sovereignty in the region?”³⁰

Leaving aside all zigzags and nuances of political struggle, gaining momentum in Russia and in the world community around the issue of Chinese presence in the Russian Far East, let us note one obvious circumstance. That is, in the last several years the understanding has emerged in the Russian Federation that it is not possible to resolve all problems connected with the illegal aspect of the Chinese immigration only by restrictive administrative methods any more than it is to resolve through an isolationist policy all problems of Siberia and the Far East, the regions that gradually ascends to the top of the list of priorities for existence of the Russian state.

Conclusions

I offer the following conclusions from the above analysis.

First, the current Chinese migration to Russia is not at all a unique or unprecedented phenomenon either in the world or in Russian-Chinese relations. There

are quite comparable precedents and, to some extent, an analogue of it in the not-so-ancient history of Russia's economic development of its Far Eastern region.

Second, this analogue is comparable to the current realities in terms of at least three general circumstances: (1) the development of market relations in the compared periods (the current period and the late 19th-early 20th century; (2) the relative transparency of the Russian-Chinese border; and (3) the strong ethno-demographic imbalance across this border.

Third, in this connection, to study the historical experience of Russia's response to the challenge presented by the Chinese migration to the Far East one hundred years ago, is a most timely and appropriate task in terms of drawing historical parallels and some general conclusions on the current situation.

Fourth, the previous wave of Chinese migration to Russia was clearly of an economic nature and contributed to the development of labor and capital markets in Russia's dynamically growing market economy of that period; as such, the Chinese immigration facilitated the formation of economic infrastructure in the Far East. A. A. Panov, a high-ranking Russian official of that time correctly observed that the Chinese labor was "of paramount significance" in the economic life of the region.³¹

Fifth, as demonstrated by Russia's historical experience, the country is quite capable of solving some of its economic problems with the use of Chinese labor, for example, problems connected with the growing market of consumer goods, construction of defense and transport infrastructure facilities, and exploration of natural resources.

Sixth, Russia's experience also has proven that even in the circumstances of evidently insufficient legislative basis for immigration policy, the country in principle is able to reach a relative balance in its policy between the need to contain the number of unofficially "settled" migrants and the need for Chinese labor and capital in contractual projects for the economic development of the Far Eastern region.

Seventh, at the same time, however, we cannot but emphasize that the discussion has revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of Russian policy vis-à-vis the Chinese migration in the late 19th-early 20th centuries, in particular, the strategic consolidation of Russia's position in the Far East through the use of a part of China's surplus labor, on the one hand, and the inability of the European-minded local administrations to provide for naturalization and assimilation of the Chinese "settlers" and to find appropriate ways to ameliorate ethnic differences, on the other hand. The problem of Chinese presence in the Russian Far East relates to the major problems and contradictions—economic, defense, strategic, legal, socio-political, ethno-cultural, and civilizational—in the broader context of the development of Russia as a Eurasian power.

Eighth, as in the previous case of 100 years ago, the new wave of Chinese migration is also marked basically by economic characteristics. So far, Russia is just starting to comprehend the constructive potential of this wave. As a consumer of Chinese labor in the 21st century, Russia most probably will become one of the largest segments of the foreign labor market in the world. Given the demographic problems of the Russian Federation and the imbalance between the labor and natural resources, as well as the gap between the human and material factors of production, this would be a quite natural development.

Ninth, the imperfection of Russia's economic and immigration laws is a serious factor, limiting the efficient use of Chinese labor resources by Russia. As in the past, the

political-administrative and normative-legal regulation of Chinese immigration today is not free from conflicts of interests between the local administrations as proponents of restrictive migration policy and business enterprises that employ Chinese labor. The development of the quota- and license-based regime for foreign labor in Russia is certainly a positive step toward the elimination of such contradictions and, equally important, toward the stronger legitimacy of Chinese immigration, as well as the gradual withdrawal of Chinese migrants from the “shadow economy.”

Tenth, the attraction of labor from China to Russia on a civilized and legitimate basis appears most important from the perspective of Russia’s integration in the Asian-Pacific economy and gradual elevation of Siberia and the Far East to the forefront in developing the priorities for the existence of the Russian state. Joint exploration and development of natural resources of these territories would provide Russia and China with real opportunities to insert specific economic contents into their strategic partnership. Meanwhile, it would be natural to link the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East to bilateral Russian-Chinese economic and resource integration, as well as to the growing openness and internationalization of the growing economic sphere. It must also be accompanied by an active policy to encourage Russian people to resettle in these territories and especially in the areas bordering China.

The progressive thinkers among the policy-makers of the world quite correctly and reasonably view the Russian-Chinese ethno-demographic imbalance in the Far East and in Northeast Asia as a threat to the stability of the Pacific region; hence, this factor requires coordinated actions within the next several years by Russia, China, and all other countries of the region and the world community. Such actions will be successful only if they are aimed at the economic development of Siberia and the Russian Far East, the consolidation of Russia’s sovereignty, and the strengthening of Russia’s presence in Asia.

