

## MIGRATION PATTERNS IN NORTHEAST ASIA: AN UPDATE\*

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### Introduction

International migration and other cross-border population flows in Northeast Asia (NEA) have surpassed fertility as a topic of regional concern, and are leading to debates regarding the nature of the nation-state, citizenship, ethnicity, and state and human security. NEA nations (China and the Hong Kong S.A.R. and Macao S.A.R., Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, and the Russian Federation) had a mid-2002 population of approximately 1.633 billion persons, more than one-quarter of that of the earth (Table 1). We estimate that in mid 2000 approximately 318 million persons, one-twentieth of the earth's population, lived within the region itself (Helongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin Provinces of China, the Russian Far East, and the entirety of the other NEA nations).<sup>1</sup>

The security task for NEA is to achieve harmony between populations, economies, cultures and resources.<sup>2</sup> Traditional security concepts emphasize the survival and prosperity of the nation-state. Human security concepts emphasize the protection of populations from economic, environmental, health, physical, political, and social hazards, and the freedom of peoples to lead their lives to the fullest extent.<sup>3</sup> State security and human security are intertwined, sometimes complementary, and one does not guarantee the other.

We describe how cross-border population flows and other population changes relate to human and state security in NEA. Ultimate (root) causes of insecurity are failures of the social contracts that bind nations and populations together in cooperative activity.<sup>4</sup> Proximate causes of insecurity apply to specific situations, and include population flows (international and intrastate migration) and changes in population stock (size, composition, and distribution). The links between migration and other cross-border flows, migration policies, and security are indirect and reciprocal. Cross-border flows affect access to resources, and implementing policies regarding these flows can both engender and alleviate conflict.<sup>5</sup>

We review and update our earlier answers to four questions concerning how international migration and other cross-border flows affect human and state security in NEA.<sup>6</sup> First, how can we explain cross-border flows in NEA? Second, what are the major cross-border and migration policies in the region? Third, what are the major trends for NEA states? Fourth, what intranational and international migration policies might enhance state and human security in the region? While the events of September 11, 2001 have dramatized the links between cross-border population flows, state security, and human security, borders remain permeable, thus emphasizing the importance of this last question.<sup>7</sup>

### Explaining Migration

#### *Definitions*

*Population stock* refers to population size and composition, defined by such characteristics as age, sex, labor force, dependency, ethnicity, and location. *Population flows* are entries into or exits out of a population, and include fertility, mortality and migration. Migration is linked to other flows, including flows of capital, communications, goods, and services, and may be a cause or a consequence of changes in population stock.

*Migration* refers to a change of *de jure* or usual place of residence, which can be

across city, county, provincial, state or international boundary lines. *International migration* refers to a change of residence between nations. *Internal migration* or *intranational migration* refers to such a change within a nation. *Immigration* refers to a flow of persons establishing a usual place of residence in a given nation and whose usual place of residence was formerly in another nation. *Emigration* refers to a flow leaving a nation for a place of residence elsewhere. *Net migration* refers to the numerical balance of immigrants and emigrants to and from a given area, according to the direction of that balance. Migratory events normally take place in *migration streams* from areas of origin to destination, and in *counterstreams* of migrants returning home.<sup>8</sup> *Free migration* is governed largely by the will of the migrant, *impelled migration* is influenced largely by the will of others, and *forced migration* is completely governed by the will of others.<sup>9</sup> *Refugee migration* and *internal population displacement* (intrastate displacement) are forms of impelled or forced migration. Sending and receiving states often disagree regarding whether certain classes of migrants are free economic migrants or impelled or forced refugees.

Most persons crossing international borders are not migrants, but are circulating travelers, including traders and other business persons, and tourists. Reasons for admission of migrants to states include education and training, employment, family formation, settlement, and humanitarian reasons (e.g., refugees, asylum-seekers, and other persons granted temporary protected status, etc.).<sup>10</sup> Major international migration flows now include labor migration, family reunification, refugee and asylee flows, and illegal migration.<sup>11</sup>

### **Migration Perspectives**

Knowledge failures as well as policy failures inhibit migration management. There are no universal laws of migration; models, judged as useful or not useful for a specific purpose, are best used to guide migration research and policy making.<sup>12</sup> Independent variables accounting for migration vary according to whether the migratory behavior explained is that of national populations or smaller population groupings.

Most migrants seek economic security, economic explanations dominate the migration field, and emphasize that individuals and families migrate for economic security, as based on their cost-benefit considerations of migration costs, destination preferences and resources available for migration.<sup>13</sup> Sociological explanations of migration include descriptions of migration fields that include “push” and “pull” factors at origins and destinations, intervening obstacles between origins and destinations, and migrant characteristics that impede or facilitate movement through migration streams.<sup>14</sup> Migration is facilitated by chains of migrants that link individual family, tribal, ethnic and national migration networks.<sup>15</sup> Political science explanations of migration focus on the roles of nation-states in generating economic migrants and refugees, and how migration can alter international balances of power.<sup>16</sup> Gender linked explanations of migration emphasize that males and females may participate in different migration networks, and make different contributions to economies at origin and destination, and that migration expands the roles of women and dampens the fertility of migrants.<sup>17</sup>

The aforementioned perspectives have been incorporated into systems descriptions of migration that emphasize the history of penetration of European capitalist markets and of the migration of Europeans from the “European core” to the “world periphery,” and the subsequent migration of non-Europeans from the periphery towards (“older” and “newer”) core areas.<sup>18</sup>

Migration and development tiers relevant to systems explanations of migration within NEA have been defined by Skeldon as (1) the “old core” (Europe, North America, and Australasia), (2) the “new core” (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (R.O.C.)), (3) “core extensions and potential cores” (coastal China, the Hong Kong S.A.R., the Macao S.A.R., and the more settled coastal areas of the Russian Far East), (4) the “labor frontier” (the populous near interior of East China, and North Korea), and (5) the “resource niche” (Mongolia, the remainder of

China including West China and Tibet, and the remainder of the Russian Far East) (Figure 2). The NEA labor frontier is a reservoir of potential migrants who can extract resources from the resource niche, and engage in manufacturing and service activities in NEA core extensions and potential cores.<sup>19</sup>

The public and private sectors share migration management within NEA, where some state mediated migration has given way to demand-driven migration serviced by labor contractors who facilitate imports of foreign labor to Japan, the Hong Kong S.A.R., the Macau S.A.R., and South Korea, and also provide cross-border services in lieu of labor.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, some NEA states have recently begun to regularize the status of selected categories of temporary migrants.

### **Migration and Other Transitions in NEA**

Cross-border flows in NEA and elsewhere are associated with a vital rates transition and other population transitions (Figure 1).<sup>21</sup> These interlinked transitions, including changes from high to low fertility and mortality (the vital rates and epidemiologic transition), from younger to older populations (the aging [and labor force] transition), from rural residence to urban residence (the urbanization [and diversity] transition) and from low to higher levels of migration (the migration transition), provide policy makers and NGOs with opportunities to influence human security and national security.

#### *Vital rates and epidemiologic transition.*

During this transition, and in the absence of migration, population growth occurs through natural increase, or an excess of births over deaths, and as birth and death rates decrease, sometimes results in a new balance of low birth rates and low death rates. Stage 1 of the transition, “The Age of Pestilence and Famine,” characterizes traditional societies, with constant population size; and high birth and high death rates that tend to cancel out natural increase (Figure 1). During Stage 2, “The Age of Receding Pandemics,” death rates decline, birth rates remain high, more women live through the childbearing years to bear children, and population growth is rapid. In Stage 3, “The Age of Degenerative and Man-Made Diseases,” birth rates decline, death rates bottom out and population growth begins to level off. Finally, Stage 4 is characterized by a low and fluctuating balance of birth and death rates of approximately equal magnitude, population size is again constant, and life expectancies may continue to increase due to lifestyle changes and medical advances.<sup>22</sup>

The vital rates and epidemiologic transition appears to be complete in Japan, urban China, the Hong Kong S.A.R., the Macao S.A.R., and Taiwan (R.O.C.) (Stage 4), nearly complete in South Korea (Stage 3), not as far advanced in rural China (Stage 3), and less advanced in North Korea and in Mongolia (Stage 2–3) (Table 1 and Figure 1). Completion of this transition leaves demographers without a clear model for assessing future demographic change. A new Stage 5 would include increasing mortality, brought about because of new and re-emerging infectious and parasitic diseases, and increased populations with compromised immune systems (including older persons and HIV/AIDS victims).<sup>23</sup>

The current vital rates situation is not clear in North Korea, due to the famine induced mortality crisis,<sup>24</sup> and in the Russian Federation, which has recently experienced decreasing life expectancy. The HIV/AIDS pandemic, now beginning to shift from Africa to Eurasia, can weaken national and human security in China and Russia, by increasing morbidity and mortality, decreasing life expectancies, degrading labor forces, and reducing economic output.<sup>25</sup>

#### *The aging (and labor force) transition.*

Countries in early stages of the vital rates and epidemiologic transition obtain a “demographic bonus” of a temporary increase in ratios of labor force age/total population, resulting in more savings, investment, and development. During Stages 3 and 4 of the

transition increases in relative numbers of working age adults are followed by increases in the relative numbers of the elderly.<sup>26</sup>

In Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (R.O.C.), the Hong Kong S.A.R. and the Macao S.A.R., population aging underlies a shift from youth dependency to old age dependency, the aging of the native labor force, labor shortages, more importing of migrant labor, and sometimes the outsourcing of production to lower income countries.<sup>27</sup> Despite migration, these areas are moving from isosceles triangle shaped population pyramids with wide bases denoting relatively many children and narrow apexes denoting relatively few older persons, towards “mushroom” shaped pyramids, whose caps denote high proportions of older populations (Figure 2).<sup>28</sup> The aging transition has led to the recruiting of immigrants to serve as replacement workers for retired natives. Nevertheless, it is not feasible that Japan and South Korea can import enough workers to maintain current (2000) support ratios of the working age (15-64 years of age) to old age population (65 years of age and older), but support ratios could possibly be enhanced by increasing retirement ages, to perhaps 75 years.<sup>29</sup>

#### *The urbanization (and diversity) transition.*

Urbanization makes possible the economies of scale necessary for the modernization of economies. The percentages of populations termed urban (typically defined as living in cities and towns with populations of 2,000 or more) in NEA countries now range from as low as 38 in China to 99 in the Macao S.A.R. and 100 in the Hong Kong S.A.R. (Table 1). Rural-urban migration in NEA has increased economic, ethnic, linguistic, and social diversity, and may also have increased the potential for ethnic conflicts.

