

THE KOREAN COMMUNITY IN JAPAN AND SHIMANE

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The Korean community in Japan is made up of people of varied types of Korean identity. However, the Japanese authorities and statistics usually treat as Koreans both people of South Korean citizenship and so-called special permanent residents. Together these two groups made up 82.6 percent of all the foreigners legally in Japan, excluding tourists, in 1982. While the absolute number of permanent Korean residents has been relatively stable over the decades, the numbers of other foreigners have steadily risen. In 1993 the Koreans represented 51.7 percent of registered foreigners in Japan but by the end of 2001 they had dropped to 35.6 percent. The age structure and naturalization together have caused a slow but steady decrease in the number of “Korean residents.” Between the period of 1992 to 2001 they dropped from 688,144 to 632,405 (an annual decline ranging between 11,786 in 1997 and 1,279 in 2000). At the same time the share of Chinese residents climbed from 15.2 percent to 21.4 percent, Brazilians from 11.5 percent to 15.0 percent and the citizens of the Philippines from 4.9 percent to 8.8 percent. The total number of foreigners in Japan rose from 1,281,644 to 1,778,462.¹

The age and gender structure of the Korean residents in Japan is very different from all other ethnic minorities. Since most Korean residents are born in Japan and “repatriation” largely stopped in the 1970s, it is quite natural that there are no big differences in the gender distribution in any age groups. There are some contrasting differences between Korean and Japanese populations in Japan. First, there are fewer children (0-10 years old) among resident Koreans than among the Japanese population of the same age cohort, which has one of the lowest birth rates in the world. Second, the proportion of people 65 and older and especially women over 75 is larger among Korean residents. Third, there are somewhat larger numbers of Koreans in the age cohorts of 25 to 49, apparently due to recent immigration of working-age people from South Korea. One of the major differences between the Korean resident population and other ethnic minorities is that there is no other larger group of elderly people without Japanese citizenship than the Koreans. In the age group 75 and over the Korean residents make up 81 percent of the total population of foreign residents, while people with a Chinese passport make up 12.1 percent and people with a US passport 3.2 percent. In the age group of 0 to 4 the Korean residents account for only 25.9 percent. The small number of Korean children stands in contrast with the Brazilian community (most of them *Nikkeijin*) who have substantially more young children than the average Japanese. As for the number of working-age people, among virtually all other ethnic groups there is a far larger “over-representation” of them than with the Koreans, because working in Japan is the very reason why most of the first generation immigrants come to Japan. As for gender “imbalance” among the largest ethnic communities the biggest imbalance in regard to women is found among the Philippine citizens and in regard to men among US citizens.²

In terms of regional distribution, Korean residents in Japan are heavily concentrated in few

larger cities. For lists of prefectures with highest and lowest concentrations of Korean residents, see Appendix 1. From these numbers it is clear that the Kansai region and to some degree Fukuoka Prefecture are where Korean residents outnumber all other “foreigners” and where their sheer numbers make the Korean community visible. In Tōkyō, however, where Koreans have for a long time had a strong presence, they have recently been outnumbered by Chinese by 100,870 to 102,559. The regional distribution of Korean residents largely reflects the distribution of colonial period settlement and where job opportunities have been available. In most rural areas the number of Korean residents has remained very small and has often decreased rapidly from the 1950’s level. At least the perception of many Korean residents is that in smaller cities the labour market tends to be even tougher.

Assimilation

Japanese laws, regulations, and practices regarding foreign nationals from the 1950s to the early 1980s were predominantly aimed at dealing with Korean minority community. However, this situation has rapidly changed with relatively large numbers of newly arriving immigrants, mostly from other Asian countries, and the so-called *Nikkeijin* (ethnic Japanese) from Latin America. Japanese policies toward Korean community have always had two contradictory objectives, to facilitate total assimilation and to maintain control, which would be more difficult if the Koreans were protected by the rights that go together with Japanese citizenship or otherwise become indistinguishable from the majority Japanese. With other ethnic communities the same approach is in most cases impossible and the increased heterogeneity of the community of foreign residents raises questions about the fundamentals of Japanese policies regarding foreign residents.

On the other hand, Japanese immigration policy has increasingly been influenced by such social factors as the rapid ageing of Japanese society, which is in the end largely due to extremely low birth rates, and the need of Japanese economy to maintain inexpensive labour reserves and ever more specialised and internationally competitive work force. The rapidly increasing numbers of immigrants are the best proof that Japanese immigration policies have changed although the type of people who have entered Japan are partly in sharp contrast with the stated objectives of Japanese immigration policy. For instance, it is difficult to find any legitimate reason why the authorities grant so many visas to female entertainers from other Asian countries and have been so ineffective to crack down on the use of so-called illegal workers. The inconsistencies of Japanese immigration policy are partly to blame for the negative attitudes that many Japanese have toward the presence of foreigners in Japan.

In contrast to “real foreigners” and newly arrived immigrants the *de facto* Japanese resident Koreans are usually not much different from “ordinary” Japanese and it can be assumed that the increased immigration and awakening to the reality of multiethnic Japan will sooner or later have a positive impact on the status of Koreans in Japan.³ There are expectations within the Korean community that a greater cultural plurality (*fukusū bunka*) and greater awareness of cultural differences would first question the myth of the homogeneous Japanese nation (*tan’itsu minzoku kokka*) and then translate into multicultural co-existence (*tabunka kyōsei*).⁴ However, in the light of continued discriminatory practices and strong political resistance to significant reforms concerning the status and conditions of foreigners in Japan there is every reason to remain cautious.

One of the most persistent stereotypes in Japan concerning the Koreans is that they are likely to have some kind of semi-criminal background, because many Koreans work in so-called ethnic businesses of ill repute or have links to the North Korean government, which itself is seen in Japan to be a source of illegal activities. The reason why many Koreans have started their businesses in these fields and why many Koreans continue seeking occupation from them has little to do with inherent criminal tendencies and is largely a result of continued discrimination of Koreans in the labour market. In other words, the Japanese stereotypes themselves cause social isolation of Korean residents and serve as the final barrier to total assimilation. The problem with stereotypes of Koreans in Japan is that it is true that in many areas *pachinko* parlours are significant for the small Korean community and that many Koreans, indeed, have links with the North Korean government through Chongryun (see below). However, Japanese people often fail to see that ethnic businesses would not be profitable without Japanese customers or the contrast between the situations of prospering and respected Korean American minorities and the Korean permanent residents in Japan. Between 60 and 70 percent of the about 20,000 *pachinko* parlours in Japan are run by Korean minorities and economically the impact of *pachinko* on the Korean community has been enormous. The other money-maker for the Korean community in Japan has been the Korean barbeque (*yakiniku*) restaurants.⁵

There are a few high profile “success stories” of Koreans who have become rich or famous or both on the basis of their own talent. Very often these people represent arts, literature or sports, all fields where individual merit is what counts in the end. Especially among the *enka* singers people of Korean background are in great numbers. However, most of these people go by their Japanese names/aliases and their Korean identity is a subject of gossip magazines. Among the exceptional business achievers the most notable case is Son Masayoshi, the Bill Gates of Japan. In politics Korean background has thus far been a major handicap since Korean residents cannot vote. There have been two Diet men with (known) Korean background in Japanese history. Pak Ch’un-gum was elected in 1932 and 1937 with a very conservative platform. The only post-war case was a third-generation resident Arai Shōkei (Pak Kyong-jae). This LDP politician is today best remembered for hanging himself at a Tōkyō hotel as the Lower House prepared for a vote to lift his immunity from arrest after prosecutors had claimed that Arai had pocketed hefty amounts from illegal transfer of profits by Nikkō Securities. Arai was a Tōkyō University graduate with a Ministry of Finance background, both qualities that are rare among naturalized Koreans and impossible among Korean residents. Arai, however, was careful not to make an issue of his Korean background in the sense of promoting the causes of the Korean community although his background was repeatedly used against him when his opponents wrote “*chōsen*” on his posters or raised the issue in political meetings. A candidate in a rival LDP faction declared in a broadcast that Arai’s loyalty would be in doubt in the event of conflict with either Korea.⁶ The few positive success stories are important, because they test stereotypes and provide role models for young people. However, the success stories cover only a very small fragment of the relatively large Korean community and have virtually no significance on their socio-economic standing. In the long term it may be more important that in recent decades there have been quite a few lawyers and academics among Korean minorities who have openly fought against all odds and secured a good education and professions, using Japanese laws against the very system that created them.

As for the stereotype likening Chongryun to North Korean spies, it is most problematic to hold Chongryun responsible for all the acts of the North Korean government since it is most unlikely that Chongryun has been consulted about North Korean policies. Each time there is news about North Korean spy activities or missile/nuclear program, hate crimes against Chongryun Koreans surge and most attackers have escaped being arrested. Attacks against school girls wearing a Korean *chima-chogori* dress have become so widespread that nowadays girls put on their traditional clothes only after they arrive at school. Chongryun is an umbrella organisation, which serves the role of directing Korean permanent residents' educational, social, political and financial affairs. For many Korean residents there is no other organisation that could fill the practical role of Chongryun in these fields. Chongryun has been responsible for bad business decisions that have caused the community's bank to fail and the curriculum of Chongryun schools has strong North Korean ideological elements, but Chongryun has to compete with the South Korean Mindan for support among the Korean community in Japan and cannot afford alienating its own supporters. In short, Chongryun is functioning in Japan, in a society, which is fundamentally different from North Korea and the only way for it to stay influential has been to remain useful for its supporters and its most important function has been to provide Korean language education in large scale. In contrast Mindan has been unable to do so. The Japanese state has been against the whole idea of an independent ethnic educational institution in Japan. Ideologically Chongryun has faced the difficult task of applying the established North Korean dogma in a flexible manner in the Japanese setting.⁷

As for the degree of assimilation of the Koreans, some authors have gone as far as to claim that the resident Koreans are "culturally Japanese" and that the only major source of social differentiation from ethnic Japanese is the fact of Korean descent. They stress that most Koreans in Japan have grown up speaking Japanese and being exposed to Japanese culture.⁸ I would not go as far and instead I would treat Japanese culture as a web of subcultures. Secondly, many Koreans, especially those with Chongryun connections, have actively resisted Japanese cultural influences. Thirdly, continued discrimination makes all people with Korean background in Japan with Korean background well aware of the risks of being associated with anything Korean. The continued discrimination also makes it difficult for Japanese society and companies to use for their benefit the special skills that foreigners could bring in. Today South Korea is politically and economically significant for Japan and for flourishing and close bilateral relations it is necessary to have bilingual people. It is quite ironic that soon the only larger groups of people in Japan who have fluency in both Japanese and Korean are either Chongryun-educated permanent residents or recent immigrants from South Korea. The loss of Korean language among Koreans in Japan alienates them from contemporary Korean society and deprives these individuals as well as Japanese society of a chance to bridge Japanese and Korean societies.

