

CHINESE MIGRATION TO THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST: A VIEW FROM MOSCOW

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Chinese migration has been at the center of attention among politicians and the public in the Russian Far East since the early 1990s. Occasionally the issue has become a topic of heated debate. Researchers at the Institute of History, Archaeology, and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Russian Far East of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences were the first scholars to be interested in Chinese migration to Russia. Initially they dealt with this issue in connection with their effort to find out the attitudes of the local population toward the Chinese and China as well as analyze their perspectives on future Russo-Chinese relations. Their effort was a response to the angry protests of local politicians regarding the demarcation of the Russo-Chinese border and the reaction of the public toward the issue. Between 1992-97 researchers at the institute conducted several large-scale surveys of the population of the region. The results of their surveys were published a few years later in a manuscript written by V.L. Larin, the director of the institute.¹ The manuscript also contained some data on Chinese migrants² based on official information.

G.S. Vitkovskaya and Zh.A. Zaionchkovskaya became the first scholars who started research on Chinese migration per se in 1997-98.³ They polled Chinese migrants and Russian experts as a means to understand the real situation in the Russian Far East. They were the first analysts to approach the study of immigration processes in direct link to the unfavorable demographic situation and the forthcoming deficit of work force in Russia. Although the size of the poll was relatively small, its importance cannot be underestimated. Their research awakened interest in concrete studies of the issue. They were the first to openly develop an estimate of the size of the Chinese migrant population in Russia. Their research prompted a shift in immigration policy from a restrictive one to a more encouraging direction. Following their pioneering work, other scholars and independent research groups actively started to study Chinese migration. The professionalism of the pioneering researchers facilitated professional networking among researchers from different parts of the country, including Zabaikalye and the Russian Far East. Two sets of proceedings of the conference "Migration and Labor Markets in the Russian Far East: Trans-regional and Transnational Interaction," held in Khabarovsk on June 10-11, 1998, allowed the compilation of results of a number of research projects.⁴

Our research, conducted between late 1998-early 1999, was the largest-scale survey of Chinese migrants in Russia. It was conducted in Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Ussurisk. Its conclusions can be found in a monograph⁵ and other publications. One of the most important conclusions from the research was that the largest concentrations of Chinese migrants in Russia are found not in the Russian Far East but in European Russia. Differences among Chinese migrant communities were also revealed: In the Russian Far East, they were composed of immigrants from three provinces of northeast China; in Moscow they were from practically all Chinese provinces. We also found out that the composition of migrants in the Russian Far East changed frequently, like a pendulum, while the Chinese who came to Moscow intended to remain in Russia more or less permanently. We also discovered that the Chinese community in Moscow plays a significant role in the formation and life of Chinese migrants across the country. We do not need to review all the conclusions of our research at this point. What is important is that the research demonstrated the importance of conducting further studies of Chinese migration in the European part of Russia. It also became clear that studying Chinese communities in Russia required focused attention.

So far, there has not been any shift in research focus toward the European part of Russia. The focus of attention of researchers continues to be placed on the Chinese migration in the Far East and Zabaikalye region. One can find many publications on Chinese migration, but few of them are based on thorough research. Among those one should mention firstly the fundamental research of V.L. Larin, who is leading the research of Chinese migration in the Russian Far East.⁶ E.L. Motrich, a researcher who worked with G.S. Vitkovskaya and Zh.A. Zaionchkovskaya and also participated in our project, produced several publications. She conducted a survey of Chinese migrants in Khabarovsk in 2001-02, using our questionnaire.⁷ G.B. Dudchenko, a researcher of the Institute of History, Archaeology, and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far

East, also conducted a survey of Chinese migrants, using parts of our questionnaire, in Vladivostok in 2000 and later joined our project.⁸

M.A. Alexseev, a researcher at San Diego State University in the United States conducted a major research on the issue. However, it only became known in Russia through a magazine article.⁹ A.N. Bogaevskaya has summarized a number of studies of Chinese migration in Primorye, adding her own observations.¹⁰

A number of Chinese permanent residents of Russia have started to provide insiders' views on the subject of Chinese migration in several publications.¹¹ This is a notable development of recent years.

"Russia and China on the Far Eastern Frontier," the second international conference on this topic organized by the Amur State University on May 15-17, 2002, demonstrated that the research into Chinese migration in Zabaikalye and the Russia Far East is on the rise.¹² The scale and variety of research projects makes us hope that in the near future sufficient empirical evidence will be accumulated in order to systemize data regarding such serious phenomenon as Chinese migration in the life of the Russian state and society.

The international conference "Russia and the East: A View from Siberia at the Beginning of the New Millennium," which took place in Irkutsk on May 17-19, 2002, showed that the interest in Chinese migration is growing in Siberia as well.¹³ It is notable that Chinese migration was a topic of special youth fora in Irkutsk in 1999-2000.¹⁴

The analysis of publications of recent years allows one to identify full-scale studies of Chinese migration and Chinese communities in Russia as a new research trend in the country. The following reports on the research we conducted in 2002.¹⁵ The research has not been completed yet. Therefore, we are offering only a few conclusions and considerations for our discussion.

Russia in the Global Flow of Chinese Migration

During the third session of the National People's Congress in the spring of 2000, the PRC Chairman Jiang Zemin declared the Chinese foreign economic strategy, which later became known as "To Go Outside or to Go Global." It may seem odd but one cannot find this particular speech in the official proceedings of the session. Only an abstract from his speech, the content of which is not related to the declaration, can be found. Several books regarding this important issue of party policy were published in China during a short period of time. One of the books cites Jiang Zemin's speech given at the third session of the National People's Congress, but provides no reference to any published document.¹⁶ Other publications contain the same text without quotation marks or references to the author.

Let us now turn to the central issue of Chinese migration. The goal of the strategy, "To Go Outside or to Go Global," is to transform PRC into the most economically powerful state in the world by the year 2020, at the latest. The goals of the strategy are as follows:

- To expand the market for Chinese goods and to overcome the limits of the internal market, which has created a long-term deflation and under-utilization of productive capacity.
- To guarantee an uninterrupted flow of natural resources and raw materials into the country.
- To contribute to the extended utilization of world scientific and technological achievements and the influx of foreign capital.
- To increase PRC's share in the international labor market.