#### *The migration transition.*

The idea of a migration transition to higher rates of migration in NEA is useful for categorizing migration and other flows, but it does not explain migration, and migration does not always follow from or lead the vital rates and epidemiological transition in one specific manner.<sup>30</sup> Migration streams in NEA appear to be increasing in number due to other population transitions, and economic, political, and environmental changes.

Migration linking adjacent states can enhance the development of transborder cities (TBCs) that cross nation-state boundaries and are based on increasingly borderless economies. TBCs sometimes coalesce into *transborder urban systems* (TBSs), consisting of adjacent urban aggregations on or near national borders, that have extensive cross-border economic and social integration, diverse populations, organize transactions between nations, are driving engines for migration, and are cultural and political bridges between adjacent states.<sup>31</sup> NEA examples are the Hong Kong S.A.R., Macao S.A.R., Guangzhou (China) TBS, and the Tokyo (Japan) – Seoul (South Korea) – Pyongyang (North Korea) – Beijing (China) urban corridor. While TBSs affect the political structures and population stocks and flows of adjacent states, and pose difficult questions regarding national sovereignty, they can enhance regional stability by integrating human and economic resources.

### **Migration Trends and Policies**

#### *Regional Migration Trends*

*International migration systems* are defined by flows between groupings of nations. These systems include Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, North America, West Asia, Latin America, and Asia.<sup>32</sup> A NEA subsystem includes inflows from countries with labor surpluses, and of professionals from outside NEA to Japan and South Korea, and outflows to other regions, particularly to North America. Major interregional migration streams flow

from China to the United States and Canada.<sup>33</sup> Minor interregional streams flow from the Philippines, and South America to Japan, and smaller streams flow to South Korea. The Russian Federation and Hong Kong are the most important NEA destinations, and ranked fourth and twenty-third respectively, in terms of the world's total reported net migrants (in-migrants minus out-migrants) from 1990 to 1995.<sup>34</sup>

Increasingly restrictive migration policies of industrialized states outside of NEA are lessening demands for NEA unskilled labor, yet migration pressures within NEA have increased, expanding legal and illegal cross-border flows to and within NEA, and heightening international human security concerns.<sup>35</sup> Recent examples of migration-human security-state security links in NEA are as follows: (1) tensions around Chinese cross-border traders and other Chinese migrants in Eastern Siberia, the Russian Far East, the remainder of Russia, and Mongolia; (2) negative responses in the Russian Far East to construction and timber laborers from North Korea; (3) negative responses of Japanese to Russian visitors in Japanese port cities; (4) incidents involving North Korean economic migrants and asylum seekers in Northeast China, some of whom seek to migrate to South Korea, China, and elsewhere; (5) the status of ethnic Koreans in China, Japan, the Russian Far East, and the remainder of Russia; and (6) the lack of assimilation and exploitation of Chinese, Filipino, and Korean migrants in Japan.<sup>36</sup> Refugee incidents have recently taken center stage in interstate relations in NEA, but there are now relatively few refugees in NEA, with the exception of ethnic Russians who have returned to the Russian Federation from the South-Central and West Asia republics of the former USSR, and the North Korean economic migrants and asylum seekers who have crossed into Northeast China.<sup>37</sup>

### **Migration Policies**

Governments use migration policies to facilitate development, avoid uncontrolled migration, and increase national identity. Migration policies are specified by policy instruments originating in many government and non-government organizations. Summaries of national population policies, including migration policies, by the United Nations Population Division suggest that nations are now increasing migration controls,<sup>38</sup> which can then increase asylum, refugee, and illegal immigration. In recent decades, for example, third-country refugee resettlement in NEA has given way to refugee exclusion, or restrictive refugee camps, e.g., Hong Kong prior to 1997.<sup>39</sup> In 1998 all NEA governments except the Russian Federation viewed their levels of immigration as satisfactory and planned to maintain their immigration policies (Table 2). The Russian Federation reported its level of immigration as too high (contradicting its negative population growth rate and its policy of raising immigration). All NEA countries viewed their levels of emigration as satisfactory, and sought to either maintain the current emigration policy or not intervene.<sup>40</sup>

Massey notes that the global economy generates migration that is beyond state control, and also leads to restrictive migration policies, that liberal democracies in particular find hard to implement. He indicates that (1) labor migration policies are generally formulated bureaucratically outside of public arenas for industry related clients, (2) refugee policies are based on negotiations between executive branches of governments and NGOs with humanitarian concerns, and (3) permanent migration policies are formulated in public arenas.<sup>41</sup> Liberal industrial democracies find it hard to restrict migration by judicial processes because the "convergence of markets and rights" hinders regulation, and then opt for symbolic rather than realistic migration control. State capacity to implement migration appears to depend on strength of bureaucracies, demand for entry, strength of constitutional protections, independence of judiciary and traditions of immigration.<sup>42</sup> Asian migration policies now appear to favor the circulation of highly skilled personnel, control labor migration, and restrict permanent settlement.

### **National Cases**

## China

In terms of sheer population numbers, China has a great influence on population stocks and flows in NEA.<sup>43</sup> The vital rates transition appears to be at Stage 2 in rural China, and Stage 4 in urban China. China is experiencing rapid population aging, extensive rural-urban migration, rapid social change, exerting lateral internal and external pressures to the north, south, east and west, is assimilating the Hong Kong and Macao S.A.R., and exporting significant population.<sup>44</sup> Early 1990s census results suggest increasing social and economic diversity between the highly developed new “core extension” east coastal areas, the older “core extension” areas of the northeast, the “interior labor frontier,” and “resource niche” areas in Tibet and west China.<sup>45</sup> Economic growth has resulted in attempts by China to attract skilled foreign workers and Chinese students who were educated abroad, more undocumented migration (largely from Vietnam and North Korea), and more international travel by Chinese. Chinese passports are now easier to obtain; following international practice after joining the World Trade Organization, all Chinese citizens will be allowed to apply for passports by 2005.<sup>46</sup>

**Aging.** China’s past birth control policies led to a rapidly aging population, a trend now affecting national discourse on China’s economic future.<sup>47</sup> By 2050, old age population (65 years of age and older) will comprise almost 14 percent of China’s population.<sup>48</sup> The support ratio of working age to old age population is declining, affecting pensions and health care, and requiring infusions of working age populations to fund social services, an assignment that rural-urban migrants may be insufficient in number to undertake.<sup>49</sup>

**Rural-urban migration.** A combination of redundant farm labor, higher wages in urban areas experiencing economic booms, and rural environmental stress, has generated extensive rural-urban migration from China’s rural population reservoir (including the near interior of East China).<sup>50</sup> Internal population flows may be leading to cross-border flows to Mongolia, the Russian Far East, and the remainder of Russia.<sup>51</sup> By the mid 1990s internal migrants comprising a ‘floating population’ then numbering at least 80 million, challenged the household registration (*hukou*) system, which tied migrants to a natal place.<sup>52</sup> Excluding Beijing and Shanghai, the Chinese government relaxed *hukou* registration on October 1, 2001, leaving undisturbed many of the 130 million migrants then estimated to be living outside their place of registration.<sup>53</sup> Much Chinese internal migration is circular, as rural-urban migrants keep their links to rural areas, in case the government policies change and urban migrants are returned to rural areas.<sup>54</sup>

**Ethnic minorities and trans-border regions.** Concomitant with non-*hukou* rural-urban migration is government-encouraged internal migration to modernize the Chinese economy, build up its underdeveloped provinces, utilize resources, and redistribute Han population to peripheral areas,<sup>55</sup> particularly to Xinjiang Province in the northeast, the autonomous region of inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang Province in the NEA portion of China, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Ethnic, religious and political tensions are escalating in some regions targeted for development because the majority of the citizens are not Han Chinese (e.g., Xinjiang Province).<sup>56</sup> In the trans-border northeast regions, such as the Amur Region, in the Russian Far East, and the Tumen River Basin, near North Korea, Han presence and migration favor China’s relations with its neighbors.<sup>57</sup>