Community Divisions

The Koreans in Japan make up an increasingly heterogeneous community, which often is forgotten because the origin of the Korean community in Japan is so strongly tied to the history of Japanese colonialism. First of all, the community is divided roughly in half on the basis of relationship or attitudes toward either of the two large Japanese Korean organizations, Mindan and Chongryun. The political division of the Korean Peninsula has made it difficult for these organisations to co-operate in

issues of common interest to the Korean community since both these organisations have close relations to the different governments. As for ordinary Japanese Koreans this first split runs largely in the family. However, this choice has little to do with the original location of Korean ancestors since some 98 percent of the Koreans who came to Japan during the colonial period were from the present-day South. The reason why so many Japanese Koreans did not want to join Mindan initially had to do with the unpopularity of South Korean military governments and their close relations with the United States. After all, the overwhelming majority of Koreans had chosen to be repatriated to Korea soon after the war (well before the Korean War) and those that remained in Japan had various personal reasons for staying. The other reason was that most socially active Koreans already during and before the war were close to communist and socialist ideologies and after the war they were in a better situation to organize themselves and defend the interests of the Korean community.

The single most important reason that has won the hearts for Chongryun has been its consistent policy of running Korean schools (now numbering about 150, ranging from primary level to a university). In contrast, Mindan has just four schools, forcing some of its members to enrol their children in Chongryun schools, where the curriculum openly praises the North Korean social system. The two organizations have very different policies toward assimilation. The Japanese government has done very little to help minority education in Japan, and, in fact, has denied assistance as well as official recognition to existing Korean schools. On the other hand, some local governments, usually under leftist or independent leaders in power, have given some support to Korean schools. After the war several Korean schools were set up and then destroyed by Japanese authorities,⁹ but especially in Ôsaka Prefecture (with the largest Korean population in Japan), there have been so-called ethnic classes (*minzokugakkyû*) for Korean children after regular school hours and on voluntary basis.¹⁰ Nowadays about 90 percent of Korean children in Japan go to regular Japanese schools and in most cases they hide, more or less effectively, their Korean background from their classmates. Japanese schools still tend to emphasize conformity and bullying is widespread after the lower grades. Any perceived “difference” makes a child a likely victim of bullying.¹¹ All in all, Chongryun has a good reason to claim that it has done its best under difficult circumstances to maintain Korean culture in Japan.

For its part, Mindan has successfully used its relations with the South Korean government and has been able to work for gradual improvements in the legal status of Koreans in Japan. The ideological rigidity of Chongryun education has also alienated some Koreans from Chongryun and made them approach Mindan.¹² Having a South Korean passport already is seen by many as being more practical than having no passport at all (since Japan does not recognise the validity of North Korean passports). For ordinary Japanese Koreans the ideological basis of the community division has often remarkably little to do with their own ideological convictions. People simply are born to both Mindan and Chongryun, but it is later up to individuals how active they become within the community.

The second big issue that increasingly divides (or threatens) the Korean community is the attitudes toward mixed marriages with Japanese people. From the mid-1970s a majority of marriages involving Koreans in Japan were with Japanese citizens (some of whom naturally are of Korean background) and in the 1990s the number reached well over 80 percent. Having a mixed marriage itself does not necessarily signify total assimilation, but it is a clear problem that the Japanese society does not

support bi- or multi-culturalism. Even some Japanese Koreans can turn their back on people who live in mixed marriages. The issue of mixed marriage is closely tied to the citizenship issue since for most people of mixed Korean-Japanese parentage it is practical to renounce their Korean citizenship when they finally have to make the choice at the age of 22. Keeping the Korean citizenship would suddenly make them subject to various forms of discrimination and they can simply escape it by playing instead the role of native Japanese citizens. Such symbols as a citizenship status, Korean/Japanese surname, and use of aliases serve to divide the Korean community. In addition, the Korean community has all the divisions that reflect the heterogeneity in terms of occupation, education, wealth, and gender. As for the older generations even the cultural divisions between different parts of the Korean Peninsula have been preserved. All these divisions together make the social lives of Japanese Koreans very complicated. To start with, approximately 90 percent of Japanese Koreans normally use their unofficial “Japanese names” or (clearly) Japanese pronunciations of their names. The concealment of the Korean identity is sometimes so efficient that even other Koreans have no means of knowing about the non-Japanese identity of their fellow Koreans. When most Japanese Koreans learn early on to hide their true identity it becomes difficult for Korean Japanese (especially outside the Chongryun community) to widen their social contacts with other Koreans. Therefore, most young Japanese Koreans hide their Korean identity in their daily lives and end up socializing mostly with Japanese people (in some areas of the Kansai region, where there are so many people of Korean background that there is no point in hiding Korean background). The concealment of “true” identity and use of aliases are typical patterns of behaviour within the Korean community in Japan and, as will be shown later, these patterns exist even among small sub-communities, such as Shimane Koreans, where even the people themselves see little rationale in trying to pass as Japanese.

The effectiveness of passing as Japanese in daily life has particularly large impact on the marriage prospects of Korean Japanese as Koreans often find it difficult to find eligible Korean partners. Revealing the Korean identity also severely tests the depth of love in Japanese-Korean romances. However, the large number of mixed marriages testifies to the possibility of accepting Koreans as individuals in Japan and to the growing number of Japanese who are not readily deterred by discrimination and feudalistic conventions.¹³ As for the use of aliases and passing as Japanese, it stops being effective when people are asked to submit their official papers, in situations such as employment and renting apartments –even Koreans who have married Japanese sometimes face problems with landlords.

As for marriages, statistics also reveal that from the early 1970s marriages between Japanese male citizens and female Korean citizens have been far more commonplace than those between Japanese females and Korean males. The difference was the widest in 1990 and has since narrowed. In 1990 and 1995 mixed marriages involving Japanese and Korean citizens (where some apparently were naturalized Koreans) were 83.7 percent and 82.2 percent, respectively. They consisted of marriages between male Koreans and female Japanese citizens (19.5 and 31.7%) and female Koreans and male Japanese citizens (64.2 and 50.5%).

Migration data show that the number of Koreans entering Japan as ‘the spouse of a Japanese national’ in those two years was 578 and 916 persons, respectively. The overwhelming majority of these

marriages are said to be between Japanese males and Korean females.¹⁴ This gender difference has many different explanations since both categories (Korean/Japanese citizens) are quite heterogeneous. However, available statistics reveal that permanent male Korean residents have significant problems getting married. There are still different parental expectations placed on boys and girls and in some cases Korean parents are relatively more willing to allow their daughters to marry Japanese. Secondly, gender based discrimination is rampant in Japanese society and working life. The status of a husband is often extended to the wife, and for minority women marriage to an (ethnic) Japanese male can help to escape some forms of discrimination while the general expectation is that the wife assimilates to the mainstream Japanese community and turns her back on her own community. Male Korean residents who struggle with discrimination and are still expected to be main breadwinners and supporters of their parents are in many cases not attractive marriage prospects for either female Korean residents or female Japanese citizens.¹⁵

New Migration and the Present Situation of Korean Residents

For many years new migration from both Koreas to Japan was tightly controlled by all three governments. However, migration from Korea to Japan had a new wave after the South Korean government considerably liberalized travel restrictions in 1988. The rise of the South Korean economy has been reflected in the number of Korean professionals living in Japan. On the other hand, among the official list of “illegal immigrants” in Japan the South Koreans have also been among the top ethnic groups. For many South Koreans Japan is a large and wealthy neighbouring country in which to work and study or try their luck for a period of time. Some newcomers find themselves staying in Japan much longer than they initially thought. Most of these newcomers go to large cities with good employment and educational opportunities. In other words, the situation of the newcomers is radically different from that of the vast majority of the ethnic Koreans who have been born and raised in Japan and never had a realistic option of “going back” to Korea. The difference in the degree of Japanese assimilation is a factor that affects the relations between the newcomers and Japan-born resident Koreans. In other words, these groups have little in common, except the exposure to Japanese discrimination. However, due to job discriminations the Korean community in Japan has for a long time relied heavily on so-called ethnic businesses for employment and it seems that these businesses have also provided employment for many Korean newcomers. South Korean students make up a substantial part of foreign students in Japan and for them Japan remains a very expensive country where part-time working is in many cases indispensable while work opportunities, especially for foreigners, have vanished due to the continued recession and rising unemployment in the country.

Among new migration from South Korea to Japan students play a special role since Koreans know very well that without Japanese education their chances of finding good employment in Japan are very limited. As of the end of 2001 there were 93,614 foreigners with a student visa in Japan (after government efforts to boost the number which in 1998 had still been 59,648), and Koreans (17.8%) were the second largest group after Chinese (63.1%). The number of Korean students in Japan has risen moderately from 12,381 in 1998 to 16,671 in 2001, while the number of Chinese students has almost doubled in the same period, from 32,370 to 59,079.¹⁶ Since very few Japanese educational institutions

use other languages than Japanese in instruction the students are in most cases expected to be fluent in Japanese and in the admission process proficiency in Japanese plays a central role. After completing their studies South Korean students have more realistic prospects for finding work either in Japan or South Korea and are therefore in a completely different situation from most long-term Korean residents in Japan.

In 2001 there were 1,005,451 registered new entrants of South Korean citizenship/place of birth. The total for the world was 4,229,705, which means that South Korea was number one on the list of citizenship/place of birth of people entering Japan, followed by Taiwan (with 777,673) and the United States (with 628,731). The number of tourists from Korea was 566,567 people. This number is relatively small in light of the short distance between the two countries and is even smaller than that of Taiwanese tourists (689,002). This still reflects the negative attitudes that prevail among South Koreans toward unnecessary spending abroad. The rest composition of other categories of visas gives a very good idea of Japan's immigration policy toward South Koreans. In the short-term business visa category South Koreans are in their own group with 327,393 new visas, followed by US citizens (231,024), Chinese (66,805; and Hong Kong 8,044), Taiwanese (65,946), and British citizens (65,531). In the category of short-term cultural/academic activities South Koreans are also on the top of the list, with 22,976 visas and in the category of short-term family visits they received 42,875 visas, second only to visitors from the United States (54,315 visas). Regarding the numbers of visas that are issued to Koreans in other main categories, see Appendix 2.