Having joined the anti-terrorist coalition, Beijing did not give up the "To Go Outside" strategy and its goals. Objectively speaking, it predetermines the PRC's participation in global economics as a rival of the United States and other economic powers. Beijing neither gave up its nationalist ideology nor methods of its progressing global economic expansion. China is fighting for the triumph of the Chinese nation and for the revenge for its almost 100-year-long humiliation by the imperialist states. Russia is considered to be among the offenders of the Chinese nation.

Every Chinese since school years is convinced that Russia occupied at least 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory. Russia's past crimes against the Chinese nation are an important component of educational programs for many generations. This topic is cultivated in the Chinese consciousness by the party-government propaganda, which never became a cause of public protest of either the Soviet or Russian government.

The Russian-Chinese treaty of 2001 states PRC's official abandonment of any territorial claims against Russia. The fact is that the treaty is in force only for twenty years and on behalf of the government, but ordinary Chinese who arrive in Russia have their own understanding of who is the real owner of the land they want to settle. Often they directly note that the territory will be returned to China soon. This is why Chinese migration takes place and social and psychological atmosphere of anxiety, suspicion, and even fear on the part of some local population versus the stubbornness, vigor, and surreptitiousness of the immigrants.

One of the crucial methods Beijing uses in realizing its new external strategy is the maximum use of the growing Chinese migration and the Chinese communities' activities around the world. The Chinese believe that the strategy to go outside must improve China's position in the international labor market. China recognizes that its population represents one-third of the working population of the world but only 2-3 percent of the international labor market. Therefore, Beijing states that it needs to conquer approximately 10 percent of the international labor market. In 2001, there was a working population of more than 730 million people in China.¹⁷ In 2002, according to Chinese experts' estimates, assuming that China's GDP grows at 7-8 percent, 8 million Chinese could be employed in cities. However, this year 12 million Chinese would join the potential work force. In the first half of 2002, already 4.1 million Chinese lost their jobs due to staff reductions. Even if one were to ignore the scale of the stagnant employment situation in cities, a legacy of the past years, one would clearly realize that social problems in Chinese cities are becoming more acute. One should add that according to various Chinese estimates, the number of unemployed in rural areas ranges from 100-200 million people. Consequently, if China indeed plans to conquer 10 percent of the international labor market, then all more or less developed countries of the world, including Russia, will face a new major challenge, a rapid growth of Chinese migration.

Recently, the number of Chinese officially leaving the country for personal reasons has been increasing by more than 30 percent annually. Back in 1996, there were 2.4 million such people, while in 2001 more than 6.9 million Chinese officially left the country for personal reasons. This means that in 2001, the number increased almost 2.9 times, and accounted for 57 percent of the total number of Chinese leaving the country.¹⁸ During many years there will be gigantic labor resources in China. The PRC has not been able to use those resources in the past years; it has even fewer chances to utilize those resources in the future. Therefore, emigration pressures will grow stronger. One can find actual estimates in the Chinese press. One of the books compiled by respected Chinese economists says that sending abroad 1-2 million capable people for entrepreneurial activities annually would allow 10-20 million jobs in the country and outside, thus alleviating the employment problem in China.¹⁹ In other words, China considers emigration to be a way to overcome the unemployment problem in the country.

In the middle of 2001, Beijing called a forum of friendly ties among overseas Chinese communities in the new century.²⁰ The forum's motto was "friendship, unity, and development." The event's significance was found in the list of participants who spoke there:

- Li Junhuan, member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CC CCP), Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council (CPPCC), one of the top four officials in the government;
- Qian Qichen, Vice Premier of the PRC State Council, former head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and
- Guo Dongpuo, head of the administration of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the PRC State Council.

High-ranking Chinese officials pointed out the necessity for the Chinese living overseas to strengthen friendly and family ties between the growing members of Chinese communities around the world. Chinese officials encouraged cooperation among them to study economic, scientific, and social development trends in their countries of residence. They urged Chinese migrants on to orient themselves toward the globalization process and to become an important part of international scientific-technical cooperation and exchange. Li Junhuan expressed hope that immigrants in Chinese communities will preserve the traditions of persistent struggle directed toward overcoming difficulties, achieving success, and strengthening ties with their motherland. Chinese leaders called on overseas Chinese to assist and continually contribute to the economic development of China.

The above-mentioned 2001-2002 forum was followed by different meetings, conferences, and conventions of Chinese migrants around the world. The European Association of Chinese Entrepreneurs also held its regular meeting. Representatives of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the PRC State Council participated in many of these meetings.

In other words, Russia and the whole world experience a critical moment. It is the formation of new conditions of the global growth of Chinese migration and development of Chinese communities.

Russia holds a special place in Beijing's plans. It represents a rather large market for Chinese consumer goods. So far, this market has been developed mainly by Chinese migrants and Chinese firms located in China and Russia, which use mostly "gray" and "black" (shady) business schemes. This kind of trade is called "unofficial shuttle trade" in Russia. Initially, such trade was defined as uncivilized in Russia and China as well. Some movies were produced which fun of the backwardness and lack of culture among the Chinese who were engaged in trading in Russia. Later China changed its attitude toward the shuttle trade and began to call it "people's trade." In 1996, Zhu Rongji, the Premier of the State Council of China, said, "The most favorable conditions need to be created for the shuttle trade, in which citizens of China and Russia are involved. The volume of this trade surpasses official trade between the two countries. Shuttle traders' contribution to bilateral economic ties is enormous. Shuttle traders are the driving force of Chinese-Russian trade."²¹ At a press conference in Moscow on September 11, 2002, Zhu Rongji estimated the volume of "people's trade" with Russia at \$10 billion. "People's trade" has almost matched the \$10.6 billion in official trade turnover between the two countries.

Official assessments are extremely important because they determine political decisions in Beijing. The essence of their conclusions is that Russia can and should become an even larger market for Chinese consumer goods. With this goal in mind, Beijing relies on the expansion of "people's trade" and introduction of large Chinese firms and enterprises into the Russian market. Due to the considerably cheaper labor force in China, Chinese products can not only to maintain their niche in the Russian market but also conquer new and larger market segments, containing and even constricting Russian national industry.