**Hong Kong S.A.R.** The transformation of the global economy since the 1970s resulted in the rapid economic development of then British controlled transborder system Hong Kong, which is now in Stage 4 of the demographic and epidemiologic transition<sup>58</sup> (Table 1). Since 1997, when Hong Kong reverted to China, the new Hong Kong is a separate system from

mainland China with close links based on economic ties, but with a different government, and a border and immigration control similar to other TBSs.<sup>59</sup> The economic integration of Hong Kong and the rest of China is facilitating development of the Greater China economic bloc (China-Hong Kong S.A.R., Macao S.A.R.-Taiwan [R.O.C.]), and increasing China's interdependence with the global system.<sup>60</sup>

Illegal migration in Hong Kong has been relieved by the development of special economic zones near the city, which attract residents from the mainland. Many Hong Kongese have established places of residence in mainland China. Major immigration issues include the right of some mainland Chinese to live in Hong Kong, and attempts by the Hong Kong government to limit abuse of foreign domestic helpers.<sup>61</sup>

**Macao S.A.R.** The Macao S.A.R., which reverted from Portuguese to Chinese administration in 1999, appears to be at Stage 4 of the vital rates and epidemiologic transition (Table 1). Macao's economy has been based largely on tourism (accounting for approximately 25 percent of gross domestic product [GDP], and gambling [accounting for an additional 40 percent of GDP]).<sup>62</sup>

China is undertaking extensive infrastructure development in order to integrate Macao into its economy. Foreign labor is used in lieu of mainland Chinese labor because laws now restrict the flow of mainland Chinese to the area (Macao Chinese are free to enter and exit the mainland). To decrease reliance on outside labor, the Macao government is giving hiring preference to locals and reducing the number of outside workers.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, Macao's low fertility rate suggests that locals will not solve the labor shortage.

#### *Taiwan (R.O.C.)*

Taiwan (R.O.C.) appears to be at Stage 4 of the vital rates and epidemiologic transition (Table 1). The population is aging, as a result of low fertility, and the government is now promoting higher fertility. Urbanization is increasing in already densely populated settings, and new urban areas have sprouted around the official limits of major cities.<sup>64</sup> Taiwan's economy is moving from labor to capital- and technology-intensive industries, and Taiwan is a large investor in other Asian economies, including China. Labor shortages led to the importing of illegal as well as legal foreign workers, but the government has recently (1998) halted labor imports because of rising unemployment.<sup>65</sup> There is an increasing interchange of Taiwan and mainland Chinese populations; "800,000 of Taiwan's 22 million people lived full-time or part-time on the Mainland in 2002."<sup>66</sup>

#### *Japan*

Compared to China, Japan has a small population, but within the NEA region, its population is relatively large. Since World War II Japan has transformed itself by economic recovery, and by rapid transition from high to low fertility and low mortality, and is now a Stage 4 country in the vital rates and epidemiologic transition (Table 1).

Japan now faces birth rates falling below replacement, delayed marriage, rising dependency burdens on the labor force, more focusing of resources on the support of the older population, increasing labor migration, reduced trade surpluses, increasing unemployment and decreasing levels of living.<sup>67</sup> Recognizing that a dwindling pool of able-bodied workers will severely limit public contributions to its pension plans (as well as hampering funding of other projects such as the proposed expansion of its military), the Japanese government is also attempting to shift the responsibility back to families.<sup>68</sup> Labor force burdens may entail a need for Japan to import foreign labor in numbers that would prove to be impossible.<sup>69</sup>

During the 1980s and 1990s the reported aversion of young Japanese to the "3-K" (*Kitanai*, *Kiken*, and *Kitsui*) or dirty, dangerous, and demanding jobs and Japan's failures,

despite low fertility rates, to fully integrate women into the labor force, aggravated labor shortages and made Japan a labor-importing nation focusing on less-skilled workers, and importing illegal migrants, particularly with respect to the 3-K jobs, and jobs for female “entertainers.”<sup>70</sup> Japan also experienced large increases in circulating travelers, some who came to stay.<sup>71</sup> At the end of 2001 Japan had approximately 1.8 million foreign residents, about 1.4 percent of the population, including 685,000 permanent residents, and 1.1 million non-permanent residents.<sup>72</sup> Japan is also estimated to have about 252,000 illegal residents as of April 2001.<sup>73</sup> The current migration of Koreans and Chinese to Japan are raising new questions about the assimilation in Japan.<sup>74</sup>

Japanese immigration laws have yet to resolve immigration issues, and Japan may continue to focus on *de facto* immigration policies, to avoid an open debate on the question of whether Japan should remain bound to the principle of Japanese ethnicity.<sup>75</sup> Options to deal with population decline may include policies to encourage higher fertility, increasing women’s labor force participation, increasing the labor force participation of older populations, investing to increase labor productivity, developing more production abroad, and continuing to recruit foreign workers (sometimes illegally) through private contractors.<sup>76</sup> Japanese immigration policies may be moving toward accommodating the needs of foreign nationals, but also focusing on tighter oversight due to national security considerations.<sup>77</sup>

#### *North Korea*

Within the NEA region, North Korea has a medium level of natural resources and medium size population.<sup>78</sup> North Korea has been experiencing a slower vital rates transition than South Korea, and is moving from Stage 2 to Stage 3 of the vital rates and epidemiologic transition (Table 1). Famine resulted in from 500,000 to one million excess deaths in the 1990s.<sup>79</sup> North Korea has strict emigration controls, but a worsening political or economic situation and civil strife in North Korea could result in state implosion and/or massive refugee migration to South Korea.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, increasing emphasis on trade and economic integration, including well-managed labor flows between North Korea and South Korea, could enhance development and NEA stability. The Chong-Rajin-Sonbong and Pyong-Nampo regions are candidates to spearhead an economic turnaround and are currently attracting some foreign investments. The rural market economy has taken root on the Chinese border.<sup>81</sup> North Koreans who have recently moved to Northeast China have been treated as economic migrants, but some have become asylum seekers, and recently sought refuge in foreign embassies and consulates in China.<sup>82</sup>

#### *South Korea*

South Korea, which is at Stage 4 of the vital rates and epidemiologic transition, has the third largest population within the NEA region, a rapidly increasing level of technological development, and some resources. South Korea is now a major labor importer and declining labor exporter.<sup>83</sup> “Irregular migration” is the norm in South Korea; imported labor is not acceptable to Korean unions.<sup>84</sup> Major labor sources are reported to be the Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal.<sup>85</sup> By 1996, 131,000 foreign workers were reported, of which 63 percent were illegal workers.<sup>86</sup> By fall 2000, the total number of foreigners in Korea was surpassing 500,000.<sup>87</sup> In the past South Korea has attempted to limit the settlement of foreign workers.<sup>88</sup> Some foreigners who have lived in Korea for more than five years may now apply for permanent residence status.

Ethnic Korean migration to South Korea, from China and North Korea, is also raising a number of international questions.<sup>89</sup> The Emigration and Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Bill in January 2000 allows ethnic Koreans permission to stay in Korea for

two years with the possibility of extending their visa, and integrating into South Korean society. Nevertheless, ethnic Koreans in either China or Japan whose ancestors left Korea before and during the Japanese occupation (1910–1945) may find it almost impossible to guarantee their Korean ethnicity.

Taking Germany as a model, Korean reunification would likely produce capital movements from South Korea to North Korea, and extensive labor migration from North Korea to South Korean cities,<sup>90</sup> but the two-way exchange, assuming no mass exodus of North Koreans to the south, and limited border controls, could eventually lead to real wage adjustment and less migration. Nevertheless, South Korean barriers to mass migration from the north, such as the Demilitarized Zone, could be rendered ineffective by a humanitarian crisis that could produce a tidal wave of refugees and consequently pressure Seoul to go around these mechanisms to offer assistance.<sup>91</sup>

### *Mongolia*

Mongolia has extensive natural resources, the smallest population of any NEA nation, extensive land area, and is sandwiched between China and the Russian Federation. Mongolia is moving from Stage 2 to Stage 3 of the vital rates and epidemiologic transition (Table 2).