There is a strong South Korean official and business presence in Japan. In the categories of education, engineering, entertainment, and mixed marriages, South Koreans are well represented but not in their own class. All in all, this list tells that immigration from South Korea to Japan is still tightly controlled and new immigrants from South Korea are tightly screened. Some categories raise questions. For example, is there any sensible reason to allow so many entertainers when it is well known that many of these people will be exploited by Japanese entertainment establishments of questionable reputation? As for the trainee visas there is a widespread criticism that this category allows companies to hire manual labour from developing countries and pay only a fraction of standard Japanese salaries. As for the people who fall outside these statistics, on the lists of deportations there have been wide annual fluctuations, but South Koreans have been among the largest groups of people arrested for not carrying valid visas (usually having overstayed their tourist visas).¹⁷ There are apparently relatively large numbers of South Koreans in Japan without proper visas and the popular press in Japan has painted a picture of Chinese and Korean gangsters and pickpockets terrorising Japanese cities. However, most "illegals" are simply people working in difficult, dirty and dangerous jobs for Japanese employers, with authorities doing little to stop this practice.

The Issue of Nationality

In addition to the Japanese colonial policies, the other important political factor that has had a deep impact on the lives of Koreans in Japan has been the political divisions of the Korean Peninsula and the uneasy relations between all the three states. In particular, the hostile relations between Japan and North Korea have created additional obstacles to improving the legal status of Koreans in Japan, or

possibly all the foreign permanent residents. The Japanese authorities have wanted to maintain a strict control on all Koreans because of the perceived security risks instead of trying to take care of the human, social, and cultural rights of this large minority. Part of the solution has been to keep and treat the “special permanent residents” with North Korean links clearly as “foreigners” because they can then be easier to monitor. The next step has been to maintain a clear distinction between citizens and foreigners. The decision of not recognising North Korean citizenship is important because it gives the Japanese authorities a monopoly to dictate the terms of everything relating to the “special permanent residents.” However, on the Japanese side there was a tendency to treat both “special permanent residents” and South Korean permanent residents in a similar manner as “foreigners”. As a consequence, many authors are describing the Japanese citizenship practices as institutional or systemic discrimination (*seidotekisabetsu*).¹⁸

The rigid treatment of people on the basis of their citizenship (of lack of it) has further complicated the choice of identity among Koreans in Japan. In 1965 Japan recognized South Korea and concluded a peace treaty with it. Those Japanese Koreans who had wanted to take a South Korean citizenship have since been treated as permanent residents, provided they had been living in Japan since 1945 or had been born in Japan. Since the Japanese government does not recognise North Korea, it treats the Chongryun Koreans as resident aliens, not North Korean nationals. However, during the following decades the Japanese government gradually liberalized the granting of permanent residence on “exceptional basis” to those Koreans who were not South Korean citizens. The Japanese ratification of the International Covenant on Human Rights in 1979 was helpful in improving the situation of resident alien Koreans. After these measures had settled the legal status of Koreans in Japan, in 1990 there were over 323,000 South Koreans who had been granted a permanent residence permit and 268,000 who had permanent residence on exceptional basis.

In 1991, Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers signed a memorandum which was aimed to reform the Japanese Alien Registration Act Law and Immigration Control Act, as well as change such practices as were seen as being discriminatory against the Koreans in Japan and were a source of friction in Japanese-Korean relations. The memorandum that was issued in January 1991 during Prime Minister Kaifu’s visit to South Korea brought major improvements to the status of Koreans in Japan. Many Japanese practices had been brought to Japanese courts and the Japanese side knew well that doing nothing would have made the situation worse and would only increase South Korean determination to push for reforms. The memorandum covered practical issues relating to five different fields: 1) immigration control, including procedures and rules of permanent residence and deportation; 2) alien registration, where fingerprinting of permanent residents was abolished but the requirement to always carry the alien registration card was maintained; 3) education, where the Japanese government pledged to place no hindrance to teaching of the Korean language and culture in extracurricular courses conducted at the discretion of local authorities; 4) appointment of permanent resident teachers in public schools, where the prefectural authorities were advised to use the same rules for them as for Japanese teachers, subject to reasonable distinctions on the basis of nationality in regard to appointment to public office; and 5) appointment of permanent residents to public office, where local public bodies would broaden opportunities for appointment, again subject to reasonable distinctions arising from difference of

nationality in appointment to public office.¹⁹ The memorandum was followed by relatively rapid changes in legislation and even in the attitudes of Japanese civil servants. Many Koreans noted a marked difference in the way that they were treated when they visited immigration offices.²⁰

The impact of the 1991 memorandum extended to all Korean residents when in 1992 all Korean permanent residents were made “special permanent residents.” Moreover, the fingerprinting (which is still used to register other foreigners) was abolished and re-entry permit for special permanent residents was made multiple and valid for a maximum of five years. In short, only in the 1990s did the legal status of permanent resident Koreans begin to reflect the special circumstances of their presence in Japan. A clear recognition and written rules regarding their special status are needed to guarantee that Koreans are not discriminated against in their daily lives, for instance, in employment or when they apply for pension plans or welfare benefits. A lack of understanding of their status still frequently causes discrimination. For instance, in Japan there are companies which have declined to rent their goods to “special permanent residents” (as well as other foreigners) saying that foreigners could flee to foreign countries without returning the goods they have rented. Similarly, the non-Japanese nationality of these people, most of whom have lived all their life in Japan, is still used as an excuse for excluding Koreans from employment, education, and business life.

Since the diplomatic restoration with South Korea in 1965 Japan has had to take into consideration the wishes of the South Korean government in issues that have an impact on the lives of the Koreans in Japan with South Korean nationality. However, the military governments of South Korea initially were not in a good position to preach human rights to Japan. There are also people in South Korea who are not totally convinced that it is up to the South Korean people to keep fighting for the status of these who have opted to stay in Japan and many of whom cannot even speak basic Korean to make them capable to “return” to Korea. Many South Koreans simply wonder why the Japanese government keeps treating the assimilated Korean community so badly and for them the issue serves as a reminder of the psychology that made Japanese colonialism possible. However, over the years the South Korean pressure has had a major impact in removing some of the official discriminatory practices and greatest injustices, such as the fingerprinting practice. With the democratization of South Korean society Japan increasingly had to worry about its public image in South Korea. Also within Japan there were many people who had raised their voice against the most unreasonable practices that Koreans were subjected to and questioned the rationale for treating the permanent residents and recent immigrants in the same way. However, with the end of Cold War there were many good reasons for Japan to improve its relations with South Korea and the status of Korean minority was an issue that simply could not be ignored anymore.

The biggest wave of migration from Korea to Japan took place in the 1930s and 1940s when under the Japanese colonial rule hundreds of thousands of Koreans were brought to Japan. After the war a large number of Koreans have had to live in Japan without Japanese citizenship and face various forms of discrimination. The majority of Koreans in Japan today are descendants of the people who came or were brought to Japan during the colonial period and include second, third or fourth generation Japanese Koreans who have grown up in Japan. Because of the political problems that have prevented the formation of close relations between Japan and both Koreas the Korean community in Japan has lived in relative isolation, which has made it difficult to keep up with the cultural and social changes in

contemporary Korean societies. On the other hand, Koreans in Japan have had to make the best of their situation and for most people this has meant assimilation into Japanese society. However, the issue of “assimilation” is very sensitive since most Japanese Koreans understand and see the value of Korean culture (far better than most Japanese) and are keenly aware of the “otherness” that continues to separate them from the “mainstream” population, no matter how well they seem to be doing in Japan.

Assimilation includes an aspect of turning one’s back on one culture while embracing the other. When both the Japanese laws and intersubjective practices have discriminated against the Koreans most Koreans have had little reason to feel like being Japanese even when they have assimilated far deeper than perhaps any other foreign community in Japan.

In Japanese statistics on foreigners Koreans still make up about half of the total number of aliens in the country and the existence of the Korean community has had a major impact on the development of Japanese policies on foreigners in general. The most fundamental issue concerning Koreans in Japan is the “foreignness” or “Koreanness” of the Koreans. Most statistics fail to track ethnicity after people become Japanese citizens and, for instance, most numbers on such minority groups as the Ainu or Burakumin tend to be very low estimates. In the 1990s, in spite of the practical difficulties that are involved in the process of naturalization, about 10,000 Koreans annually changed their citizenship and at least in appearance became part of the Yamatô race. These people usually had practical reasons to change their nationality, and naturally intermarriage with Japanese played an important role in many cases. The Japanese naturalization practices (not law) have emphasised the importance of selecting a Japanese name, and with a Japanese name and their outward appearance most Japanese Koreans can easily pass as Japanese, if they want to escape most forms of discrimination.²¹ In other words, administrative practices in Japan are based on the assumption that people are either Japanese or foreigners and a grey area should not be tolerated. The insistence to maintain the household registration (*koseki*) system adds weight to the rigid interpretation of nationality in Japan. The *koseki* system with its “family head” label is a remnant of the feudal *ie* (household) system and is sexist and against the principle of equality of people before the law. However, *koseki* excerpts are routinely used in Japan to check the background of people and to keep their privacy to minimum. Since only Japanese nationals can have *koseki* registry the inability to produce one has become the favourite method of employers and businesses to exclude all foreigners.²² In addition, the *koseki* excerpt includes information that has helped to maintain discrimination of other groups such as Burakumin. In many other industrialized countries double citizenship would be a practical solution that would solve similar problems that the Japanese Koreans face. Furthermore, the solution of the European Union has been to gradually make the citizenship category obsolete while emphasizing the rights and duties of “residents”. In short, the Japanese treatment of permanent residents seems increasingly dogmatic and insensitive with respect to human rights. One reason why Koreans in Japan and the South Korean government have not been vocal against the *koseki* system that makes discrimination so easy is that the South Korean family registry has similarities to the Japanese *koseki* system.

As for the motives behind the inflexibility of Japanese authorities, the problem is partly caused by the political difficulties with North Korea. As long as Japan and North Korea do not have diplomatic relations many Japanese policy makers feel reluctant to do much that would change the status of Koreans.

Japan does not recognize North Korea or North Korean citizenship. In the most extreme cases the Japanese government has not allowed its citizens who have become naturalized North Korean citizens to renounce their Japanese citizenship on the basis that such a decision would imply recognition of North Korean citizenship. On the other hand the Japanese government has no means to force all Koreans in Japan to become South Korean citizens and, in fact, the treatment of South Korean permanent residents does not differ much from that of special permanent residents (the term used for people without any recognised citizenship and known North Korean links). In other words, there has been little incentive for Koreans in Japan to take South Korean citizenship if they plan to continue living in Japan. The relationship between Japan and South Korea has remained rather cold and on both sides there has been little willingness to promote radically better people-to-people relations that would include new innovative arrangements for the legal status of Japanese Koreans who would be in a key role to bridge these two societies if deeper regional integration were seriously contemplated.