This economic direction is very valuable for China. Firstly, Chinese migrants as well as Russians who purchase Chinese goods from them in Russia or China are participants in "shuttle" or "people's trade." Those goods are usually of low quality, produced in small enterprises. Such enterprises are located mostly in the countryside and have been suffering economic crisis for a number of years. But they are very important, as their revenues are the main source of life and development in Chinese rural areas. Almost 131 million people²² worked at those enterprises in 2001. It is possible that their number is already comparable to the total number of workers in Russian industry.

Secondly, Chinese migrants have developed and successfully implemented "gray" and "black" schemes and used profits from them to purchase in Russia and export to China a variety of raw materials. They have also successfully repatriated their profits from Russia and western countries.

Thirdly, a specific commodity distribution network providing large areas with Chinese goods has been formed in Russia, especially in western Siberia and the Russian Far East. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese in Russia are involved in this trade network. Annually more than 450,000 Chinese enter and leave Russia. During the six years between 1997-2001, approximately 2.3 million Chinese visited Russia.²³ The number of Russian visitors to China doubled during this period, reaching 1.2 million.²⁴ Most of them are engaged in shuttle trade.

Until recently the majority of Chinese who aspired to establish their life abroad did not see Russia as a promised land. Indeed only 10 percent of the Chinese who are leaving the country for personal reasons go to Russia.²⁵ This number tends to decrease, but the situation can change anytime, especially under the influence of the Chinese government. It is very important to note that during the first round of negotiations regarding Russia's entry into the WTO, China demanded that Russia lift restrictions on Chinese traders entering the country, giving them equal rights to those of Russian businessmen.²⁶ One should also take into consideration the fact that the majority of Chinese migrants in Russia so far have come to the country as private citizens. The main reason for their migration is to earn money. Some of the Chinese visitors have succeeded. The Chinese press in Moscow has reported that prominent Chinese businessmen are appearing in Russia and are quite successful. Now the Chinese press is discussing the issue of promising areas for them to invest their accumulated capital.

The interests of successful Chinese businessmen in Russia do not or will not necessarily coincide with those of the Chinese government. Many Chinese migrants say that this is one of the reasons why the Chinese business community in Russia has not yet established an organization capable of uniting all Chinese migrants. Undoubtedly, Chinese authorities will intensify their efforts to promote such an organization and will succeed sooner or later. This is important for Beijing, moreover, because Russia occupies a key place in its plans not only as a market for Chinese goods and labor but also as a source of natural resources and raw material. Russia also is of great interest to China as a potential source of scientific-technical research. A decision has been made in China to attract Russian scientists and experts and finance scientific-technical research in Russian institutions that are of particular interest to China. Beijing is placing its hopes on Chinese communities as active agents who are capable of accomplishing PRC's strategic aim at overcoming the backwardness of Chinese science at the expense of Russian scientific research.

The following circumstances determine the specifics of contemporary Chinese migration. First, the Chinese government started to direct, encourage, and consolidate Chinese communities in other countries. Second, the Chinese government aspires to realize its foreign economic strategy using experience, connections, and financial capital of the Chinese living abroad. Third, the Chinese government has changed its policy of splitting Chinese communities toward a policy of unification and encouragement of their cooperation. It appears that the management of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the PRC State Council is being transformed into headquarters leading Chinese migration in the interest of the "To Go Outside" strategy on a global scale. If this is the case, then the period of spontaneous increase of numbers of Chinese communities in Russia, as well as in other countries, has come to an end. The stage of their managed growth in numbers and development of their activities' directed by Beijing has begun. It is quite possible that the historical period of Chinese immigration driven by a search for better life and tireless struggle for survival is over now. The function of Chinese communities is also being changed. Previously the Chinese government encouraged them only to invest in the PRC; now the government is also calling for the raising of funds to support Chinese migration and to strengthen China's international economic position.

The Number of Chinese Migrants in the Russian Far East

There is no reliable statistics on the subject. One can find very diverse, sometime incredible, estimates in the Russian media. For example, Svyatoslav Timchenko wrote with frustration in 2001 that if this situation continued the central part of Russia would become similar to the Far East, where according to some estimates two million Chinese had already settled and in the number of border regions there were more Chinese than local Russians.²⁷ Other authors prefer to make references to Federal sources. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there (in the Russian Far East) are 237,000 officially registered Chinese and between 400,000-700,000 illegal Chinese migrants.²⁸ It is noteworthy that the same estimates were used in 1993.²⁹ Minister of International Affairs Boris Gryzlov noted at the meeting of the heads of the ministry's Federal Migration Service branches in May 2002 that the Far East is filling up with Chinese.³⁰ According to a report on the social situation in the Far Eastern Federal districts prepared for the Russian Federation Council in 2002, "approximately one million Chinese reside illegally" in the district. This means that every seventh resident in the district is Chinese!

Our estimate, which was made in 1999, was completely different. The number of Chinese migrants in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Ussurisk, does not exceed 10,000. The number of Chinese residents in Khabarovskii and Primorskii Krai does not exceed 20,000 each.³¹ V.L. Larin, referring to the situation in 1999, notes, "Not more than 30,000 Chinese were simultaneously in the Russian Far East. Even at the peak of the tourist season, those who have resided for a long period of time would not exceed 20,000."³² The results of our polling of the experts in Blagoveschensk, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok in 2002 indicated there have been no significant changes since 1999. The experts concur with our estimates.

The majority of Chinese migrants polled during our 2002 project failed to indicate the approximate number of their compatriots residing in the Far East. Perhaps some of them preferred not to reveal concrete numbers. Twenty percent of the respondents in Vladivostok said there were between 1,000 and 2,000 Chinese, about 9 percent think their number does not exceed 10,000, and the remaining respondents chose either "many" or "few," or declined to answer this question. The absolute majority of respondents in Khabarovsk refused to answer the question. Only 8.6 percent of the respondents said the number of Chinese

fluctuates between 2,000 and 5,000. Consequently, the ordinary Russians in the region are not convinced that there has been a considerable increase in the number of Chinese migrants during the last few years.