Approximately 85 percent of Mongolia's residents are Mongol Khalkha, other ethnic categories include Turkic groups, primarily Kazakh (7 percent); the Tungusic (5 percent), and other, primarily Chinese and Russians (3 percent).<sup>92</sup> Urbanization was rapid and well controlled from the 1950s through the 1980s. During the 1990s Mongolia transitioned from a Russian and Soviet influenced socialist government to a more market-oriented government, but with a continued focus on social welfare. Most internal migration during the 1990s, driven by a lack of employment opportunities at origin, was from the west and the central regions to Ulaanbaatar, and to other cities.<sup>93</sup> The government is concerned about the geopolitical situation of Mongolia, has not opted to lower population growth rates, has liberal immigration policies, and relaxed foreign travel for Mongolians to the point that large numbers of Mongolian citizens of Kazakh ethnicity have returned to Kazakhstan.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless, increasing population numbers could burden socio-economic infrastructures (health services, education, housing, and jobs), and negatively impact economic growth.<sup>95</sup> Modernization in Mongolia is increasing pressures for both immigration and emigration, with attendant hazards and benefits. There are long-standing Mongolian concerns about Chinese assimilation, but Russian immigrants have been more accepted. If migration into Mongolia increases significantly, flows from China and particularly from Inner Mongolia will play an important role.<sup>96</sup>

### *The Russian Federation*

The Russian Federation has extensive natural resources, the next to the largest population of NEA nations, and a high level of technological development for the nation as a whole. Russia is in Stage 4 of the demographic and epidemiologic transition, is in competition with the West, Turkey, and China for access to economic resources of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and has experienced recent declines in production and income and increasing economic uncertainty.<sup>97</sup>

Conflict within the 12-member states of the CIS resulted in an estimated 700,000 refugees and 2.3 million internally displaced persons in 1991–1992, declining to an estimated 516,800 refugees and 1.3 million internally displaced persons by early 1996. Of the approximately 25 million ethnic Russians in non-Russian successor states perhaps two million returned to the Russia Federation, and approximately 116,000 persons had migrated from the Russian Federation to market economy countries by 1997,<sup>98</sup> but as market economy countries increase their migration restrictions, more migrants may settle within the Russian Federation. Cross-border flows and migrations from China and South Korea are of concern to Russian

policy makers who wish to maintain control the Russian Far East (RFE).<sup>99</sup>

The Russian Federation experienced severe demographic problems in the 1990s, including unusually high mortality from preventable causes (e.g., alcoholism), decreasing life expectancy, increased morbidity, extremely high induced abortion rates, and fertility rates that are among the lowest in the world.<sup>100</sup> Stressors may include the crisis of transformation of the Russian Federation social and economic systems, and dislocations in the labor market, family structure, and geographic distribution, and inadequate policy action.<sup>101</sup>

During the early 1990s there was increasing dispersion of levels of loss of life among inhabitants of geographic subdivisions in the Russian Federation. The Russian Far East (RFE) appears to have a higher level of years of life lost from all (combined) causes of death than the Russian Federation for the total male and female populations classified by total rural and urban residence for the years 1989 through 1994.<sup>102</sup>

The instability of the Russian Federation is amplified within the sparsely settled RFE<sup>103</sup> due to out-migration of ethnic Russians, proximity of the Chinese population, high unemployment in China, growing economic dependence of the RFE on China, lack of state and private resources for the Russian Federation to resettle the RFE, and unresolved border disputes with China. The population of the RFE has shrunk from 8 million to 7 million since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.<sup>104</sup>

Economic problems of the RFE include (1) the reduction of Russian military forces and degrading of the military-industrial complex,<sup>105</sup> (2) cancellation of subsidies for electrical energy and infrastructure,<sup>106</sup> and (3) Moscow's presumption of regional income from duties on exports of oil, gas, and refinery products.<sup>107</sup> Energy development, food supply, transport, and social services in the RFE have stagnated due to lack of money. Trade between the RFE and the rest of Russia has decreased due to high transportation and energy costs, forcing up food prices and depriving the RFE of markets and supplies. China and Russia opened their borders after Sino-Russian relations were normalized, resulting in uncontrolled border activity, and folk trade in China's consumer goods throughout Russia.<sup>108</sup> Further, trans-border population imbalance with China and the subsequent increase in Chinese immigration to the RFE has spurred Russian concern, and some alarmist and nationalistic sentiments, leading RFE officials to strengthen trans-border control measures.<sup>109</sup> Li indicates, "current Russian policy toward Chinese migration is aimed at control rather than management; short term rather than long term goals, and concentrates on the Russian Far East rather than Russia."<sup>110</sup> Nevertheless, the governments of Russia and China appear to be moving toward cooperative migration policies.<sup>111</sup>

## **Increasing Security**

### *Barriers to Security*

Can NEA countries work together to develop and implement policies regarding cross-border population flows that will increase human and state security? Policy makers in NEA, aware of the advantages of population stabilization, have been generally successful in facilitating a regional equilibrium of low birth and death rates. A question remains as to whether NEA will be able to link changes in population stocks and internal and cross-border flows in ways that will enhance security.

Potential barriers to state and human security related to NEA migration are as follows: (1) China—rural population growth, rural population unemployment, increasing numbers of HIV/AIDS victims, population aging, rural-urban migration, increasing regional diversity, ethnic conflicts, lateral pressures and sometimes unwanted clandestine migration to Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia, and countries further abroad; (2) Hong Kong S.A.R., Macao S.A.R., and Taiwan (R.O.C.)—failures of economies to continue to thrive, and lack of assimilation of new immigrants, (3) Japan—population aging, a shrinking labor force, social security system

stresses, failure to fully use female human resources, temporary migrants, lack of assimilation of migrants, unsolved questions of national identity, and increased international tensions; (4) North Korea—potential state failure, illegal migration and asylum seeking in China and Korea, conflict with South Korea, and mass movement of refugees to South Korea; (5) South Korea—potential conflict with North Korea, potential refugee migration from North Korea, irregular labor immigration, problems of temporary migrants, and tensions with labor-supplying countries; (6) Mongolia—concerns over cross-border population flows from China and Russia; and (7) Russian Federation—a morbidity and mortality crisis, increasing numbers of HIV/AIDS victims, depopulation, economic failures, rivalry with China for access to resources in Central Asia, failures to attract sufficient Russian population to stabilize the RFE, and negative responses to cross-border population flows from China.

### *Strategies to Enhance Security*

The following policies appear relevant to state and human security problems raised by migration in NEA cross-border populations: (1) facilitate trade, investment and human rights by bolstering successful population policies that enhance human security, (2) help maintain stability at home with migrant remittances, and (3) facilitate migrant integration into labor forces and into social life at destination to enhance stability at destination and establish “special relations” between areas of origin and destination.<sup>112</sup> These strategies can be linked to Inoguchi’s five models for “waging peace,” as follows:<sup>113</sup>

1. The “balancing realism” model assumes that “the more even the power balance the more permanent the peace.” From this perspective, security would appear to be enhanced by regularized migration policies in Japan, China, and the Russian Federation.
2. The “bandwagoning realism” model assumes that hegemony facilitates peace; hegemony would be enhanced by economic and migration policies in Japan, China, and the Russian Federation, that would avoid United States retrenchment, Japanese economic failure and Chinese mercantilism, and stabilize ethnic Russian populations in the Russian Far East.
3. The “institutionalist” view would suggest that peacemaking is facilitated by increasing the density of and diversity of public- and private-sector migration related institutions in NEA.
4. The “interdependence” view, that open markets and shared interests facilitate peace, suggests that NEA trading partners could profitably coordinate labor force participation and migration policies, in order to avoid fully free markets that could upset the status quo.
5. The “democratic” view, that democracy in NEA facilitates peace, would suggest that the promotion of migrant women’s rights, and the acceptance of expressions of cultural diversity by migrants while also preserving political unity, promotes peace.

### **Key Issues**

The following problems and predicaments regarding population aging, Chinese rural-urban migration, and the Russian Far East will continue to affect migration and security issues in NEA for years to come.

### ***Population aging and migration***

NEA countries are experiencing rapid population aging, which will lead to labor force aging, shrinking labor forces, decreasing labor force support ratios for older populations, increasing longevity, and higher pension costs. NEA countries will not be able to absorb sufficient labor migration to maintain current labor force support ratios for older populations.<sup>114</sup> McKeller notes that under such conditions, younger people pay higher taxes, older people work longer, pensions are smaller, and workers’ assets have less value. Further, as NEA policymakers are learning, short-term migrants often become permanent residents. The natural increase of

NEA migrants is expected to decrease to that of the native populations, thus further contributing to the “graying” of NEA. There is no escape; aging, according to McKeller, “is a predicament, not a problem that can be solved.”<sup>115</sup> NEA nations will have to choose carefully their migration policies and migrants.

#### *Chinese rural-urban migration*

By 2001 the sheer size of China’s floating population of approximately 130 million internal migrants threatened the government’s ability to use the *hukou* system to limit internal population movement, as well as placed pressure to illegally migrate to other countries. The October 2001 relaxation of the *hukou* system, which left in place most urban migrants, appeared necessary for the government to uphold political legitimacy, maintain social cohesion and obtain equitable economic development.<sup>116</sup> Moreover, it was thought that China could thus ease political tensions in Northeast Asia, show its neighbors that it could not control a growing domestic concern,<sup>117</sup> and reduce some illegal emigration.<sup>118</sup> On the other hand, increased circulation of migrants within China will increase the scope of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

#### *The Russian Far East*

State and human security in the RFE would improve if population stabilized. Any solution would appear to require four components. First, the health of the population must be stabilized, including the control of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Second, a solid and well financed economic infrastructure must be put in place in order to reverse out-migration. Third, economic and social incentives can increase the population of the RFE through increased immigration of Russians from Russia as well as from the Newly Independent States. Fourth, there is need for an intra-regional trade network which would facilitate investments in the RFE by wealthier nations of the region, i.e., Japan and South Korea. (Some industries in the RFE are labor intensive; and could attract more immigrants.) The initiatives would be more likely to succeed if Russia and Japan negotiated a settlement over the disputed Kurile Islands, and if Russia and China ensured that no further rancor about Russia’s century-old rule over former Chinese territories is allowed to stand in the way of the regional initiative, and developed effective ways to manage cross-border flows.