In Japan the possibility of extending voting rights to permanent residents as well as opening public jobs that include the “exercise of public authority” to them has been widely discussed. Many “progressive” prefectures have gradually opened more and more job categories to foreign job seekers. This, in reality, largely means Korean permanent residents, because most of these jobs de facto also require a native speaker fluency in Japanese and a Japanese educational background. However, the central government has fought against this by interpreting the “exercise of public authority” in a narrow way. For instance, foreigners cannot be fire fighters in Japan because it is argued that it is possible that in an emergency situation fire fighters need to give orders to Japanese citizens. The debate about foreigners and “exercise of public authority” has surely made all civil servants aware of the possible problems that could follow if they hired a foreigner. Keeping much of the public sector jobs closed to the core of the Korean community deprives the Japanese society of bureaucrats who would be familiar with the Korean community (or even Korean societies) and also prevents the Korean community from having models of its acceptability. The most influential politicians within the LDP have opposed the granting of voting rights to foreigners in any elections on the basis that foreigners should first become Japanese citizens if they wanted to vote. This argument has put pressure on making the naturalization process less complicated. However, the current reality is that Koreans in Japan increasingly represent third and fourth generations and have little experience of any other society than Japanese. Keeping such a large group of people without voting rights and largely banning them even from the public sector clearly constitute a major issue of social justice.²³

The Issue of Minority Rights

The fact that much of the debate in Japan is related to the “foreignness” of Japanese Koreans tells much about the lack of understanding for minority rights. In many other societies it is widely believed that the society needs to actively support multiculturalism, which in turn makes the culture more dynamic and lessens social tensions. From that point of view it is acceptable that minorities have special privileges and tax money is spent to take care of special educational and social needs that keep a minority culture vibrant. Of course, it is difficult to generalize about all the minority groups in the world, but it is important to note that there are plenty of examples of harmonious co-existence and tolerance between a

flourishing minority group and a majority group. It is deplorable that Japanese media and even academic literature too often treat ethnicity literally as “*minzoku mondai*” (problems of different people) in the sense that multiculturalism inescapably breeds ethnic tension and social ills. No one seriously expects that the present Korean community would ever cause social turmoil (although Governor of Tôkyô Shintarô Ishihara has with his infamous *sangokujin* (third country people) comments implied exactly this). The reason why ethnic studies became popular in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s has more to do with larger numbers of newly arrived migrant workers, many of whom can never be expected to integrate or assimilate to Japanese society in any manner close to the Koreans. Furthermore, there has been a rise in unpermitted “illegal” immigrants and in certain types of crime committed by foreigners, which has led some people to worry that Japan is on its way to acquiring similar minority problems that exist in the United States, Britain, France or Germany.

In Japan ethnic minorities do not have much special protection for their human rights or culture, which is well illustrated by the persistent problems of discrimination that such groups as Burakumin, Ainu, and Okinawans face. As for the Koreans, the foreign citizenship is often a convenient excuse to ignore the needs of people of Korean origin in Japan and it has been up to the Koreans individually or as a community to make up for the non-existent social and cultural support. Many people fail to see that the Korean community in Japan is far larger than simply the sum of the two groups of Koreans who are not Japanese citizens. Many naturalized Japanese citizens of Korean origin feel very strongly about their ethnic origin and continue to pass the heritage to new generations. When talking about the Korean community in Japan it would be much better to talk about people of Korean background instead of citizenship. A more loosely defined Koreanness could easily increase the community to two million people. The key point is that there is no necessity to make people choose between being Japanese or Korean. With the majority of Japanese Koreans marrying Japanese, the number of people with partly Korean ancestry continues to rise rapidly. Becoming Japanese citizens apparently reduces discrimination but at the same time the naturalization process with its perceived requirement of adopting a Japanese name and identity causes many people to be silent about their Korean heritage. Similarly in a mixed marriage it is convenient for the children to adopt Japanese citizenship (dual citizenship is allowed until the age of 22) and a Japanese name to escape trouble. In other words, the citizenship issue divides the Korean community. Non-Japanese citizens face legal discrimination and Koreans who are Japanese citizens have often concluded that there is little incentive to publicly display their Korean heritage. Some Koreans feel that assimilation and adoption of Japanese citizenship signify turning their backs on the Korean community. Assimilation and citizenship issue are sensitive matters in the Korean community and especially between the different generations.

As for the foreign citizenship as a basis for ignoring the social and cultural needs of the people of Korean origin, the most fundamental issue is the use of a nationality provision in legislation as well as in everyday life (such as eligibility to join an insurance scheme or get a credit card or a loan). When the state openly discriminates against all foreigners just for being foreigners it is natural that the private sector is quite free to do the same. Even the word “people” used throughout the American-drafted constitution of Japan was “translated” to *kokumin* (which was interpreted as citizen) denying equality to Koreans, who until the end of the war were treated as citizens of the Japanese Empire. The nationality

clause has been particularly unfair in terms of cutting welfare benefits from Korean people. For instance, the national pension fund had a nationality clause until 1981 making Koreans unable to join. Furthermore, the system still requires that recipients have paid contributions for at least 25 years to receive their pensions. These two rules alone leave many elderly Koreans with about ¥10,000 monthly, which local governments offer them as a special measure.²⁴ Since the older generations of Koreans in Japan, especially the first generation, faced the harshest forms of discrimination and in many cases had difficult time to make ends meet, the younger Koreans often have to take care of their parents while paying taxes to the government which does not give much in return. Old immigrants are more prone to ill health and when their physical condition weakens it becomes more difficult to be living in an environment with latent or open conflict/hostility. The ageing, first generation has also some members who in their old days start losing command of their Japanese and as a result may have communication problems with less than understanding authorities, hospital personnel, and others.

Development of the Korean Community in Japan and the Shadow of Colonialism

Japan and Korea have a long historical relationship. After all most Japanese could trace their ancestry to Koreans if they tried. Furthermore, Japanese culture in its earlier phases has gone through periods of language and cultural mixing where Korean elements were crucial.²⁵ The Korean (and Chinese) impact on early Japanese social institutions, religion, art, and engineering was substantial. Japanese indebtedness to early Korean culture is well known and even the current Emperor has wisely taken up the issue of his well-documented blood ties to Koreans.²⁶

The Koreans were regarded as a special case already from the year 1876, from which date the Koreans, on the basis of the Japan-Korea Friendship Treaty, were allowed to live freely in Japan outside the settlements designated for “foreigners”. However, the number of Koreans in Japan remained very small for some time. In 1885 there was only one Korean in Japan and in 1910 at the time of the annexation of Korea by Japan there were 3,542 Koreans in Japan. Many of the early visitors/immigrants came to Japan as students, because Japan maintained rigid immigration controls. After 1910 the number of Koreans in Japan started to rise gradually. The Japanese “reforms” on the peninsula ended up depriving millions of Korean farmers of their farmland and making them a pool of cheap labour force for Japanese corporations (many of which had virtual monopoly positions) both in Korea and in Japan. In 1920 there were over 30,000 Koreans in Japan, in 1931 over 300,000, in 1938 over 800,000, in 1941 about 1,5 million, in 1943 about 1,9 million and finally in the end of war in 1945 over 2,3 million. During the Pacific war over a million Koreans were drafted under a wartime conscription to work mostly at construction sites or mines to do heavy and dangerous manual labour. At least 60,000 Koreans died at Japanese mines during the Pacific War and some were murdered in cold blood during or after rioting. The living and working conditions of the forced labour were appalling and clearly constituted a war crime.

However, the people who were taken to Japan as forced labourers still constituted less than a half of the total of Koreans in Japan during the 1940s. The rest had a number of different reasons to move to Japan. Some members of the Korean elite, especially students, wanted to use the new opportunities that Japan offered and for them Tôkyô signified not only the capital of a country that had occupied Korea but also a large relatively modern and international city. Some of these Koreans, especially before the

Pacific War, believed that history could be on Japan's side for a very long time and that collaboration was necessary. Since the Japanese colonial authorities in any case already controlled all public institutions in Korea for many Koreans it was not necessarily that much different to deal with the Japanese authorities and culture in Japan itself. The Korean literature of the colonial era and the post-war era has recorded many of the contradictory feelings that many Koreans felt about Japanese society. The Japanese side also needed their Korean collaborators and many Japanese apparently believed in the justifications of Japanese colonialism and assumed that the assimilation of Koreans would only be a matter of time. For them the extent of Korean bitterness over the colonial occupation remained hidden.

Koreans during the colonial era were not regarded as foreigners as regards their legal status and they were classified as "people from outer areas" (*gaichijin*), whereas the Japanese were classified as "people from inner areas" (*naichijin*). The number of Korean and Chinese people who came without permission to work in Japan rose steadily, especially after the economic boom at the end of the 1910s. Conflicts between illegal foreign workers and Japanese workers became frequent in the 1920s and the authorities were quick to tackle the problem. The media also became interested at this time. Usually these conflicts led only to minor injuries but the violence broke out of all control in 1923 after the Great Kantô Earthquake when, acting on false information and exaggeration, Japanese civilians, police, and soldiers attacked Koreans and Chinese and at least 6,000 Koreans were killed.

The whole mentality of colonialism was based on the assumption that it was fine to subjugate weaker and less developed people and keep them under strong discipline. Japanese foreign policy had used the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars to create an expanding colonial empire. All the information and propaganda that Japanese people had received about the wars and new colonial possessions had led them to believe that the Japanese people were superior to their colonial subjects and that they were expected to rule with an iron fist. In short, many Japanese had little use for such concepts as equality or equal rights, especially when their own government was still authoritarian. The Koreans and Chinese were distrusted because they were seen as a weaker race from the beginning and they were not perceived to be behaving like the Japanese and in some cases the Japanese may have discovered that the new migrants did not even want to assimilate as soon as possible. The rumours provided an excuse for some Japanese people to turn to violence. What was significant was that no one came to defend the Koreans and the Chinese and the local authorities actually took part in the violence, which obviously was illegal in terms of existing Japanese legislation. For the Koreans it did not take long to discover that they could never truly trust the Japanese authorities. The scale of the massive lynching that followed the Kantô Earthquake was such that from then on no Korean in Japan could have had any illusions about the essence of Japanese colonial rule.²⁷

The wars in the 1930s and 1940s were particularly hard times for all Koreans. The treatment of Koreans drafted into the Imperial Army, and others used as a forced labour in Japan, and the fate of the Korean women who worked as "comfort women" (*jûgun ianfu*) remain a major source of tension in relations between Japan and Korea even in the 1990s. As the Korean minority community in Japan also is a reminder of Japanese colonialism, their existence keeps war history in the minds of both the minority and the majority.²⁸ After the war a substantial part of the Korean population remained in Japan, as the situation in Korea remained unsettled for a long time and many of these people had already established

strong roots in Japan. The majority of Koreans left Japan for South Korea either with help of Americans/ Japanese or on their own. In 1952 there were only 535,065 Koreans registered in Japan. In the 1950s and 1960s there was a major campaign to repatriate Chongryun Koreans to North Korea and some 100,000 people did leave Japan then. Some of them left together with Japanese spouses who have not been able to visit Japan ever since and therefore the issue of “homecoming visits of Japanese wives” has become one of the difficult diplomatic issues between North Korea and Japan.