The Migration Service's statistics also claim that there was no growth in the number of Chinese migrants in the Far East in the last few years. In order to analyze the situation, let us find a starting point. In 2001, according to the data of the Russian Border and Migration Services, 461,200 Chinese entered Russia, including 386,700 (almost 84%) through the territories of the Russian Far East—242,000 (52%) of them through the Primorskii Krai territory, 114,800 (25%) through the Amur Oblast, 17,800 (4%) through the Khabarovsk Krai, and 9,600 (2%) through the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. During the first six months of 2002, 96,222 foreigners visited the Far Eastern Federal District, which is 8.4 percent more than during the same period a year earlier. 65,516 of them, representing almost 70 percent of the total number of foreigners in the district, are Chinese. A significant number of visitors, as in previous years, entered the Russian territory through Primorskii Krai. Therefore, in order to understand the reality of the situation, one needs to analyze the processes taking place in this region.

Table 1. Foreign Citizens Entering Russia through Border Checkpoints in Primorskii Krai, 196-2001

Home Country	Years					
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Total	104,756	220,789	32,0311	379,516	612,322	347,842
Including:						
PRC	71,726	167,799	254,033	276,448	442,368	242,208
DPRK	8,363	11,039	11,862	9,983	13,212	5,932

The data of the Migration Service in Primorskii Krai show a gradual increase in the number of Chinese entering Russia. Chinese visitors account for approximately 70 percent of all foreigners coming into Russia. There was a considerable increase of foreigners who crossed border checkpoints in 2000, but in 2001 their number declined to the 1998-99 level.

Historically, Chinese migration to Russia in the 1990s was composed primarily of tourists, who were arriving visa-free within the framework of inter-governmental agreements. Some tourists delayed their departure in order to sell their goods, some preferring not to return to China.

Table 2. Chinese Departing from Primorskii Krai, 1994-2001.

Years	Percentage of people leaving on time (%)	Total number of people deported from the territory (persons)	Number of people deported forcefully* (persons)	Number of people punished administratively (persons)
1994	64.0	2,798	1,579	9,884
1995	68.0	6,640	6,640	1,2389
1996	97.0	3,793	1,934	8,617
1997	99.1	4,016	2,196	8,105
1998	99.6	3,240	1,191	8,957
1999	99.2	2,500	970	8,000
2000	99.3	2,100	830	7,700
2001	98.0	2,210	386	8,570

Sources: Data of Migration Service in Gelbras, *Chinese Realities of Russia*, Moscow: Muravey, 2001, p. 38; A.N. Bogaevskaya, www.crime.vl.ru/docs/books.html.

Note: * Included in the total number of people deported in the column immediately to the left.

The data rebuffs the statements that there are million Chinese in the Far East. This number could be real if no Chinese visitors to Russia had returned to China during 1996-2000.

Undoubtedly, the Russian Border Migration Services succeeded in hampering uncontrolled growth of Chinese migration into Russia during the past years. For example, in 2001, 591 tourists did not leave Russia on time but by the beginning of 2002 only 15 tourists overstayed their visas. It is possible to say that based on the statistics for the Primorskii Krai, statements such as “the Far East is filling up with Chinese,” do not correspond with reality.

Our research in 1998-99 and 2001-2002 indicates that we can characterize the migration in the Russian Far East as a pendulum. Its most important feature is that the same people constitute the main part of the Chinese migrant population and regularly go back and forth between China and the Russian Far East. An example of one hotel in Blagoveschensk is illustrative of this phenomenon. Almost 120 Chinese occupy the two stories of the hotel. All of them have been working at the main city market in the last five years. The hotel’s staff and guests know each other well and are used to each other. The owner of the hotel would not let other Chinese stay there. The Chinese routinely leave but their rooms are more or less permanently reserved. Not only does the owner mediate conflicts between her Chinese guests, as well as between them and the local police.

The second important feature of the Chinese migrants in the Russian Far East is that the majority of the migrants are hired workers or trusted representatives of Chinese firms. To illustrate this point, one can cite the example of Blagoveschensk. In 2002 local authorities decided to ban Chinese without a work permit from trading in their city markets. Only companies which established legally sanctioned labor relations with their employees and received permits from the local migration authorities were allowed to engage in trade in the local market. However, it turned out that the companies which Chinese migrants represented are located in China. Those companies neither legalized labor relations with their employees or their representatives in Russia nor had any contacts with the local migration service. Trade was paralyzed. 1,500 Chinese merchants suddenly became unemployed. The Chinese found their way out. They started to employ local residents as merchants; prices skyrocketed; and the appearance of the market changed. Some stands became empty while Russians manned others, with Chinese owners of the goods watching closely the monetary transactions and the safety of their goods. As a result, the city budget began to suffer daily losses amounting to 300,000 rubles. The taxation of Chinese merchants comprised 20 percent of the city’s revenue. In hiring Russians, Chinese reduced their tax payments five-fold. The same situation had been observed in Khabarovsk.

Finally, the majority of Chinese migrants are involved in illegal business activities. Often those activities became illegal due to mistakes or deliberate actions by local authorities. The question is, why could the Blagoveschensk administration not find a way to legalize Chinese trade? Formally they acted according to established regulations but in reality they damaged both their own budget and people’s well-being, failing to put an end to illegal entrepreneurial Chinese activities.

The following is important in the current situation. Most Chinese migrants have turned from individual traders or members of family business into hired workers or representatives of Chinese enterprises or trade firms. Our research materials testify to these changes.

Table 3. Number of Chinese Respondents’ Entries into Russia (Shares of respondents in %)

	Khabarovsk			Vladivostok	
	1999 (130 persons)	2001 (136 persons)	2002 (104 persons)	1999 (100 persons)	2002 (103 persons)
Less than 5 times	58.1	47.0	78.8	23.0	69.4
6-10 times	2.2	9.6	10.6	6.0	15.3
Over 10 times	20.2	16.2	10.6	24.0	15.3
No answer	19.5	27.2	–	47.0	–

Note: Here and hereafter, data for 2002 are preliminary data, representing analysis of only the first batch of questionnaires received.