#### **Overcoming Barriers to Human Security and State Security**

Trends in labor and capital flows among several Asian countries suggest movement toward a common market similar to the European Union. Japan has been encouraging a more flexible labor force featuring foreign workers, has been active in proposing regional trade arrangements, and uses other Asian sites for profits, cost-effectiveness, and global competitiveness.<sup>119</sup> South Korea, recognizing that foreign workers are an important component of its labor force, has enacted legislation regarding foreign workers.<sup>120</sup> Taiwan (R.O.C.), in enacting foreign labor laws, has also acknowledged the economic importance of labor flows to its territory.<sup>121</sup> China has joined the World Trade Organization, and is attracting capital from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (R.O.C.), thus integrating the regional economy even more.<sup>122</sup> A NEA common market (perhaps leading to closer political cooperation) similar to the EU could deepen labor and capital flows by encouraging freer movement of workers and factors of production. Transborder urban systems such as the Tokyo-Beijing urban corridor will facilitate common market development.

In conclusion, aging, HIV/AIDS, Chinese rural-urban migration, the lack of growth in the RFE, the development of transborder urban systems, the prospects for a common market, and the tendency for “short term” migrants to stay will influence state security, human security, and NEA migration policies for years to come. Demographic phenomena do not occur in isolation. Events of 9/11/01 have resulted in states reasserting their rights to control cross-border flows. Nevertheless, cross-border flows of populations, communications, goods and services, and

capital bridge nations, economic systems and demographic regimes. Guiding cross-border population flows in NEA will require coordination of the now increasing density of migration-relevant public and private sector institutions including non-government organizations.

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**Table 1. Recent Population Data for NEA Countries and Adjacent Areas\*+**

Country	Population Mid-2002 (millions)	Natural Increase (Annual, %)	Projected Population 2025	Infant Mortality Rate	Total Fertility Rate	% Population	
						<15	65+
China	1,280.7	.7	1,454.7	31	1.8	23	7
China, Hong Kong SAR	6.8	.2	8.4	3.1	.9	17	11
China, Macao SAR	.4	.4	.6	4	.9	22	7
Japan	127.4	.2	121.1	3	1.3	14	18
Korea, North	23.2	.7	25.7	42	2.1	27	6
Korea, South	48.4	.8	50.5	8	1.5	22	7
Mongolia	2.4	1.5	3.3	37	2.5	34	4
Russia	144.4	-.7	129.1	15	1.3	18	13
Taiwan	22.5	0.6	25.3	6.1	1.4	21	9

\*Source: Population Reference Bureau, 2002 World Population Data Sheet, Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C. 2001

Definitions: Mid 2000 Population: Estimates are based on a recent census, official national data, or UN and U.S. Census Bureau projections.

Rate of Natural Increase: Birth rate minus the death rate, implying the annual rate of population growth without regard for migration. Expressed as a percentage.

Projected Population 2025: Based on UN, U.S. Census Bureau or Population Reference Bureau projections.

Infant Mortality Rate: The annual number of deaths of infants under age 1 year per 1,000 live births.

Total Fertility Rate: The average number of children a woman would have assuming that current age-specific birth rates will remain constant throughout her childbearing years (usually considered to be ages 15–49).

% Population <15 and 65+ in “dependent ages.”

Life Expectancy at Birth: The average number of years a newborn infant can expect to live under current mortality levels.

Urban Population: Percentage of the total population living in areas termed urban by that country.

GNI PPP Per Capital: 2000: Gross National Income in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) by midyear population, based on value of goods and services in U.S. which can be purchased in referenced country with U.S. dollars.

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-- Data unavailable or inapplicable.

**Table 2. Population Policies, NEA Countries, Circa 1998\***

Country	Policies						Migrant Stock (% 1990)
	Government's View on Population Growth	Government's Intervention on Growth	View on Immigration	Policy on Immigration	View on Emigration	Policy on Emigration	
China	Too High	Lower	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	Maintain	0
Japan	Satisfactory	No Intervention	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	No Intervention	.7
Korea, North	Satisfactory	No Intervention	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	Maintain	--
Korea, South	Satisfactory	No Intervention	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	Maintain	2.1
Mongolia	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	No Intervention	.5
Russia	Too Low	Raise	Too High	Raise	Satisfactory	No Intervention	--

\*Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Global Population Database, 1999*, ST/ESA/SER. R/155, United Nations, New York, 2000.

*Government's View on Population Growth:* The Government's perception of the growth rate of the country's total population: whether the prevailing rate of growth is satisfactory, too high or too low.

*Government's Intervention on Growth:* (a) to raise the rate of growth; (b) to maintain the rate of growth; (c) to lower the rate of growth; and (d) no intervention.

*Government's View on Immigration:* Based on the Government's assessment of the current level of overall immigration into the country including immigration for permanent settlement, entry of persons on non-permanent work permits, dependents of persons on work permits, refugees, asylum-seekers, and undocumented or illegal migrants; it is divided into three categories: satisfactory; too high; and too low.

*Policy on Immigration:* Refers to Government policies towards the current level of immigration for permanent settlement; it is divided into four categories: (a) to maintain the level of immigration; (b) to lower the level of immigration; (c) to raise the level of immigration; and (d) no intervention.

*Government's View on Emigration:* Based on the Government's assessment of the current level of overall emigration from the country; it is divided into three categories: satisfactory; too high; and too low.

*Policy on Emigration:* Refers to Government policies towards nationals leaving for residence outside the country; it is divided into four categories: (a) to maintain the level of emigration; (b) to lower the level of emigration; (c) to raise the level of emigration; and (d) no intervention.

*International Migrant Stock:* Refers to the estimated total number of foreign-born or the foreign residents as a percentage of the total population in a country on January 1 of each year.

Figure 1 Stages of the Vital Rates and Epidemiologic Transition





Figure 2 Population Pyramids for Japan and South Korea: 2000, 2025 and 2050

Population Pyramid Summary for Japan

Population Pyramid Summary for Korea, South



<http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbpyrs.pl?cty=KS&out=s&ymax=200>

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For an earlier estimate see Sim Yee Lau and Alexander Sheingauz, “National Resources and Environment Management in Northeast Asia,” in Alexander Sheingauz and Hiroya Ono, eds., National Resources and Environment in Northeast Asia, Status and Challenges, Tokyo: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 1995, pp. 18–19.

<sup>2</sup> Robert A. Scalapino, “Northeast Asia Today: An Overview,” presented at the seminar “Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo,” The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; Tsuneo Akaha, “Introduction and Project Update,” presented at the seminar “Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo,” The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.

<sup>3</sup> Nana Poku and David T. Graham, “Redefining Security for a New Millennium,” in Population Movements and National Security, Westport, CT, 1997, pp. 1–17.

<sup>4</sup> Paul R. Shaw, “Rapid Population Growth and Environmental Degregation: Ultimate Versus Proximate Factors,” Economic Geography, vol. 1 (1989), pp. 199–279; and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., “Demographic Changes in Northeast Asia and Their Implications for Regional Stability,” in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia, New York: St. Martins, 1999, pp. 279–309.

<sup>5</sup> Nazli Choucri, Population and Conflict: New Dimensions of Population Dynamics, United Nations Fund for Population Activities, Population Development Series no. 8, New York, NY, 1983, p. 25; Gil Loescher, “International Security and Population Movements,” in Robin Cohen, ed., The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 559; and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., “Population Change and Conflict in Los Angeles: 1965 and 1992,” in Peter Hedström and Eckert Kñhlhorn, eds., Sociology through Time and Space: Essays in Honor of Carl-Gunnar Janson, Edsbruk, Sweden, Sociologiska Institutionen, 1996, pp. 13–26.

<sup>6</sup> Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., Glenn DC Guarin, and Stephen Lam, “Migration Human Security, and National Security in Northeast Asia,” in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., International Seminar: Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, Proceedings, Monterey, California, November 2–3, 2001, The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, January 20, 2002, pp. 9–33.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas Faist, “Extension du domaine de la lutte: International Migration and Security before and after September 11, 2001,” International Migration Review, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 7–14.

<sup>8</sup> David M. Heer, “International Migration,” Edgar F. Borgatta, editor-in-chief, Rhonda J.V. Montgomery, managing editor, Encyclopedia of Sociology, Second Edition, vol. 2, New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2000, pp. 1431–1438; Henry S. Shryock, Jacob S. Siegel and Associates, The Materials and Methods of Demography, condensed edition by Edward G. Stockwell, San Diego: Academic Press, 1975, pp. 349–372.

<sup>9</sup> William Petersen, The Politics of Population, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations, Commission on Population and Development, Thirtieth Session, February 24–28, draft, World Population Monitoring 1997: Issues of International Migration and Development: Selected Aspects, ESA/P/WP.132, December 20, 1996, United Nations, New York, NY, pp. 8–21.

<sup>11</sup> Philip Martin and James Widgren, “International Migration: A Global Challenge,” Population Bulletin, vol. 55, (1996), Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, Inc., p. 19.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas K. Burch, “Teaching Demography, Ten Principles and Two Rationales” (CD-ROM), XXIV *General Conference, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population*, Salvador, Bahia Brazil, August 18–24, 2001, Paris Cedex 20 France, 2001.

<sup>13</sup> Michael P. Todaro, International Migration in Developing Countries, International Labor Office, Geneva, 1991; Oded Stark, The Migration of Labor, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991; and David M. Heer, Society and Population, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1975.