Case Study: Koreans in Shimane²⁹

In the end of 2001 there were 1,102 registered Koreans (*zainichi kankoku-chōsenjin*) living in Shimane. They were the second largest group of non-Japanese people in the prefecture after Chinese (1,741) and with the smallest possible difference ahead of the people with a Philippines passport (1,101).³⁰ Shimane is ahead of nine other prefectures in the number of Koreans and it may serve as an example of a typical predominantly rural prefecture with relatively few Koreans or other foreigners. The total for Shimane residents in 2000 was 761,503. The largest concentrations of Koreans in Shimane are located in the areas shown in Table 1.

Table 1. The Largest Concentrations of Koreans in Shimane

| Area | Koreans (2001) | Total Residents (2000) |
|---------|----------------|------------------------|
| Matsue | 276 | 153,616 |
| Izumo | 200 | 87,330 |
| Hamada | 134 | 47,187 |
| Masuda | 110 | 50,128 |
| Yasugi | 64 | 30,520 |
| Gōtsu | 56 | 25,773 |
| Ôda | 47 | 33,609 |
| Mito | 25 | 2,691 |
| Yoshida | 20 | 2,434 |

Source: Shimane Prefecture.

First of all, the overwhelming majority of Koreans (720) live in the four largest cities of Shimane and there are quite a few towns and villages without one Korean resident. The Filipinos in Shimane are also resident in the top four cities (400, 90, 78 and 89, respectively). For the Chinese the following areas are the most populous: Matsue (267), Izumo (235), Hamada (180), Gōtsu (150), Ôda (83) and Hikawa (80). The Chinese are the only foreign nationals in Shimane who are fairly well represented also in most rural towns and villages with at least double-digit numbers. Most Brazilians in Shimane are living in the city of Izumo (419) making them the most numerous foreign nationals in any one city of Shimane. Many Brazilians also live in Hikawa (125), and in most other places there are no Brazilians at all.

The only cities where Koreans are the largest “ethnic minority” are Masuda and Yasugi. These figures together show that there is no single place in Shimane with a distinctly large Korean presence and

for many “ordinary” Japanese the presence of Koreans goes largely unnoticed. In this respect Koreans are in a very different situation from all other larger groups of foreigners. First of all, Koreans are the only group of foreign citizens whose numbers have steadily decreased in the post-war era whereas, for instance, the Brazilians are true newcomers and stand out by concentrating in just two locations and working for a small number of relatively large enterprises in Shimane.

As for the history of Koreans in Shimane during the colonial period, see Table 2.

Table 2. Korean Residents in Shimane from 1913 to 1990

| Year | Koreans in Shimane | Year | Koreans in Shimane |
|------------|--------------------|------|--------------------|
| 1913 | 51 | 1947 | 6,138 |
| 1920 | 717 | 1950 | 5,828 |
| 1930 | 2,733 | 1960 | 4,007 |
| 1940 | 8,075 | 1970 | 1,555 |
| 1942 | 9,803 | 1980 | 1,270 |
| end of war | about 40,000 | 1990 | 1,326 |

Sources: *Mô Hitotsu no Kokusaika. Zainichi Kankoku-Chôsenjin no Mondai o Gozonjidesuka?*, Matsue: Shimaneken Sômbu Kokusaika, Shimane Prefecture, 1997, pp. 1-3.

After the war most Koreans got out of Shimane but the number of Koreans in Shimane continued a rapid decline even later until the early 1970s, when the number started to stabilize. In the post-war period the population of Shimane has been in a steady decline and also young Japanese have in many cases sought jobs and education outside the prefecture. The Kansai region is relatively close and it is only natural that some Shimane Koreans have moved there. The issue of work opportunities continues to be particularly difficult for Shimane Koreans. According to Shimane Prefecture information Koreans in Shimane have moved for jobs in cities, where employment is provided by Korean ethnic businesses that operate in such fields as restaurants, pachinko parlours, construction, and used goods.³¹ In short, Koreans in Shimane have major problems finding employment outside the ethnic community and if they do so they are likely to move outside Shimane. These factors may explain partly the relative tendency toward the “ethnic purity” that is seen in some results of surveys on Shimane Koreans that will be shown later.

As for the ancestral origins of the Koreans in Shimane, it is relatively easy to make conclusions about this since Koreans have similar family registries as the ones in Japan and the South Korean “*honseki*” have been registered in Japan. In the end of 1996 the list of Shimane Korean family registries kept by Korean provinces was as follows: Kyongsangnam-do: 45.7 percent, 586 people; Kyongsangbuk-do: 31.4 percent, 402 people; Chollanam-do: 7.2 percent, 93 people; Pusan City: 3.6 percent, 46 people; and other: 12.1 percent, 155 people.³²

This list tells that two south-eastern provinces of South Korea with the city of Pusan next to them count for some 80 percent of the Koreans in Shimane. There is a good reason to claim that

culturally the Shimane Koreans are quite homogeneous when it comes to their ancestral origin. This geographical origin together with the shared interest in the Tokdo/Takeshima territorial issue has been one of the main reasons why Shimane has selected Kyongsangbuk-do as its sister prefecture/province. On the Korean side Tokdo belongs to the County of Ullungdo Island, which is part of Kyongsangbuk-do and on the Japanese side the same islands are under the jurisdiction of Oki Islands, which are part of Shimane Prefecture. This political relationship is the most significant and active direct foreign official relationship that Shimane Prefecture has.³³ For instance, the University of Shimane, a prefectural institution, has a quota for exchange students from Kyongsangbuk-do and consequently all our South Korean students from South Korea are from there.

The International Section of Shimane Prefecture's General Affairs Office has conducted in co-operation with local organizations representing both sides of the Korean community a survey to find out the basic patterns of the Korean community in Shimane. Questionnaires were distributed by mail to all Korean residents (above the age of 20) twice, in February 1991 and February 1996. The return rate in 1996 was 26.2 percent and the table below gives the breakdown by age.

Table 3. Korean Respondents to 1996 Survey

| Age | 20s | 30s | 40s | 50s | 60s | 70s | Total |
|--------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Registered Koreans | 164 | 202 | 240 | 153 | 110 | 129 | 998 |
| Returned Replies | 41 | 44 | 48 | 45 | 43 | 40 | 261 |
| % | 25.0 | 21.8 | 20.0 | 29.4 | 39.1 | 31.0 | 26.2 |

Source: *Mô Hitotsu no Kokusaika. Zainichi Kankoku-Chôsenjin no Mondai o Gozonjidesuka?*, Matsue: Shimaneken Sômbu Kokusaika, Shimane Prefecture, 1997, p5.

In addition, the same office conducted in 2000 a general survey of all foreigners in Shimane and sent a questionnaire to 4,728 foreigners. The return rate was 1,244 (26.3%) and among these were 234 Korean residents representing 18.8 percent.³⁴

Together these surveys reveal something about the reality of Koreans in Shimane. However, it should be remembered that the community itself is relatively small and respondents have a good reason to refrain from answering if they feel that it is difficult to protect their anonymity. It is difficult to speculate about the reasons for not returning their questionnaire. The main difference between the 1996 and 2000 surveys was that the later general survey was mostly concerned about whether respondents had problems with Japanese language or using different public services whereas the survey of Koreans asked questions that were more substantive and sensitive for Shimane Koreans. In fact, it is somewhat insensitive to send resident Koreans questionnaires which contain questions such as "Are you currently studying the Japanese language?" (Forty-one Koreans said that they did, 61 said that they do not and 16 did not answer.) The survey asked follow-up questions that tried to identify what kind of problems foreigners had with the Japanese language. Asking this kind of questions of most Japanese Koreans is about as meaningful as asking ethnic Japanese people whether they currently study Japanese and how they can

become more proficient in it. For Koreans, however, these silly questions serve as a reminder of their foreign status.

As for the 1996 Korean survey, it contains plenty of interesting pieces of information. All the statistical information below is from this survey, if not indicated otherwise. Shimane Prefecture also put out in 2002 a publication that tells about the history of Koreans in Japan and Shimane and shows the results of the previous survey and adds examples of situations involving Shimane Koreans.³⁵

Migration

Out of the 998 responds, 58 percent were born outside Shimane, 84 of them in other parts of Japan and 67 in Korea. Among the post-war generations (people younger than the 40s) there was a large gender difference: 60 percent of the women were born outside Shimane and 35 percent in Korea, whereas comparable figures for men were 23 percent and just one person born in Korea. When we already know that the Korean population in Japan decreased rapidly from the 1950s to the 1970s it seems that at the same time when many Koreans were leaving Shimane there were others coming in and among the newcomers women were a majority. Most new migrants that came to Shimane from Korea were also women.

Marriages

The statistics in Table 4 show a very strong overall tendency among Shimane Koreans to choose their marriage partners among their own ethnic community. This result contrasts with the overwhelming tendency among younger Japanese Koreans to marry Japanese citizens, decades-long tendency in the rest of the country. However, the difference between the 1991 and 1996 surveys indicates that Shimane also is rapidly moving in the same direction as the rest of the country. Furthermore, among the youngest age group (people in their 20s) mixed (Korean-Japanese) marriages had reached 57 percent and 36 percent among the people in their 30s. To interpret these results we have to observe the fact that Korean organisations were consulted when the survey was planned and it is possible that among the 26.2 percent of the Koreans in Shimane in 1996 who replied, the “ethnically pure” Koreans were over-represented, especially in some of the age groups. It is also possible that in Shimane among the mixed Japanese-Korean couples there is a particularly strong tendency to naturalize, to become Japanese citizens, and to vanish from this kind of surveys. In any case, the respondents of this survey make up a rare, and rapidly vanishing, group of ethnically unmixed Koreans in Japan.