In analyzing the data obtained from the polling of Chinese migrants, one should take into consideration the length of their stay in Russia. Our surveys have always included some Chinese students and interns. In 2002 our goal was to make sure that they comprised at least 30 percent of our sample. As a result, the number of migrants staying in Russia for less than a year or making fewer than five trips to Russia

may seem slightly exaggerated. However, this inaccuracy is offset when we analyze more deeply issues facing Chinese students and if we develop effective schemes of using Chinese migration to fill up the fast-approaching labor deficits in Russia.

Table 4. The Length of Chinese Respondents' Stay in Russia
(Share of respondents in %)

	Khabarovsk			Vladivostok		
	1999	2001	2002	1999	2000*	2002
Less than 1 year	24.6	17.6	51.4	23.0	46.0	65.3
1-4 years	21.2	45.6	37.9	51.0	26.0	23.5
Over 4 years	15.1	26.5	10.7	10.0	21.0	11.2
No answer	39.1	10.3	—	16.0	7.0	—

Note: *Based on research conducted by G.B. Dudchenko—154 Chinese respondents.

Data on respondents living in the Far East for more than five years are very important. According to numerous in-depth interviews, most Chinese who stayed in Russia for over five years cannot adapt to life conditions in China. Once they return to their homeland, they look for ways to return to Russia.

It is rather difficult to analyze the collected data. In order to provide a quality analysis, one should constantly monitor the situation. The facts at our disposal indicate first, a gradual spread of various job-sharing schemes among Chinese migrants and second, the formation of a stable nucleus of Chinese migrants settled in Russia despite the absence or weakness of their legal status.

In order to understand the current situation, it is important to know the geography of Chinese migration in Russia. Tables 3, 4, and 5 may give the first impression that the majority of Chinese migrants live a nomadic lifestyle. This assumption helps to understand why the majority of respondents live in dormitories and hotels. The actual situation is more complex. In many cases Chinese migrants stay at the same hotel or dormitory for many years. Often Chinese live in student dormitories although they do not do anything but trade.

Table 5. Types of Residence among Chinese Respondents
(Share of respondents in %)

	Khabarovsk			Vladivostok		
	1999	2001	2002	1999	2000*	2002
In Chinese hostels and hotels	14.5	19.8	24.0	31.0	67	21.4
In Russian organizations' hostels and hotels	10.6	18.2	19.2	8.0		9.2
In student dorms	34.1	13.1	21.2	13.0		38.8
Rented apartments	29.6	40.1	29.8	39.0	16	28.6
Owned apartments	9.5	8.8	1.0	8.0	11	1.0
No answer	1.7	—	4.8	1.0	6	1.0

Note: Based on research conducted by G. B. Dudchenko.

The most significant conclusion from the above data is that there is a group of rather prosperous Chinese who are planning a long-term stay in Russia, in both cities. Nearly one-third of all migrants polled live in apartments that are either rented or owned.

The formation of Chinese migration in the Russian Far East is significantly slowed by law-enforcement efforts.

There is no single body in Russia that could systematically keep track of Chinese migrants. Furthermore, there is no clear definition of the term "immigrant" in the country. Therefore, the current situation presents many questions. For example, is it possible to develop a universal definition of

“immigrant” for representatives of different countries? Today, employees of western, Japanese, or South Korean business firms can hardly be called “immigrants”. They may live and work on Russian territory for a relatively long period of time, but leave the country when their contracts expire. The same situation is observed about foreign students who leave Russia when they graduate from educational institutions.

The situation of most Chinese in Russia is different. Formally they are also allowed to stay in the country for a certain period of time. The majority of them work for small, as a rule, family-owned firms or act as business agents or representatives of companies or enterprises located mostly in China. The vast majority of Chinese students also attempt to combine study and work, or to be classified as a student as a legal pretext for working in Russia. They do various types of work in communities or work in markets, restaurants, etc.

In order to understand Chinese migration in Russia, the following points need to be noted. The vast majority of Chinese migrants are a part of an organized structure, a functional element of the flow of goods from China. During the 1990s, Chinese migration was formed by individuals who were setting out to Russia in search of income at their own risk. In the late 1990s the situation changed. Therefore, in our research we define Chinese who permanently live and conduct business in Russia or periodically or routinely visit the country for business purposes as “migrants”.

As a natural part of the Chinese trade structure, Chinese migrants cannot disrupt their connections with China. The disruption or break-up may leave them without a source of income. Moreover, receiving Russian citizenship has been quite complicated before but it became even more difficult after the Russian government adopted a new law on citizenship. That is why Chinese migrants who have lived in Russia for five or even ten years still have to retain their Chinese citizenship using different legal loopholes in order to stay in Russia. It is also important for them to retain the Chinese citizenship in order to protect their rights and dignity. For this reason, until recently only a few Chinese sought Russian citizenship.

Table 6. Respondents’ Views on Desirable Legal Status & Russian Citizenship
(Share of respondents in %)

	Khabarovsk			Vladivostok	
	1999	2001	2002	1999	2002
Chinese citizenship	87.2	83.8	38.5	89.0	46.9
Russian citizenship	10.6	8.8	12.5	10.0	9.2
Permanent residence permit in the Russian Federation	8.9	5.9	8.6	1.0	13.3
Russian business visa	—*	—*	14.4	—*	15.3
Citizenship of other country	2.2	1.5	17.3	—	11.2
Abstained	—	—	8.7	—	4.1

Note: * - the question was not included.

It is worth noting that the number of respondents seeking Russian or other countries’ citizenship has increased dramatically. This is a brand new phenomenon. Furthermore, the number of Chinese migrants who intend to settle in Russia permanently if they are guaranteed stable legal rights for living and working in the country. There is little doubt that their numbers will continue to grow rapidly if the Russian attitudes towards Chinese migrants change, if police and bureaucrats will stop extorting money and nationalists will stop their discriminatory campaigns.

To sum up, there is no reason to believe that the second half of 2002 was marked by gigantic-scale migration in the Russian Far East. Based on all the available data, the Chinese population in the Far Eastern district cannot exceed 100,000 people, which is at least one-tenth of the official estimates. One could not find any villages or settlements in the region with a predominant Chinese population.