<sup>14</sup> E. G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 48 (1885), pp. 167–227; E. G. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 52 (1889), pp. 245–301; and Everett S. Lee, “A Theory of Migration,” Demography, vol. 3 (1965), pp. 47–57.

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- <sup>15</sup> Douglas S. Massey, Rafael P. Goldring, and Jorge Durand, Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.
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- <sup>19</sup> Ronald Skeldon, Migration and Development: A Global Perspective, Harlow, Essex CM 20 2JE, England, Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1997.
- <sup>20</sup> These activities are linked to the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the subsequent increases in proportion of trade in services, particularly in Japan, South Korea, the Hong Kong S.A.R., and Taiwan R.O.C. State policies that prevent integration of foreign workers and their dependents give labor contractors influence over migration policies, facilitate exploitation of migrant workers, encourage deregulation of labor markets, and subsidize marginal jobs at destination. See: Ashwani Saith, “Migration Perspectives and Policies: South Asian Perspectives,” Asia and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 8 (1999), pp. 285–311; United Nations Commission on Population and Development, World Population Monitoring, 1997, Issues of International Migration and Redevelopment: Selected Aspects, pp. 128-129; and Phillipe Garnier, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 5 (1996), pp. 367–395. Increasing numbers of skilled migrants in NEA, including intra-company transferees, individual service providers and specialists on specific assignments, short-term or business visitors, and diplomatic or international personnel, now provide specialized cross-border services, based on demands for services rather than labor. Philip Martin, “Labor Contractors: A Conceptual Overview,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 5 (1996), p. 203, pp. 201–218.
- <sup>21</sup> “2002 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau, Demographic Data and Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World,” Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, Inc.; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision, Vol. I Comprehensive New Tables, ST/ESA/SER A/198; for 2000 national populations; Kingsley Davis, “The World Demographic Transition,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 237, no. 5 (1945), pp. 1-11; and Abdel R. Oamaran, “The Epidemiologic Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, vol. 19 (1971), Part 1, pp. 509-538.
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- <sup>24</sup> Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, “The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact,” Population and Development Review, vol. 27 (June 2001), pp. 219–238.
- <sup>25</sup> Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Future of Aids,” Foreign Policy, vol. 81, no. 6 (November-December 2002), pp. 22-45 and <<http://www.aei.org/scholars/eberstadt.htm>>.
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<sup>27</sup> United Nations, Commission on Population and Development, Thirtieth Session, February 24-28, draft, World Population Monitoring, 1997, Issues of International Migration and Development: Selected Aspects, p. 23.

<sup>28</sup> Increases in economically disadvantaged populations of labor force age in China, North Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, India and other Asian countries, increase reservoirs of potential migrants to NEA employment centers. Graeme Hugo, "The Demographic Underpinnings of Current and Future International Migration in Asia," Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 7 (1998), pp. 1-24.

<sup>29</sup> Recent United Nations projections indicate that Japan would require 10 million new migrant workers by 2050, and the Republic of Korea would require 102 million new migrant workers. "The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration," Population and Development Review, vol. 26, no. 2 (June 2000), pp. 413-417.

<sup>30</sup> Zilensky has argued that migration regularities accompany modernization, that different forms of migration (i.e., "international," "frontierward," "rural-urban," "urban urban" and "intra-urban," and "circulation") come into prominence at different times, that some potential migration can be absorbed by circulation, and that some potential circulation could be absorbed by communication systems. See Wilbur Zilensky, "The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition," Geographical Review, vol. 61 (1971), pp. 219-49; cited in Skeldon, Migration and Development: A Global Perspective, p. 32.

<sup>31</sup> Jane R. Rubin-Kurtzman, Roberto Ham-Chande, Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., and Qian-wei Wang, "Demographic and Economic Interactions in Trans-border Cities: The Southern California-Baja California Mega-City," Proceedings, XXIIInd International Population Conference, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Montreal, Canada, August 24-September 1, 1993, vol. 3, Liege, Belgium, 1993, pp. 131-142.

<sup>32</sup> Graeme Hugo, "The Globalization of Population Movements: Legal Migrants," in Nana Poko and David T. Graham, eds., Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, pp. 91-199.

<sup>33</sup> China's net migration from 1990 to 1995 is estimated as -800,000 persons. United Nations, Commission on Population and Development, Thirtieth Session, February 24-28, draft, World Population Monitoring, 1997, Issues of International Migration and Development: Selected Aspects, p. 27.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* Net migrants from 1990 to 1995 were: Russian Federation - 1,800,000; Hong Kong - 228,000. Percentages of population growth from 1990 to 1995 due to migration for the Russian Federation, and Hong Kong were 120 and 45, respectively.

<sup>35</sup> Gil Loescher, "International Security and Population Movements."

<sup>36</sup> Tsuneo Akaha, "Project Description Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia: A Human Security Perspective," Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, 2002.

<sup>37</sup> United Nations, Commission on Population and Development, Thirtieth Session, February 24-28, draft, World Population Monitoring, 1997, Issues of International Migration and Development: Selected Aspects, p. 60.

<sup>38</sup> United Nations, Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, "International Migration Policies, 1995," United Nations, New York, NY, 1996, p. 10. These instruments vary in their paper value (i.e., concern with implementation, provision for funding, plan for ensuring compliance, specification of targets and timetables, provisions for supporting infrastructures, and reporting requirements), and strength of implementation. In 1976 only 13 percent of all governments reported policies to raise or lower immigration, and 17 percent reported policies to influence emigration. By 1998, the percentages were 24 and 24 percent, respectively. The percentage of countries of origin closing the emigration safety valves increased from 13 in 1976 to 19 in 1998.

<sup>39</sup> Vaughan Robinson, "Security, Migration and Refugees."

<sup>40</sup> In 1998 China viewed its population growth rate (0.9 percent/year), about the median for NEA countries, as too high and reported a policy to lower growth (Table 2). The Russian Federation perceived its annual population growth (-0.2 percent/year) as too low and reported a policy to raise growth. Growth was seen as satisfactory by the remaining NEA governments, which stated they did not intervene to raise or lower

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growth. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Global Population Policy Database, 1999, ST/ESA/SER. R/153, United Nations, New York, 2000.

<sup>41</sup> Massey, 1999, p. 312. Kenichiro Hirano, Stephen Castles and Patrick Brownlee, "Towards a Sociology of Asian Migration and Settlement: Focus on Japan," Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 9 (2000), pp. 243-272.

<sup>42</sup> Massey, 1999; and Christian Joppke, "Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Migration," World Politics, vol. 50 (1998), pp. 266–293.

<sup>43</sup> China has approximately 78 percent of the population of NEA nations, and Helongjian, Liaoning and Jilin Provinces have one-third of the population of the more narrowly defined NEA region.

<sup>44</sup> Alexander Sheingauz and Hiroya Ono, eds., Natural Resources and Environment in Northeast Asia: Status and Challenges, Tokyo: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 1995, pp. 17-31.

<sup>45</sup> William Lavelly, "First Impressions of the 2000 Census of China," Population and Development Review, vol. 27, no. 4 (December 2001), pp.755–770.

<sup>46</sup> "China, Hong Kong," Migration News, vol. 9, no. 7 (July 2002),

<[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive\\_MN/july\\_2002-14mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive_MN/july_2002-14mn.html)> (October 19, 2002); "China, Taiwan, Hong Kong," Migration News, vol. 8, no. 10 (October 2001),

<[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/oct\\_2001-15mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/oct_2001-15mn.html)> (October 19, 2002); and "China, Hong Kong, Taiwan," Migration News, vol. 8, no.12 (December 2001),

<[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/dec\\_2001-14mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/dec_2001-14mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).

<sup>47</sup> For example, see Yuan Zhi Gang, "Renkou Nianling Jiegou, Yang Laonian Baoxian Zhidu yu Zuiyou Chuxulu" [Population Age Structure in Supporting Pension Insurance and Favorable Savings Rate], Jingji Yanjiu [Economic Research], 11, November 20, 2000, pp. 24-32.

<sup>48</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Monitoring 1999: Population Growth, Structure and Distribution, United Nations, New York: UN, 2000, p. 47; China Statistical Yearbook 1999, Beijing, 1999, p. 798; and Gordon White, "Social Security Reforms in China: Towards an East Asian Model?" in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon eds., London, UK: Routledge, 1998, pp. 175-197.

<sup>49</sup> World Population Monitoring 1999: Population Growth, Structure and Distribution, p. 47; China Statistical Yearbook 1999, Beijing, 1999, p. 798; Gordon White, "Social Security Reforms in China: Towards an East Asian Model?" in The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orientalism and the State, Roger Goodman, Gordon White, Huck-ju Kwon eds., London, UK: Routledge, 1998, pp. 175-197; and "The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration," Population and Development Review, vol. 26, no. 2 (June 2000), pp. 413-417.

<sup>50</sup> Delia Davin, Internal Migration in Contemporary China, London, UK: MacMillan Press, 1999, pp. 51-52, p. 75; and Cheng Li, "Surplus Rural Labor and Internal Migration in China: Current Status and Future Prospects," Asian Survey, vol. 36, pp. 1122-1145.