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Notes

¹ In particular, according to Dr. Victor Larin, Director of the Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Peoples (Vladivostok), the “yellow peril” theme appeared in at least 150 publications in Russian mass media just within 1993-1996.

² *Rossiia i Kitai na dal'nevostochnykh rubezhakh* (Russia and China in the Far Eastern Frontiers), Vol. 2, Blahoveshchensk, 2001, p. 26.

³ In order to level up the demographic situation in China, the Beijing government, beginning in 1878, pursued a policy of active resettlement of population from central provinces to Northern Manchuria.

⁴ Calculated on the basis of: *Vsepoddanneishii otchet priamurskoo general-gubernatora general-leitenanta Doukhovskogo za 1892-1894 gg* (The entirely subordinated report by Lt. General Doukhovskoy, Governor-General of the Amur Territory), Saint Petersburg, 1896.

⁵ *Rossiia i Kitai* (note 1), pp. 4-6. According to other sources of data, in 1910-1914 the number of Chinese in the Far East of Russia amounted to 80,000 (see L. L. Rybakovskii, *Narodonaseleniye Dal'nego Vostoka za 100 let* [Population of the Far East for 100 years], Moscow, 1969, p. 75).

⁶ Op. cit., pp. 30-34.

⁷ See *Materialy po izucheniyu rabocheho voprosa v Priamuriye* (Materials on the study of the workers' issue in the Amur Territory), Issue 2, Saint Petersburg, 1912, p. 5.

⁸ See *Kitaitsy, koreitsy i yaponsy v Priamuriye. Otchet upolnomochennogo MID V. V. Grave* (Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese in the Amur Territory. Report by the Foreign Ministry Authorized Representative V. V. Grave), Saint Petersburg, 1912, p. 45.

⁹ *Rossia i Kitai*, p. 31.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 32.

¹¹ *Rossiiskaya Federatsiya v tsifrah v 1993 g* (The Russian Federation statistics of 1993), Moscow, 1994, pp. 76-77.

¹² Data from the PRC Embassy in Moscow.

¹³ “Echo Moskvyy” Radio broadcast, July 22, 2000.

¹⁴ Tian Zhang, “*Kitaitsy v emigratsii*” (Chinese in Emigration), *Rossiia i ATR* (Russia and Asia-Pacific), 1994, No. 2.

¹⁵ See, for example, *Migratsiya i besopasnost' v Azii*. (Migration and security in Asia), Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000, pp. 206-209.

¹⁶ Zakharova O. D., Mindagoulov V. V. *Nelegal'naya migratsiya v pogranychnykh raionakh Dal'nego Vostoka: istoriya, sovremennost' i posledstviya* (Illegal migration in the border areas of the Russian Far East: history, modernity, and consequences), Moscow, 1994, pp. 15-19; *Izvestiya*, February 16, 2001.

¹⁷ See, for example, G. Vitkovskaya and J. Zaionchkovskaya, “*Novaya stolypinskaya politika na Dal'nem Vostoke Rossii: nadezhdy i realii*” (The new Stolypins' policy in the Far East of Russia: hopes and realities), in *Perspektivy Dal'nevostochnogo regiona: mezhsranovyye vzaimodeistviya*, (Prospects of the Far Eastern regions: cross-country interactions), Moscow, 1998, p. 98.

¹⁸ *Russkii journal*, April 25, 2001.

¹⁹ These figures are based on *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1994), pp. 636-8.

²⁰ *Delovaya Sibir'*, May 28-June 3, 1993.

²¹ *Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda* (Khabarovsk), July 2001.

²² *Dunxu zhongya yanju* (Beijing), No. 1 (1994), p. 19.

²³ *Rossiya i Kitai*, Vol. 1, pp. 436 and 416.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 598.

²⁵ Li Chuanxiung. "O *torgovo-ekonomicheskoy sotrudnichestve provintsii Heiluzian KNR s Rossiyei*" (On trade and economic cooperation between the PRC province of Heilongjiang and Russia), in *Rossiya i Kitai*, Vol. 1, p. 417.

²⁶ Calculated on the basis of *China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Yearbook, 1999-2000*, Beijing, 2000.

²⁷ The working group for this project is led by V. Ryzhkov, Deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

²⁸ Cited in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, August 14, 2001.

²⁹ *Vremya MN*, May 15, 2001.

³⁰ See *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, August 14, 2001.

³¹ *Materialy po izucheniyu rabochego voprosa v Priamuriye* (Materials on the study of the workers' issue in the Amur Territory), Issue 2, Saint Petersburg, 1912, p. 63.