Chinese Migration as a Social-Economic Factor

As an introduction to this topic, one should mention the social-psychological perception of PRC in the Russian society. Fear of the so-called Chinese yellow peril, which emerged in the end of the 19th century through the beginning of the 20th century, has proved to be amazingly lasting. As the Chinese economy grew,

this fear again became a reality of the social consciousness. The Russian condescending imperial views of China and the Chinese changed to contemptuously complacent attitudes toward the great power of China and the Chinese. Russian mass media raise two problems regarding the social-economic role of Chinese migration. Both of them are viewed through the prism of a new social-psychological situation in the country. First, China is often mentioned when the question of potential labor deficits, caused by low birthrates and emigration of local people from the Russian Far East, are raised. Second, many politicians and experts believe that Chinese migrants cause severe damage to the Russian economy by carrying out illegal operations, such as the export of currency and gray-black schemes in acquiring lumber, rare natural and industrial raw materials, poaching, import of drugs, etc. At the same time the Chinese migrants' positive influences on the Russian economy are rarely mentioned.

Let us analyze the real situation. In 1991, the population of the Russian Far East peaked at 8.1 million; in the early 2002 it stood at 7.2 million. This means that over the decade, the population of the region declined by 900,000 people. This was the result of both migration and natural population decline. Migration outflow was the main factor of the decreasing population. Based on Migration Service's analyses, 10-15 percent of those who left the region went to look for employment, 15-20 percent returned to their former place of residence, 15 percent left to continue their education, and the rest (50%) left the Far East for personal and family reasons. In other words, if one was to believe this conclusion, it was not economic stagnation and unemployment that caused the population outflow from the region. However, if the region's economy prospered, migration processes could be entirely different.

Currently, labor deficit exists in several Russian regions, including the Far Eastern territories. For several years these regions signed contracts and agreements aimed at attracting temporary foreign labor. However, the scale of this practice has not yet increased. According to the Migration Service's data, in 2001, enterprises and companies located in the Far Eastern Federal District attracted a total of 29,400 foreign workers. Chinese labor force made up over 36 percent of all foreigners who officially worked on a temporary basis in the federal district. Primorskii Krai is the major employer of foreign citizens. The number of foreign workers in the krai was approximately the same in the period between 1994-2001. For example, in 2000, foreigners who came to Primorye to work included 7,708 PRC citizens (65.8%); 1,469 DPRK citizens (12.5%); 940 Vietnamese citizens (8.0%); and 338 citizens of the Republic of Korea (2.9%). During the same period, 1,169 workers (10%) from the CIS countries were employed. Compared to 1999, Chinese working population increased by 1,334 people and Vietnamese by 634 people, whereas the working population from DPRK dropped by 904 people. In 2002, the size of foreign labor force decreased, among them the number of Chinese citizens showing the most dramatic decline.

Table 7. Size of Foreign Labor Force in the Far Eastern Federal District, 2001
(in thousands of people)

	Total	<i>Including:</i>				
		Primorskii Krai	Khabarovsk Krai	Amur Oblast	Jewish Autonomous region	Sakhalinskaya Oblast
Total	29.4	9.8	7.1	4.2	1.0	1.4
<i>Citizens of:</i>						
The PRC	10.6	5.8	2.7	0.6	0.9	0.2
DPRK	6.6	1.8	1.7	2.9	0.01	0.2
CIS countries	8.9	0.9	1.7	0.6	0.04	0.4
<i>Involved in:</i>						
Trade and food services	9.7	5.9	2.5	0.2	0.4	0.2

Construction	6.5	2.6	1.1	0.3	0.08	0.3
Industry	4.7	0.6	0.9	0.5	0.04	0.2
Lumbering	4.9	0.1	1.7	2.8	0.04	0.1
Agriculture	1.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.06

Table 8. Size of Foreign Labor Force in Primorskii Krai, 1999-2000

	1999		2000		2001	
	Population (persons)	Share (%)	Population (persons)	Share (%)	Population (persons)	Share (%)
The PRC	6374	63.0	7708	65.8	5828	59.6
DPRK	2373	23.5	1469	12.5	1762	18.0
Vietnam	306	3.0	940	8.0	*	–
Republic of Korea	155	1.5	338	2.9	*	–
Other	894	9.0	1257	10.8	*	–
Total	10102	100.0	11712	100.0	9774	100.0

Note: * Data are not available

Given that the size of economically active population in the region exceeds one million people, it is clear that currently the share of foreign workers is very small. If one ignored specific industrial projects, one would conclude that the contribution of foreign labor force in the region's economy was and remains insignificant. The situation with foreign citizens working in different industrial projects in Russia is rather complex. A part of the Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese workers who entered Russia in accordance with contractual obligations for different types of work in reality is not engaged in the designated lines of work. Often their bosses force them to conduct independent business, support themselves, and simultaneously make regular financial contributions to the enterprise, which enables them to earn income in Russia. Illegal activities, which take place in the personnel practices of foreign companies, can be prevented with the help of appropriate control mechanisms. However, what is important is that the well-intended proposals of many Russian specialists to solve the problem of Russia's labor shortage by attracting Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese workers are extremely difficult to realize. In order to make it work, Russia should establish a proper form of incorporation, develop legal regulations, and ensure effective protection of foreign workers' rights.

In principle, signing contracts and agreements that provide for the importation of foreign labor for certain volume of work in the country is a widespread phenomenon. Its role in Russia is most likely to increase due to the growing labor shortage in the country. Up to now, however, foreign workers are offered positions which do not attract the local population.

Until recently Russia has almost never attracted foreign experts specializing in the fields which are in short supply of Russian specialists. The country will most certainly need to acquire this kind of experience available in international business practices.

One cannot hope that the Chinese migrants who settle in Russia will be engaged in Russian domestic production, thus helping to overcome the shortage of work force. The majority of this particular contingent of foreign workers do not speak Russian and lack necessary professional qualifications. As an element of the Chinese trading system, Chinese migrants are oriented toward generating fast and large profits; therefore, most of them prefer to be involved in trade and restaurant business.