Table 4. Marital Status of Koreans in Shimane (%)

| | 1991 Survey | 1996 Survey |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| Married to Other Koreans | 88.7 | 82.4 |
| Married to Koreans with Japanese Citizenship | 0.4 | 1.9 |
| Married to Ethnic Japanese | 9.9 | 13.9 |
| Other | - | 0.5 |
| Not known | 1.1 | 1.4 |

| | | |
|----------------|------|------|
| Total, married | 84 | 82.7 |
| Unmarried | 14.1 | 16.9 |
| Not known | 1.8 | 0.4 |

Education

In the 1996 survey the respondents gave answers regarding their education as shown in Table 5 below. There is a strong tendency toward rising levels of education among the ethnic Koreans in Shimane. In the older age groups secondary education was common but it has largely been replaced by high school. However, this tendency has been just as marked in most other populations in Japan and the biggest differences have to do with so-called ethnic education. The respondents include a relatively large number of people who attended Korean ethnic schools and even Korea University graduates. According to Ryang the ratio of Korea University graduates to Koreans in Japan was 1:90 in 1986, when there were 7,000 such graduates.³⁶ and if these figures are correct Korea University (located in Tōkyō) is particularly popular among young Koreans in Shimane. One reason for such popularity might be that state universities, unlike most other universities, do not allow the graduates of ethnic schools to take their entrance examination and in Shimane the most significant university has traditionally been a state university, Shimane University, and therefore the Korean students with ethnic school background have had few real alternatives to continue their studies in Shimane. The general educational level of the survey respondents is very close to the national averages in all three categories (being slightly higher in the second category and lower in the first and third).³⁷ However, the statistics for Shimane are highly selective and tell only a part of the picture. Combining these data with fragmentary information I have received, it seems that Koreans in Shimane generally see the value of education. There are very few drop-outs who have not received basic education. On the other hand, educational opportunities in the prefecture have been limited and even among the Japanese population there has been a strong pattern of moving out of the prefecture for continued education or for better employment. Against this background it is quite interesting that there are even that many university graduates among the Shimane survey respondents. All in all, the educational profile of the respondents paints a picture of a community that has high enough educational levels that should help them make a living and protect them from some forms of discrimination. However, this level is not particularly high and Shimane Koreans generally are not on their way to becoming a “privileged” minority with higher educational levels and wealth as the “mainstream” population. There are many examples of such minorities in many other countries. As for the educational “elite” among Shimane Koreans there are very few people who have come from Korea with university degrees. This can be expected since there have been and are limited employment opportunities for first-generation Koreans with professional background in Shimane. Secondly, the relatively large number of Korea University graduates is partly explained by the existence of a Korean school in Matsue.

Table 5. Educational Background

| | |
|---|-------|
| Secondary School (<i>chūgakkō</i>) | 27.4% |
|---|-------|

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Korean Ethnic School (<i>minzoku gakkō</i>) | 3 persons |
| Japanese Schools | 43 persons |
| School in Korea | 12 persons |
| High School (<i>kôtōgakkō</i>) | 50% |
| Korean Ethnic School (<i>minzoku gakkō</i>) | 21 persons |
| Japanese Schools | 72 persons |
| School in Korea | 13 persons |
| University (<i>daigaku</i>) | 22.2% |
| Korean Ethnic School (<i>minzoku gakkō</i>) | 14 persons |
| Japanese Schools | 31 persons |
| School in Korea | 3 persons |
| Total | 212 persons |
| Korean Ethnic School (<i>minzoku gakkō</i>) | 38 persons |
| Japanese Schools | 146 persons |
| School in Korea | 28 persons |

Language

The proportion of respondents who said that they used a lot of Korean (*bokokugo ga ôi*) at home, was 18 percent, those who answered that they spoke a lot of Japanese numbered 60 percent, and those who said that they spoke only Japanese at home were 22 percent. Over 80 percent stated that they were communicating mostly in Japanese. These results are in line with the previous information about the number of first-generation Koreans and the number of people who have attended ethnic schools. In general, the knowledge of Korean among Shimane Koreans seems to be fairly good compared to nationwide trends among Koreans in Japan. However, the use of Korean seems to correlate strongly with attendance of ethnic schools. In other words, it seems that few parents seem to teach Korean systematically to their children, who attend Japanese schools, or otherwise make an effort to help their children become bilingual in the sense of being equally fluent in the two languages, which is often the objective in bilingual families and bilingual education in Europe. If the current trend continues, it is likely that the number of Koreans who do not know even the basics of their “mother language” will increase rapidly. As for the terms “*bokokugo*” (mother tongue) and “*kokugo*” (national language = Japanese), and *wagakuni* (our country) that are used widely in Japan, many Koreans have pointed out that in many schools students have been corrected/failed if they have replaced these nationalistic terms in their answer by more neutral ones, such as *nihongo* (Japanese) or *nihon* (Japan). What are those respondents supposed to think who are forced in surveys like this to answer that they do not know their “mother language”?

Table 6. Korean Language Level (%)

| Ability of Mother Language (<i>bokokugo</i>) | 1991 Survey | 1996 Survey |
|--|-------------|-------------|
|--|-------------|-------------|

| | | |
|--|------|------|
| Knows Well (<i>yoku dekiru</i>) | 27.6 | 28.7 |
| Knows Somehow (<i>maa dekiru</i>) | 21.2 | 15.3 |
| Knows Basic Words (<i>tango teido</i>) | 26.1 | 29.1 |
| Does Not Know (<i>dekinai</i>) | 22.4 | 26.8 |

Korean Customs at Home

As shown in Table 7 below, the overwhelming majority of Koreans in Shimane keep at least some Korean customs alive. However, even in the short period between 1991 and 1996 there was a clear pattern of decline, although at the same time those people who claimed they did not observe any Korean customs had virtually disappeared. Since the 1990s there has indeed been a greater popular acceptance of some aspects of Korean culture in Japan. Increasing numbers of Japanese people eat Korean food simply because they like it and, consequently, the availability of Korean food in general supermarkets has increased. Also South Korean popular music (and movies, to a lesser degree) is becoming increasingly popular among the Japanese youth, which means that finally contemporary Korean cultural items are available in Japan, especially in bigger cities.

The “fashionability” of Korean popular culture must be welcome for many younger Koreans in Japan. However, the “Korean boom” in Japan is highly selective and quite superficial. There is still a long way to go before Shimane bookstores start to have selections of books, newspapers, videos or DVDs in Korean or any other foreign language. Nowadays, the only foreign language newspaper that is (occasionally) sold at the Hamada train station is in Portuguese and the same day delivering of the Japan Times at home is not available. Better access to Korean television programs and literature would be the first steps to take if people were serious about a wider use of Korean in Shimane.

Table 7. Korean Customs at Home (%)

| | 1991 Survey | 1996 Survey |
|--|-------------|-------------|
| Cuisine | 92.3 | 91.6 |
| Ethnic Clothing | 88.7 | 82.8 |
| Festival/ Rituals (<i>matsurigoto</i>) | 77.6 | 69.7 |
| Wedding Rituals | 67.2 | 58.2 |
| Books, Records | 58.9 | 49.0 |
| Nothing | 6.1 | 1.1 |

Relations with Japanese

The replies shown in Table 8 indicate that most respondents assume that most of their professional colleagues and neighbors are well aware of their Korean background.

Table 8. Awareness of Respondents' Korean Background among Co-workers and Neighbors (%)

| | Co-workers | Neighbors |
|--------------|------------|-----------|
| All Know | 63.6 | 71.6 |
| Some Know | 20.3 | 22.6 |
| No One Knows | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| Do Not Know | 3.1 | 4.2 |
| Unclear | 11.9 | 0.4 |

The figures in Table 9 below reveal a strong tendency among Shimane Koreans to have a Japanese alias. The Shimane Koreans know that most acquaintances know that they are Koreans, but they still widely use their unofficial Japanese name. As for the reasons for this practice the most popular answer was “no reason at all” (*nantonaku*).

In recent years in the Japanese Korean community there has been a campaign to get rid of the aliases and start using the Korean names and especially for younger Koreans the decision to start using a real name signifies “coming out” and letting others know about their Korean background. Some naturalized Koreans have been able to restore their original Korean name after a long legal battle. However, people in Shimane generally know their neighbours much better than in more urban areas and there is less point in trying to hide one’s Korean identity. The inability of respondents to give clear reasons for their use of aliases may indicate that there is less bitterness about this practice than in some other areas of the country. The use of Japanese names among Koreans goes back to the days of Japanese colonial rule when Koreans were forced to use Japanese names. However, among the older generations some people learned the benefits of passing as Japanese in daily life. Furthermore, some Japanese employers still require their Korean personnel to use Japanese aliases, because they do not want their customers to know that they have employed Koreans. Moreover, the use of aliases often goes in families and once a family starts to use a Japanese name it is difficult to discontinue its use.

Table 9. The Use of Japanese Aliases (Japanese Names)

| | 1991 Survey | 1996 Survey |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| People Who Have a Japanese Alias | 84.7 | 82.0 |
| Using Only the Official (Korean) Name | 2.2 | 5.1 |
| Using the Official (Korean) Name Often | 9.8 | 9.3 |
| Using Both about as Much | 18.8 | 15.4 |
| Using (Japanese) Alias Often | 35.1 | 22.9 |
| Using Mostly (Japanese) Alias | 26.1 | 40.2 |
| Unclear | 8.0 | 7.0 |
| People Who Do Not Have a Japanese Alias | 10.1 | 10.3 |
| People Who Previously Had a Japanese Alias | 4.6 | 6.9 |

| | | |
|---------|-----|-----|
| Unclear | 0.6 | 0.8 |
|---------|-----|-----|

As for the “alias” (*tsūmei*, literally “used name”), the chosen name in many cases is based on the Chinese characters of the original name, but is then pronounced according to the Sino-Japanese convention. Very often Korean names are Japanised by adding another character to make a shorter Korean surname look more Japanese. The use of aliases is partly explained by the widespread Japanese practice to pronounce all Korean and Chinese names according to the Japanese convention, even when the person him/herself insists that the correct Chinese or Korean pronunciation is totally different. With all other languages Japanese usually first try to pronounce names written in Roman script according to the American English convention and then write the result in *katakana* by removing all the sounds that do not exist in Japanese and adding missing vowels. Many Koreans may simply have concluded that Japanese are unable to pronounce a foreign name in a manner that even distantly resembles the original and if they can not expect to be addressed in their own name they might as well select a Japanese alias on their own.³⁸

Japanese Friends

As for socializing with Japanese, 24.1 percent of the respondents said that they had many Japanese friends, 55.2 percent that they had some Japanese friends and 20.3 percent that they had no Japanese friends. The most important factor explaining these results is attendance at ethnic Korean schools. Forty percent of those who attended ethnic schools said they had no Japanese friends. This pattern has also been documented in many other studies elsewhere in Japan.³⁹ Those students who attend ethnic Korean schools tend to have few close contacts with Japanese people. In addition, all Korea University students live on campus and the most realistic employment opportunity for many of them is to become a teacher at an ethnic Korean school.