<sup>51</sup> Vilya Gelbras, "Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East: A View from Moscow," presented at the seminar: "Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo," The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; and Elizabeth Wishnick, "Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East: A Research Update," presented at the seminar "Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo," The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.

<sup>52</sup> There were then two systems of internal migration within China – highly skilled, highly educated and government sanctioned registered *hukou* migrants, and free-market governed non-*hukou* migrants. The *hukou* system, which traditionally tied a person to a natal place by an urban-rural bifurcation that restricts geographic movement and work eligibility, contained requirements to dissuade citizens from relocating domiciles, but economic reform and the lure of ensuing benefits continue to encourage rural-urban migration. In the 1980s, 71.9 percent of urban growth in China's towns and cities came from internal migration or reclassification of *hukou* status. See World Population Monitoring 1999: Population Growth, Structure and Distribution, p. 47.

<sup>53</sup> "China, Hong Kong," Migration News, vol. 9, no. 1 (January 2002),

<[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/jan\\_2002-13mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/jan_2002-13mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).

- <sup>54</sup> “China, Hong Kong Migrants,” Migration News, vol. 8, no. 4 (April 2001), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/apr\\_2001-13mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/apr_2001-13mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).
- <sup>55</sup> Ching Huai Niu and Chao Kun, “*Xibu Da Kai Fa: Ying Zhuyi Shi ge Guanxi*” [Western Development: Ten Important Issues], Zhongguo Gaige [China Reform], June 2000, pp. 30-31; and Ming Shan Zhou and Ran Yu, “*Xibu Kaifa: Que Qian Haishi Que Ren?*” [Western Development: Lacking Money or Lacking People?], Zhongguo Gaige [China Reform], June 2000, p. 32.
- <sup>56</sup> Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis: Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 132.
- <sup>57</sup> Peggy Falkenheim, “The Russian Far East’s Economic Integration with Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 72 (Summer 1999), pp. 209-226; Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, vol. 17 (Spring, 1999), pp. 5-41.
- <sup>58</sup> Ronald Skeldon, “International Migration and the Escafe Region: A Policy-Oriented Approach,” Asia-Pacific Population Journal, vol. 7 (1992), pp. 3-22, and Ronald Skeldon, “Hong Kong’s Response to the Indochinese Influx, 1975-93,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Strategies for Immigration Control: An International Comparison, vol. 534 (1994), p. 92. Hong Kong’s rise in the 1960s was grounded on cheap labor for labor-intensive manufacturing largely supplied by refugees, the spatial dispersion and economic integration of populations, and the coordination of capital accumulation, industry, labor flows and migration.
- <sup>59</sup> Frank Ching, “Misreading Hong Kong,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 76 (1997), pp. 53-66.
- <sup>60</sup> Cheng-yi Lin, “The Taiwan Factor in Asia, Pacific Regional Security,” in Takashi Inoguchi and Grant B. Stillman, eds., North-East Asia Regional Security, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997, p. 95.
- <sup>61</sup> “China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,” Migration News, vol. 9, no. 3 (March 2002), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/mar\\_2002-15mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/mar_2002-15mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).
- <sup>62</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, Taiwan, 2001, <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>> (November 26, 2001).
- <sup>63</sup> Migration News, vol. 7, no. 9 (September 2000), <<http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive/mn/sep/2000-16mn.html>> (October 20, 2001).
- <sup>64</sup> Taiwan (R.O.C.) Ministry of Interior, <[http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/book2000/cho2\\_1.html](http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/book2000/cho2_1.html)> (October 20, 2001).
- <sup>65</sup> There were perhaps 250,000 foreign workers employed in Taiwan (R.O.C.) in June 1998, including 120,000 from Thailand, 100,000 from the Philippines, and 15,000 from Indonesia. Migration News, vol. 5, no. 11 (November 1998), <[http://migrations.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/nov\\_1998-mn.html](http://migrations.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/nov_1998-mn.html)> (October 19, 2001).
- <sup>66</sup> “China, Taiwan, Hong Kong,” Migration News, vol. 8, No. 9 (September 2001), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/sep\\_2001-14mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/sep_2001-14mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).
- <sup>67</sup> Milton Ezrati, “Japan’s Aging Economics,” Foreign Affairs vol. 76 (1997), pp. 96-105.
- <sup>68</sup> Naohiro Ogawa and Robert D. Retherford, “Shifting Costs of Caring for the elderly Back to Families in Japan: Will It Work?” Population and Development Review, vol. 23 (1997), pp. 59-93. Transfers of financial burdens will likely meet resistance from modern Japanese households, in which women increasingly have to choose between working and taking care of their elderly, and from workers who have looked forward to their retirement but who would have to continue to work.
- <sup>69</sup> “UN Population Division on Replacement Migration,” Population and Development Review, vol. 26 (2000), pp. 413-417.
- <sup>70</sup> Wayne A. Cornelius, “Japan: The Illusion of Immigration Control,” in Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, eds., Controlling Migration: A Global Perspective, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994, pp. 376-410. Martin, “Migrants on the Move,” p. 7.
- <sup>71</sup> Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, “The Russian Presence in Niigata and Hokkaido: Preliminary Analysis of International Surveys,” Tsuneo Akaha, ed., International Seminar: Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Proceedings, Monterey, CA, November 2-3, 2001, p. 64; Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, “Russian Migrants in Niigata and Hokkaido: A Research Update,” presented at the seminar “Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20-21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo,” The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.

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- <sup>72</sup> “Japan, South Korea,” Migration News, vol. 9, No. 8 (August 2002), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive\\_MN/aug\\_2002-15mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive_MN/aug_2002-15mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).
- <sup>73</sup> “Japan: Migrants and Refugees,” Migration News, vol. 8, no. 4 (April 2001), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/apr\\_2001-14mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/apr_2001-14mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).
- <sup>74</sup> Mika Mervio, “Korean Migrants in Shimane,” presented at the seminar “Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo,” The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.
- <sup>75</sup> Daojiong Zha, “Chinese Migrant Workers in Japan, Policies, Institutions and Civil Society,” Tsuneo Akaha, ed., International Seminar: Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, November 2–3, 2001, p. 92; Daojiong Zha, “Chinese Migrants in Niigata: A Research Update,” presented at the seminar “Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo,” The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; and Haruo Shimada, personal interview, cited in Martin, “Migrants on the Move,” p. 405.
- <sup>76</sup> Yoshino Okunishi, “Labor Contracting in International Migration: The Japanese Case and Implications for Asia,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 5 (1996), pp. 219-240.
- <sup>77</sup> “Japan: Migrants and Refugees,” Migrations News, vol. 8, no. 4 (April 2001), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/apr\\_2001-14mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/apr_2001-14mn.html)> (October 19, 2002); “Japan, Korea,” Migration News, vol. 9, no. 5 (May 2002), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/may\\_2002-17mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/may_2002-17mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).
- <sup>78</sup> Sim Yee Lau and Alexander Sheingauz, “National Resources and Environment Management in Northeast Asia,” in Alexander Sheingauz and Hiroya Ono, p. 18.
- <sup>79</sup> Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, “The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact,” Population and Development Review, vol. 27, no. 1 (June 2001), pp. 219–238.
- <sup>80</sup> Byung-joon Ahn, “The NPT Regime and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” in Takashi Inoguchi and Grant B. Stillman, eds., North-East Asian Regional Sovereignty: The Role of International Institutions, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1997, p. 127.
- <sup>81</sup> Holger Wolf, “Korean Unification: Lessons from Germany,” in Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, Special Report 10, Marcus Noland, ed., Institute for International Economics, January 1998, pp. 165-189.
- <sup>82</sup> “China: Migrants,” Migration News, vol. 9, no. 10 (October 2002), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive\\_MN/oct\\_2002-14mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive_MN/oct_2002-14mn.html)> (October 19, 2001); and Hazel Smith, “DPRK/China Cross-border Flows in People: Defining the Problem(s) – A Research Proposal,” “Seminar: Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo,” The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.
- <sup>83</sup> Martin, “Migrants on the Move,” p. 7, and Graeme Hugo, “Illegal International Migration in Asia,” in Robin Cohen, ed., The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 399.
- <sup>84</sup> R. Isberto, “Illegal Aliens Fill Labour Shortages in Rich Asian Countries,” Bangkok Post, September 5, 1993, p. 93; cited in Graeme Hugo 1995, R. Isberto, “Illegal Migration in Asia,” in Robin Cohen, ed., The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 399.
- <sup>85</sup> R. Isberto, “Illegal International Migration in Asia,” p. 399.
- <sup>86</sup> Su Dol Kang, “Typology and Conditions of Migrant Workers in South Korea,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, vol. 5, no. 2-3 (1996), pp. 265-279.
- <sup>87</sup> “Korea: Guest Workers?,” Migration News, vol. 8, no.1 (January 2001), <[http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/jan\\_2001-17mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/jan_2001-17mn.html)> (October 19, 2002).
- <sup>88</sup> The rate of growth of foreign nationals in South Korea has been historically low, but changed after diplomatic relations with China were normalized in 1992, resulting in increased immigration of Chinese and ethnic Koreans from neighboring countries. The range of countries of origin for immigrants has increased, with workers from Vietnam and Bangladesh now making increased contributions to the migrant population. In 1999 these foreign nationals numbered 189,000 persons. OECD Trends in International Migration, SOPEMI 2000, pp. 217–219.