One possible solution to the labor shortage problem is to attract more foreigners, especially Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese, to Russian educational institutions. However, this should be a topic of a separate discussion. Before we analyze the social-economic impact of Chinese migration in the Russian Far East and Zabaikalye, we need to consider first of all its positive aspects, which are rarely discussed in the country. As far as I know, Victor Larin was the one who suggested the most complete review.³³ We will add some comments to his observations.

Table 9. Positive and Negative Aspects of Chinese Migration

	Positive aspects	Negative aspects
1.	Supplying the Russian market (particularly, the Far Eastern and partially Siberian markets) with consumer goods and food. Local population and authorities should be grateful to Chinese and Russian “shuttle” traders who supplied them with food and clothes in the hungry early 1990s. <i>V. Larin is right. In the following years their role slightly decreased, however even now, in 2002, it is still significant not only in the Far East, but also in the European part of Russia.</i>	Inhibition of Russian producers. For example, in the Far East rice cultivation has been practically liquidated.
2	Labor market competition, occupying vacant positions in construction, agriculture, and service sectors. <i>V. Larin is not right. On the contrary, Chinese migrants do not create labor market competition. Rather, the higher the share of foreign labor force, the lower the unemployment rate.</i>	Many Russian “shuttle” traders became a part of the Chinese system of goods marketing. Hundreds of thousands of Russians now buy Chinese goods in China or Chinese wholesale markets in Russia and sell them in the remote areas of Russia.
3	Price competition and dampening of domestic goods prices. Chinese migration created competition in consumer goods markets. The appearance of Chinese goods on Russian markets caused an increase in Russian production volumes and a decrease in the prices of domestic goods.	Chinese goods, due to competition from goods from other countries, are categorized as cheap and shoddy. However, this did not boost Russia’s domestic production.
4	Investments in real estate. The fact that Chinese buy real estate and lease land in Russia is always evaluated on the emotional level and presented as something negative. However, property and assets, generating revenue, stay in the country. <i>V. Larin is right. He is also right saying that the scale of Chinese investments in Russian property is still small.</i>	Until recently, Chinese migrants in Russia did not make investments. They handled their income according to the following two models. The first model is saving money in order to leave the Far East for the European part of Russia, then abroad. This is a dream cherished by many Chinese migrants. The second model is the export of goods and US dollars from Russia to China. For these purposes underground banks and “gray” and “black” schemes have been established in order to acquire natural and industrial resources in Russia, to smuggle them to China and to sell them.
5	Tax levies imposed on market traders and businessmen and customs duties go to the federal and local coffers. <i>V. Larin is right.</i>	Though Russian authorities complain that Chinese businessmen evade taxation, it was they who created lots of loopholes that allow Russian, Chinese and other citizens to minimize taxes, levies and fees.
6	Development of tourism and appropriate services sectors.	The Chinese tourism business is structured in such a way that travel agencies and Chinese communities in Russian cities generate maximum profits, whereas Russia receives minimal fees, levies and profits. This created favorable conditions for opening Chinese restaurants, casinos, bordellos etc; developing “flying money” schemes that facilitates the

		transfer of cash (Russian and US currency) to China.
7	The higher level of individual welfare of some officials, customs inspectors, policemen, etc who work with Chinese. <i>V. Larin is right when he mentions this category of people; however, he is not right mentioning only these categories of people who benefit from Chinese migration.</i>	Various Russian firms, such as transportation, law, security and other firms are now dependent on working with Chinese migrants. The size of Russians working thus is expanding.

Note: Italics represent V. Gelbras' comments on V. Larin's observations.

Some analysts state that Chinese invaded the Russian market, thus setting production and price levels in the market. Two factors should be taken into consideration. First, China is notorious for its low labor prices. It is impossible to compete with China under the condition of the scale of poverty and unemployment that exists in China. Second, the potential capacity of China's internal market should be considered. It allows for unprecedented large-scale production there. Some countries, e.g., the United States, prefer to avoid senseless competition by organizing the production of goods on the territories of China at their own expense for American needs and focus at home on more knowledge-intensive industries inaccessible to China. In other words, a real Russian problem is not trying to borrow Chinese experience in the sphere of production and price management but the lack of a clear long-term strategy of development of Zabaikalye and the Far East.

Some Russian politicians state that Chinese migrants steal jobs from Russians. This is a very controversial statement. Based on research conducted by the Migration Service of Primorskii Krai, one can state that the employment of foreign labor force creates job opportunities for local Russians.




Figure 1. Correlation between Unemployment and Foreign Labor

The data depict the situation in 2000, but there have not been significant changes since then. The data prove that the higher the share of foreign labor force in the economically active population, the lower the unemployment rate in the respective areas.

Another key issue deserving our attention has to do with the extreme minimization of taxes, custom duties, and other fees levied on Chinese migrants. This question is a large and rather complicated issue. Let us take shuttle trade business, for example. At first the Russian government allowed duty-free import of goods costing less than \$10,000, then \$2,000. In 1998, duty-free items were limited to goods \$1,000 in value and weighing under 50 kilograms. As a result, a new form of business emerged--cross-border carriers of the 50-kilogram goods. Cross-border carriers acquired the nickname of "bricks". "Brick" stands for a carrier and his cargo. 50-kilogram bricks were packed on the Russian side and then sent to various cities, as far as Irkutsk and Yakutsk. Such shipments were not registered, so officially they did not exist at all. As of late 2001, the law stipulated that if cargo's weight did not exceed 200 kilograms or if its value did not exceed \$10,000, the customs fee charged at 30 percent of the value for this type of goods. Based on the estimates of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, up to 90 percent of textiles, footwear, and fur, and 70 percent of cosmetics, etc. was imported into the country using gray schemes until recently. The Russian government decided to change the situation by considerably tightening its policy concerning cross-border shipments starting from 2002.³⁴ It is possible that these planned measures may insure that the taxes and levies are paid; however, they may also cause an increase in prices. The population of the Russian Far East, which has already vehemently protested against restrictions placed on cross-border trade, may react negatively again. This example proves that the authorities themselves create conditions for tax evasion by their unreasonable actions. Chinese migrants in their turn create new methods and find loopholes to avoid taxes and various fees. However, this does not mean that Chinese migration deserves only negative social-economic evaluation.