Experiences of discrimination

Experiences of discrimination are found in the following settings: public administration, 25.7 percent of the respondents; working life, 18.8 percent; neighborhood, 16.1 percent; school education, 26.4 percent; marriage, 8.0 percent; and other, 8.8 percent. It is remarkable that so few people complained about public sector discrimination, since many state policies are highly discriminatory against Koreans. However, many respondents probably interpreted the question to mean whether they personally were harassed in a particularly cruel manner. Whatever the reason, these figures may also be interpreted to mean that there is relatively little discrimination in Shimane in any particular life area. The highest rates are recorded in education and this apparently reflects the Japanese school system’s inability to tolerate differences and rampant bullying among pupils.

Future

The choices given in Table 10 are based on the present situation concerning the citizenship status laws and political, economic and social situation in Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. For

Shimane Koreans it would be difficult to speculate about changes in any of the relevant political factors. However, it is clear that most Shimane Koreans are so deeply assimilated that they would have little future in any future Korea. Most likely the future of Shimane Koreans will lie in Shimane for the great majority. The limited job opportunities in Shimane will make it unlikely that there would be a significant new influx of people with Korean background from other parts of Japan or Korea. On the contrary, it is likely that many more younger Koreans will move outside Shimane to find better job and educational opportunities. With each new generation without Korean linguistic skills/fluency, assimilation to Japanese society will continue. Naturalization and total assimilation will undoubtedly be the destiny of many Korean people in Shimane and since the number of Koreans is already so small, the Korean minority will become even less visible when other minority groups gain in numbers.

Table 10. Future Plans (%)

| | 1991 Survey | 1996 Survey |
|--|-------------|-------------|
| Wants to Return to Mother Country | 5.5 | 7.3 |
| Continues to Have Resident Korean Status | 66.3 | 57.5 |
| Naturalization | 17.2 | 23.0 |
| Other | 7.7 | 6.9 |
| Unclear | 3.4 | 5.4 |

Other Relations between Shimane and Korea

One chapter in Korean-Shimane relations was the settlement of people from Shimane to Korea during the colonial period. In 1919, for instance, 224 households of Japanese people moved to the Island of Ullungdo (which is administratively part of Kyongsangbuk-do Province and is located more than 100 kilometres off the coast) and among these settlers people from Oki Islands (part of Shimane) were the majority.⁴⁰ It is obvious that the Japanese government understood the strategic value of the islands that are located between Korea and Japan and the desirability of having large ethnic Japanese there. Japan had already used the islands in Russo-Japanese War for wireless communications. The only major international dispute that nowadays is related to Shimane is the dispute over the Island of Takeshima or Tokdo (formerly known also as Liancourt Rocks) and its surrounding sea areas. A Japanese cabinet decision on 28 January, 1905, incorporated these uninhabited islands (two larger ones and about 60 smaller ones) on the basis of the *terra nullis* principle as not been occupied by other countries, into Japan's territory under the jurisdiction of Oki Island, which is part of Shimane Prefecture. The most active person behind this decision was a fisherman from Shimane, Nakai Yôzaburô who started the whole process by asking (successfully) an exclusive license for sea lion hunting. At the time sea lions had commercial value, because there had been a boom in hunting of California sea lions in the United States for the whiskers, testes, and penises, which were sold to China for use as aphrodisiacs. Other uses included oil from their fat, glue out of their pelts, and pipe cleaners made of whiskers. The Japanese sea lion was closely related to the California sea lion and Takeshima had the only remaining larger colony of them. After annexation of Takeshima most sea lions were killed and in 1951 only about 50 were left and

the last individuals most likely perished in the 1950s (there are rumours of Korean soldiers having used the last sea lions in shooting practices) although there were unconfirmed sightings as late as in the early 1970s.

Apart from historical issues the present relations between Shimane and South Korea are relatively good but limited in scope. The economic relations between Shimane and South Korea are quite undeveloped. In the export statistics (1999) the United States is first with 30 percent share and South Korea is second with 8.7 percent, followed by Germany 8.6 percent, China 8.6 percent, and Taiwan 7.4 percent. Steel and electronic equipment covered about 90 percent of the value of exports from Shimane to South Korea. In imports South Korea had only eighth place with a 3.7 percent share. The biggest import items were oil, coal and nickel. These numbers show that South Korea-Shimane trade is not among the first priorities in Shimane and that Shimane is not a major business hub in the region in spite of its geographical proximity with South Korea. The distance from the Shimane harbours to most harbours on the east coast of the Korean Peninsula is the same or shorter than from Fukuoka, and geographically Shimane could serve as Japan's gateway to Korea (and the rest of Asian and European continents after railway connections between the two Koreas are completed). Shimane-North Korean trade in recent years is quite sporadic. For instance, the Hamada harbour statistics indicate that North Korean ships have infrequently used the harbour and taken used cars and fishing nets with them. Other pieces of information indicate that North Koreans have infrequently exported limited (and economically quite insignificant) amounts of Matsutake mushrooms, fish, and crabs to Shimane. Some of these items have also been consumed in Shimane since North Korean mushrooms and seafood are more or less regularly available at local supermarkets (and duly labelled as being of North Korean origin). Passengers travelling between Shimane and South Korea usually have to use flight connections from elsewhere (Tottori, Kansai, or Hiroshima), because the few charter flights from Izumo at the eastern end of Shimane do not fit the schedules of many people. After Tottori started regular flights to Seoul in 2001 and started to market Tottori for Korean tourists many people in Shimane felt that Shimane was left behind in developing direct relations with South Korea.

As for cultural links, in October 2000 there were 192 foreign students in Shimane and 21 (11 %) of them were from South Korea (17 in Matsue and 4 in Hamada). The number is well under the national average for South Korean students and shows how limited the cultural contacts still are. However, at the same time there were only two foreign students from the United States in Shimane.⁴¹ In most aspects the cultural, economic and political relations between Shimane and both Koreas consist of individual cases that do not form clear patterns.

What is significant for this research is that the relatively isolated community of Koreans in Shimane is steadily assimilating and decreasing in numbers while there has been no significant new wave of Korean migration or new links with either Korea. In larger cities outside the prefecture immigration from South Korea keeps the ethnic community and Korean culture alive in Japan. At the same time, a significant share of permanent residents are gradually assimilating, many because of mixed marriages with Japanese. The case of Shimane Koreans goes partly against these trends, because there are very few recent immigrants from South Korea and the local Korean community still is segregated quite clearly from the rest of the society. However, if measured in numbers the decline of the Shimane Korean

community has been far faster than in most other parts of Japan. When the percent share of Koreans among the foreign residents continues to decline and other nationalities surpass Koreans (as has happened in Shimane with Chinese and most likely in 2002 with Filipinos), it will be all the more difficult to demand cultural rights or special status/treatment for Koreans. It will be interesting to see whether other ethnic communities in the future awaken to demand their cultural rights and whether they are able to cooperate with the Koreans.

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Appendix 1: Prefectures with Highest and Lowest Concentrations of Korean Residents

A. Prefectures with highest concentrations

| Prefecture | Resident Koreans | % to Total |
|------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | | Resident Foreigners |
| Ôsaka | 155,702 | 74.3 |
| Tôkyô | 100,870 | 31.6 |
| Hyôgo | 63,844 | 63.3 |
| Aichi | 47,206 | 31.6 |
| Kyôto | 40,048 | 71.9 |
| Kanagawa | 34,430 | 26.3 |
| Fukuoka | 21,764 | 53.8 |
| Saitama | 18,011 | 20.2 |
| Chiba | 17,711 | 21.5 |
| Hiroshima | 13,112 | 42.3 |
| Yamaguchi | 10,496 | 68.9 |

B. Prefectures with lowest concentrations

| Prefecture | Resident Koreans |
|------------|------------------|
| Tokushima | 444 |
| Okinawa | 520 |
| Kagoshima | 548 |
| Kôchi | 794 |
| Miyazaki | 795 |
| Akita | 876 |
| Saga | 1,037 |
| Iwate | 1,114 |
| Shimane | 1,142 |
| Kagawa | 1,176 |
| Kumamoto | 1,255 |
| Aomori | 1,367 |
| Nagasaki | 1,396 |
| Tottori | 1,566 |
| Ehime | 1,690 |
| Toyama | 1,713 |
| Yamagata | 1,932 |
| Fukushima | 2,142 |
| Yamanashi | 2,400 |
| Ishikawa | 2,551 |
| Niigata | 2,564 |
| Ôita | 2,706 |
| Tochigi | 3,173 |
| Gumma | 3,183 |

Source: All statistics from the end of 2001, Ministry of Justice, <http://www.moj.go.jp>.

The list of prefectures with more than 10,000 resident Koreans in absolute numbers (with the percentage of foreigner total behind it) follows: Ôsaka (155,702/ 74.3%), Tôkyô (100,870/ 31.6%), Hyôgo (63,844/ 63.3%), Aichi (47,206/ 31.6%), Kyôto (40,048/ 71.9%), Kanagawa (34,430/ 26.3%), Fukuoka (21,764/ 53.8%), Saitama (18,011/ 20.2%), Chiba (17,711/ 21.5%), Hiroshima (13,112/ 42.3%) and Yamaguchi (10,496/ 68.9%). The Prefectures with smallest number of resident Koreans are Tokushima (444), Okinawa (520), Kagoshima (548), Kôchi (794), Miyazaki (795), Akita (876), Saga (1037), Iwate (1114), Shimane (1142), Kagawa (1176), Kumamoto (1255), Aomori (1367), Nagasaki (1396), Tottori (1566), Ehime (1690), Toyama (1713), Yamagata (1932), Fukushima (2142), Yamanashi (2400), Ishikawa (2551), Niigata (2564), Ôita (2,706), Tochigi, (3173) and Gumma (3183). Gumma Prefecture with relatively many other foreigners actually provides a statistical deviation being ahead of 24 others while it has the second lowest ratio of Koreans of foreigners (7.7%) after Okinawa (6.6%).