- <sup>89</sup> Jeanyoung Lee, "Ethnic Korean Migration in South Korea: Issues and Its Political Implication," in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., International Seminar: Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, Proceedings, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, November 2–3, 2001, p. 118.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid, p. 179. Woo Jong and Kyhack Hong, "Regional Labor Flow and International Security in Northeast Asia," Global Economic Review, vol. 27 (1998), pp. 102-118.
- <sup>91</sup> Jeffrey S. Pilkington, "Refugee Issues to Three Scenarios for the Future," in Marcus Noland, ed., Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, Special Report 10, Institute for International Economics, January 1998, pp. 119-133.
- <sup>92</sup> CIA, The World Factbook, Mongolia, <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mg.html>> (November 24, 2001).
- <sup>93</sup> "Migration Network," Fact Sheet No. 6, "Causes of Migration and Problems faced by Migrants," Fact Sheet No. 7, "Information about the 2000 Population and Housing Census and About the Micro Study on Internal Migration in Mongolia – 2000," the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor, The National Statistical Office, and UNFPA, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, ndi.
- <sup>94</sup> Ricardo F. Neupert, "Population Projections for Mongolia: 1989-2019," United Nations Population Programme Asia – Pacific Population Journal, vol. 7 (1992), p. 6, <<http://www.unescap.org/pop/journal/1992/v07n4dn.htm>>.
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- <sup>96</sup> Tsendendamba Batbayer, "Foreign Presence in Mongolia: Current Status and Problems," in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., International Seminar: Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, Proceedings, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, November 2–3, 2001, p. 141.
- <sup>97</sup> Charles E. Morrison, ed., Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1997, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, in cooperation with Research Institute for Regional Security, Asean Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1997, p. 111.
- <sup>98</sup> The United Nations, Commission on Population and Development, Thirtieth Session, February 24-28, draft, World Population Monitoring, 1997: Issues of International Migration and Development, Selected Aspects, 1997, pp. 60–61.
- <sup>99</sup> Vilya Gelbras, "Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East: A View from Moscow," presented at the seminar "Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo," The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; Elizabeth Wishnick, "Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East: A Research Update," presented at the seminar "Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo," The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; and Jeanyoung Lee, "Korean Migrants in the Russian Far East: A Research Update," presented at the seminar "Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo," The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.
- <sup>100</sup> These problems have roots in the Soviet era, life expectancy increases first stalled in the 1960s. The state-run health care system did not successfully adapt to new economic reform. Past wars, civil wars, and famines made for unbalanced age structures, and the population has aged rapidly. Julie Da Vanzo, "Introduction," in Da Vanzo, ed., with the assistance of Gwendolyn Farnsworth, Russia's Demographic Crisis, Los Angeles, CA: Rand, 1996, pp. xiii-xviii.
- <sup>101</sup> Judith Shapiro, "The Hypothesis of Stress as a Leading Explanatory Variable," Beijing 1997 International Population Conference, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, vol. 2., Liege, Belgium, 1997, pp. 529-554; and Giovanni Andrea Cornia, "Poverty, Food Consumption and Nutrition during the Transition to the Market Economy in Europe," The American Economic Review, vol. 842 (1997), pp. 297-302.
- <sup>102</sup> W. Ward Kingkade and Sergey Vasin, "Mortality by Cause of Death in Russia's Recent Past: Regional Variations Before and After the Break-up," Proceedings XXXIII International Population Conference,

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International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Beijing, China, vol. 2 (October 11-17, 1997), pp. 564-565; *Ibid.*, p. 572.

<sup>103</sup> Russian Regional Database, Far East, The Scout Report for Social Sciences Selection, <<http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/Far-East-1.html>> (October 31, 2000).

<sup>104</sup> After 1991, migration to the RFE, which was responsible for 30 percent of population increase up to 1991, effectively ceased. Population declines in the RFE after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were greater in the north than in the south and in the urban more than the rural areas. The largest numerical loss was in the Magadan region, where the population declined by 36 percent between 1991 and 1997, while the smallest loss was in Primorsky *kray* (3 percent). Demographers project a continuing loss from the population of the RFE to other areas of Russia as well as to the countries of the “New Abroad.” Reasons that émigrés give for leaving the RFE include harsh climate, difficult living conditions, distance from European Russia, and the deteriorating economy. Peter Ferdinand, “China and Russia: A Strategic Partnership?,” China Review, issue 8 (Autumn/Winter 1997), p. 4, <<http://www.gbcc.org.uk/ferdinan.htm>> (October 31, 2000).

<sup>105</sup> Peter Ferdinand, “China and Russia: A Strategic Partnership?” China Review, issue 8 (Autumn/Winter 1997), p. 4, <<http://www.gbcc.org.uk/ferdinan.htm>> (October 31, 2000).

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.* p. 4.

<sup>107</sup> Galina S. Vitkovskaya, “Russia: Cross-Border Migration in the Russian Far East (October 1997),” (Carnegie Moscow Center) – Writenet, REFWORLD Writenet Country Paper, p. 9, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wrius03.htm>> (April 17, 2001).

<sup>108</sup> Li Yonghui, “Chinese Flows Across Borders between China and Russia,” unpublished paper, Institute of East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 2002.

<sup>109</sup> Viacheslav V. Karlusov, “Chinese Presence in the Russian Far East: An Economist’s Perspective,” in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., International Seminar: Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, November 2–3, 2001, p. 44; and Elizabeth Wishnick, “Migration Issues and Russia’s Economic Integration in Asia,” in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., International Seminar: Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, November 2–3, 2001, p. 34; Vilya Gelbras, “Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East: A View from Moscow,” presented at the seminar “Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo,” The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California; and Elizabeth Wishnick, “Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East: A Research Update,” presented at the seminar “Human Flows across National Borders in Northeast Asia, November 20–21, 2002, United Nations University, Tokyo,” The Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California.

<sup>110</sup> Li Youghui, “Chinese Flows Across Borders Between China and Russia,” unpublished paper. Institute of East European, Russian, and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 2002.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> J. Edward Taylor, Joaquín Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kovaouci, Douglas S. Massey, and Adela Pellegrino, “International Migration and Community Development,” Population Index, vol. 62 (1996), pp. 181-214, and 397-418; and E. Barth and D. Noel, “Conceptual Frameworks for the Analysis of Race Relations: An Evaluation,” Social Force, vol. 50 (1972), pp. 333-348.

<sup>113</sup> Takashi Inoguchi, “Conclusion: A Peace and Security Taxonomy,” in Takashi Inoguchi and Grant B. Sullivan, eds., pp. 183-190; and Maurice D. Van Arsdol, Jr., “Demographic Changes in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Regional Security.”

<sup>114</sup> “The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration,” Population and Development Review 26, pp. 413–417.

<sup>115</sup> F. Landis McKeller, “The Predicament of Population Aging: A Review Essay,” Population and Development Review, vol. 26 (June 2000), pp. 365–397.

<sup>116</sup> For example, see the following State Council directives: “*Guoying Jianzhu Qiye Zhaoyong Nongmin Hetongzhi Gongren he Shiyong Nongcun Jianzhudui Zanzing Banfa*” [Interim Methods for State Construction Enterprises Employing Rural Contract Workers and Using Rural Construction Teams], Guowu Gongbao, vol. 27, 448 (1984), pp. 937-941; “*Guoying Qiye Shixing Laodong Hetongzhi Zanzing Guiding*” [Interim Regulation on State Enterprises Practicing the Labor Contract System], Guowu

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*Gongbao*, vol. 25, 513 (1986), pp. 739-744; “*Guoying Qiye Zhaoyong Gongren Zanxing Guiding*” [Interim Regulations on Labor Recruitment in State Enterprises], *Guowu Gongbao*, vol. 25, 513 (1986), pp. 744-745; “*Quanmin Suoyouzhi Qiye Zhaoyong Nongmin Hetong Gongren de Guiding*” [Regulations for State-owned Enterprises Employing Rural Contract Workers], *Guowu Gongbao*, vol. 28, 667 (1991b), pp. 1001-1006.

<sup>117</sup> See Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The Heyday of Beijing’s Participation in the Tumen River Area Development Programme, 1990-95: A Political Explanation,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 9 (July 2000), pp. 271-290.

<sup>118</sup> Ko-Lin Chin, *Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the US*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999.

<sup>119</sup> Dajin Peng, “The Changing Nature of East Asia as an Economic Region,” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 171-191; and Hiromi Mori, “Migrant Workers and Labor Market Segmentation in Japan,” *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, vol. 3 (1994), pp. 619-638; and Kevin C. Gai, “Is a Free Trade Zone Emerging in Northeast Asia in the Wake of the Asian Financial Crisis?” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 7-24.

<sup>120</sup> Su Dol Kang, “Typology and Conditions of Migrant workers in South Korea,” *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, vol. 5 (1996), pp. 265-279.

<sup>121</sup> Joseph S. Lee and Su-Wan Wang, “Recruiting and Managing of Foreign Workers in Taiwan,” *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, vol. 5 (1996), pp. 281-301.

<sup>122</sup> “A Panda Breaks the Formation; China’s Economic Challenge to East Asia,” *The Economist*, London; August 25, 2001, p. 57; Mark Landler, “Taiwan’s Hard Times Rekindle ‘One China’ Debate,” *New York Times*, July 8, 2001.