Note on conventions

The Romanization of Japanese words follows the standard Hepburn system and Japanese and Korean names have been given in the usual order of surname first. Names of authors (written in Roman script) have been written in the manner that they appear in publications. If writers of books in Japanese with Korean names have included the *kana* phonetic form of their name instead of (also) using a Roman one or none, I have Romanized the name from *kana* (since there would often be many different alternatives to Romanize Korean names from Chinese characters and the author seems to allow the use of that particular Japanised phonetic form of her/his name).

Notes

¹ Tani Tomio, “*Zainichi Kankoku- chōsenjin Shakai no Genzai*,” in Tanaka Hiroshi, ed., *Teijūka suru Gaikokujin*, Tōkyō: Asahi shoten, 1995, p. 137; and the Ministry of Justice Statistics in the 1990s, <<http://www.moj.go.jp>>.

² All statistics from the end of 2001, the Ministry of Justice, <<http://www.moj.go.jp>>.

³ For the reality and denial of multiethnic Japan, see John Lie, *Multiethnic Japan*, Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2001.

⁴ Kimu Teyon, *Aidentiti-Poritikkusu o Koete. Zainichichōsenjin no Esunishiti*, Kyōto: Sekaishisōsha, 1999, pp. 7-62. For the construction of the myth of homogeneous Japanese nation, see Oguma Eiji, *Tan'itsu Minzoku Sinwa no Kigen. Nihonjin no Jigazo no Keifu*, Tōkyō: Shinyōsha, 1995.

⁵ Kim Choru'un, “*Zainichi chōsenjin no Keizai Mondai*,” in Paku Chonmyon, ed., *Zainichi chōsenjin*, second revised edition, Tōkyō: Asahi shoten, 1999, pp. 123-25.

⁶ George Hicks, *Japan's Hidden Apartheid. The Korean Minority and the Japanese*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 102-104; and “Editorial: Arai's Death Must Not Hinder Reform: 6,” *Daily Yomiuri*, 21 February, 1998.

⁷ Ri Worusun, “*Zainichi chōsenjin no Minzoku kyōiku*,” in Paku Chonmyon, ed., *Zainichi Chōsenjin*, second revised edition, Tōkyō: Akashi shoten, 1999.

⁸ John Lie, “Ordinary (Korean) Japanese,” in Sonia Ryang, ed., *Koreans in Japan. Critical Voices from the Margin*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 200-201; and John Lie, *Multiethnic Japan*, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001.

⁹ Inokuchi Hiromitsu, “Korean Ethnic Schools in Occupied Japan,” in Sonia Ryang, ed., *Koreans in Japan. Critical Voices from the Margin*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

¹⁰ See, for example, Jeffrey T. Hester, “Kids between Nations. Ethnic Classes in the Construction of Korean Identities in Japanese Public Schools,” in Sonia Ryang, ed., *Koreans in Japan. Critical Voices from the Margin*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

¹¹ See Aoki Eriko, “Textbooks and Educational Practices,” in Sonia Ryang, ed., *Koreans in Japan. Critical Voices from the Margin*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 157-160.

¹² For more on Chongryun education, <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/002nd_issue/97073006.html>; and Sonia Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan. Language, Ideology, and Identity*, Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 23-67.

¹³ For more on the issue of marriage, see Nakao Hiroshi, *Zainichi Kankoku - Chōsenjin Mondai no Kisochishiki*, Tōkyō: Akashi shoten, 1997, pp. 49-56; Kim Chan-jung (Kimu Chanjon), *Zainichi to iu Kandō*, Tōkyō: Sangokan, 1994, pp. 114-132; George Hicks, *Japan's Hidden Apartheid. The Korean Minority and the Japanese*, Aldershot:

Ashgate, 1997, pp. 107-110; Fukuoka Yasunori, *Zainichi Kankoku – Chōsenjin. Wakai Sedai no Aidentiti*, Chūkōshinsho 1164, Tōkyō: Chūōkōronsha, 1993; Fukuoka Yasunori, *Lives of Young Koreans in Japan*, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2000; and Kanai Yasuo, *Zainichi Korian Nisei - Sansei no Genzai. 13 no Yareru Omai*, Tōkyō: Bakushusha, 1997.

¹⁴Fukuoka Yasunori, *Lives of Young Koreans in Japan*, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2000, pp. 35-37.

¹⁵Ibid. pp. 37-38.

¹⁶Japanese Ministry of Justice, <<http://www.moj.go.jp>>.

¹⁷Tanaka Hiroshi, *Zainichi Gaikokujin. Ho no Kabe - Kokoro no Mizo*, Iwanami shinsho 171, Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten, 1991, pp. 182-184.

¹⁸ See, for example, Sorano Yoshihiro, and Kō Chan-yū, *Zainichi Chōsenjin no Seikatsu to Jinken*, Tōkyō: Akashi shoten, 1995, pp. 71-105.

¹⁹George Hicks, *Japan's Hidden Apartheid. The Korean Minority and the Japanese*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 59-61.

²⁰ Sonia Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan. Language, Ideology, and Identity*, Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, p. 126.

²¹ For naturalization, see Kashiwazaki Chikako, “The Politics of Legal Status,” in Sonia Ryang, ed., *Koreans in Japan. Critical Voices from the Margin*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 26-29.

²²For examples of widespread company practices to make hiring and even golf club membership subject to *koseki* excerpts, see George Hicks, *Japan's Hidden Apartheid. The Korean Minority and the Japanese*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 120-126.

²³ For the issue of extending voting rights to Koreans, see Paku Kanhon, “*Zainichi Chōsenjin no Sanseiken Mondai*,” in Paku Chonmyon, ed., *Zainichi chōsenjin*, second revised edition, Tōkyō: Akashi shoten, 1999; Nakao Hiroshi, *Zainichi Kankoku - Chōsenjin Mondai no Kisochishiki*, Tōkyō: Akashi shoten, 1997, pp. 65-68; and George Hicks, *Japan's Hidden Apartheid. The Korean Minority and the Japanese*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 98-104.

²⁴ For the exclusion of foreigners from welfare benefits, see Yamamoto Fuyuhiko, *Zainichi Gaikokujin to Shakai Hoshō. Sengo Nihon no Mainoriti Jūmin no Jinken*, Tōkyō: Shakai hyōronsha, 1995; and <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/007th_issue/97090404.htm>.

²⁵See, for example, John Maher, “North Kyushu Creole: A Language-Contact Model for the Origins of Japanese,” in Donald Denoon, Mark Hudson, Gavan McCormack, and Tessa Morris-Suzuki, eds., *Multicultural Japan. Palaeolithic to Postmodern*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 31-45.

²⁶ For the Korean-Japanese relations, see Ri Jin-hi, and Kan Je-on, *Nitchō Kōryūshi*, Tōkyō: Yūhikaku, 1995; and Nagoshi Futaranosuke, ed., *Nikkan 2000 nen no Majitsu*, Tōkyō: Kokusai kiga, 1997.

²⁷For the Kantō Earthquake Korean hunt, see Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*, The Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 78-85.

²⁸For Koreans in Japan during the colonial era, see Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*, The Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies. London: Routledge, 1994; Nishinarita Yutaka, *Zainichi Chōsenjin no Sekai to Teikoku Kokka*, Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1997; Kim Chan-jung (Kimu Chanjon), *Zainichi Korian Hyakunenshi*, Tōkyō: Sangokan, 1997; Suzuki Yūko, *Chōsenjin Jūgun Ianfu*, Iwanami bukkusu 229, Tōkyō: Iwanami, 1991; and <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/003rd_issue/chongryun>.

²⁹ Unless otherwise noted, the statistics in this section are from unpublished Shimane Prefecture statistics.

³⁰ The next countries are Brazil (686), the United States (101), Vietnam (86), Indonesia (78), Bangladesh (49), Britain (39), Rumania (37), Canada (36), Thailand (31), Ukraine (27), Russia (24), Australia (24), Mongolia (17)

and Malaysia (16), New Zealand (12), Peru (11) and Colombia (10). In addition there were 17 nationalities with just one representative and 23 with 2-9 representatives.

³¹ *Mô Hitotsu no Kokusaika. Zainichi Kankoku-Chôsenjin no Mondai o Gozonjidesuka?*, Matsue: Shimaneken Sômubu Kokusaika, Shimane Prefecture, 1997, p. 3.

³² The list includes all Koreans and the category is for “*chôsenjin*”. *Mô Hitotsu no Kokusaika. Zainichi Kankoku-Chôsenjin no Mondai o Gozonjidesuka?*, Shimaneken Sômubu Kokusaika, Matsue: Shimane Prefecture, 1997, p. 4.

³³ For details, see *Shimaneken no Kokusaika no Genjô*, Matsue: Shimaneken Sômubu Kokusaika, Shimane Prefecture, 2002, pp. 5-21.

³⁴ *Shimaneken Zaijûgaikokujin Jittai Chôsa*, Matsue: Shimaneken Sômubu Kokusaika, Shimane Prefecture, 2001, pp. 6-7.

³⁵ *Tabunka Kyôseishakai no Tame ni. Zainichi Kankoku-Chôsenjin Ankêto Chôsa kara*, Matsue: Shimaneken Sômubu Kokusaika, Shimane Prefecture, 2002.

³⁶ Sonia Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan. Language, Ideology, and Identity*, Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, p. 37.

³⁷ The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan, <<http://www.wpp.mext.go.jp/eky2001/index-39.html>>.

³⁸ For an analysis of the reasons behind the use of aliases, see Kimu Irumen, *Chôsenjin ga Naze Nihonmei o Nanorunoka?*, Tôkyô: San'ichi shobô, 1978.

³⁹ Sonia Ryang, *North Koreans in Japan. Language, Ideology, and Identity*, Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997; Fukuoka Yasunori, *Zainichi Kankoku – Chôsenjin. Wakai Sedai no Aidentiti*, Chûkôshinsho 1164, Tôkyô: Chûôkôronsha, 1993; and Fukuoka Yasunori, *Lives of Young Koreans in Japan*, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2000.

⁴⁰ *Mô Hitotsu no Kokusaika. Zainichi Kankoku-Chôsenjin no Mondai o Gozonjidesuka?*, Shimaneken Sômubu Kokusaika, Matsue: Shimane Prefecture, 1997, p. 1.

⁴¹ All statistics from *Shimaneken no Kokusaika no Genjô*, Shimaneken Sômubu Kokusaika, Matsue: Shimane Prefecture, 2002, pp. 85-110.