Conclusion

Chinese migration is a complex phenomenon and cannot be evaluated unambiguously. In Russia, this phenomenon is rather unique and differs from migration processes in other countries. First of all, most Chinese migrants are a part of a Chinese trading structure. Second, these are not individuals who firmly intend to tie their new destiny in their new country with the goal to respect its traditions, rules, and norms. It is likely that Chinese migration in Russia is in a critical stage of development. The Chinese strategy "To Go Outside" and the Chinese government's aspirations to subordinate Chinese migrants and communities to the realization of this strategy could cause dramatic changes in both the growth of immigration and the level of activity of Chinese communities in Russia. Chinese communities in Russia have built a fundamental foundation for Chinese foreign economic expansion. Consequently, Russia has found itself in the position where it has to immediately work out its own strategy of social-economic development in Zabaikalye and the Far East in particular.

Notes

¹ V.L. Larin, China and the Russian Far East in the First Half of the 1990s: Problems of Regional Interaction, Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 1998, pp. 159-176.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 104-118.

³ The results are fully presented in Galina Vitkovskaya and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, "New Stolypin Policy in the Russian Far East: Hopes and Realities" in G. Vitkovskaya and D. Trenin, eds., Perspectives of the Far East Region: Transnational Interactions, Moscow: Gendalf for Moscow Carnegie Center, 1999, pp. 80-120.

⁴ G. Vitkovskaya and D. Trenin, eds., Perspectives of the Far East Region: Transnational Interactions, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, Gendalf, 1999; G. Vitkovskaya and D. Trenin, eds., Perspectives of the Far East Region: Population, Migration, Labor Markets, Moscow: Gendalf, 1999.

⁵ V.G. Gelbras, Chinese Realities of Russia, Moscow: Muravey, 4, 2001.

⁶ Viktor Larin, "The Skies Envoys in the Far East: Answer to Alarmists," Diasporas, vol. 2, no. 3, (2001), pp. 76-112.

⁷ E.L. Motrich, "Demographic Potential and Chinese Presence in the Russian Far East," Problems of the Far East, 6, 2001.

⁸ G.B. Dudchenko, "PRC Citizens in Vladivostok: The Present Realities," Russia and ATR, 4, 2001.

⁹ M.A. Alexseev, "Does Chinese Migration Threaten China? Territorial Security and International Relations in the Primorskii Region," World Economy and International Relations, 12, 2000.

¹⁰ The book of A.N. Bogaevskaya was found on the Internet only, at www.crime.vl.ru/docs/books.html.

¹¹ Lu Sumei and E.N. Rummyantsev, "China as I know It," UPAPS, 1999; Huan Tyanin, "The Chinese in Moscow: Inside View," Diasporas, vol. 2, no. 3 (2001), pp. 126-132; Li Suezun, "Russia: Is It a Chinese Dream?" Diasporas, vol. 2, no. 3 (2001), pp. 133-146.

¹² Many reports directly relating to Chinese migration problems are found in Russia and China on the Far Eastern Frontiers, Volume 3, Blagoveschensk: Amur State University, 2002, including the following: L.A. Ponkratova, "Features of Dynamics and Structure of International Migration in the Far Eastern Frontier Regions," pp. 308-319; E.S. Bazhanova, "the Far Eastern Frontier Regions: The Present Migration Problems and Ways of Their Solution," pp. 319-323; E.L.O. Motrich, "Chinese in the Russian Far East: Problems and Perspectives," pp. 323-329; A.S. Vaschuk, "Social-economic Orientations of Ethnic Immigrants in Frontier Regions on the Eve of the 20th-21st Centuries: Materials from the Primorskii Region," pp. 323-334; Z.I. Sidorkina, "Periods of Historic-Demographic Development of the Far East," pp. 335-339; S.Y. Prosvirnov, "Dynamics of Migration of the Amur Region Population," pp. 339-344; V.O. Ushakova, "Illegal Migration Problems in the Far Eastern Frontier Regions," pp. 356-359; O.S. Olifirova, S.S. Koshihina, and V.V. Krupina, "Medical-social Aspects of Chinese Citizens' Morbidity in the Amur Region," pp. 387-391; A.P. Zabayko, "Ethnic Consciousness as a Subjective Factor of Russian-Chinese Relations: Theoretical and Applied Aspects," pp. 422-429. Relevant reports are also found in Russia and China on the Far Eastern Frontiers, Volume 4, Blagoveschensk: Amur State University, 2002, including: N.V. Kashina and V.Z. Mezhakov, "Topical Problems of Development of Economic Relations between the Amur Region and China," pp. 238-243; N.A. Babkina, "Some Problems of Russian-Chinese Frontier Trade," pp. 276-280.

¹³ To cite only one study to indicate the expansion of the geographical scope of research: L.E. Vihareva, "'Old' and 'New' Chinese Migrants in Ulan-Ude," in V.I. Dyatlov, ed., Russia and the East: A View from Siberia in the Beginning of the Millennium: Report of Materials and Abstracts from International Scientific-technical Conference, Irkutsk, May 17-19, 2002, Irkutsk: Ottisk, 2002, pp. 278-282.

¹⁴ Materials of discussion for a "Migration Problems in Irkutsk: Is 'A Yellow Peril' Real in Siberia?" and "Economic Component of Chinese Migration," (1999-2000), Proceedings, Irkutsk, 2000.

¹⁵ This research was supported by the MacArthur Foundation and was conducted according to the research agenda of the Moscow Office of the International Migration Organization.

¹⁶ Li Gang, ed., 'Zou chu qu' kai fang zhanlue yu anli yanjiu [The Open-Up Strategy of "Going Out" and Case Studies], Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai jingji maoyi zhubanshe, 2000; Zhongguo tongji zhayao, 2002 [China Statistics Digest 2002], Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2002.

¹⁷ Zhongguo tongji zhayao, 2002 (Brief statistic reference book of China, 2002), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2002.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

¹⁹ Xiao Zhuoji, ed., 2001 nian jingji fenxi yu fazhan. (2001 jingji jin pi shu) [Economic Analysis and Developments in 2001. (Economy Golden Book 2001)], Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 2001, pp. 186-187.

²⁰ Mosike huaren bao [Chinese in Moscow], June 30, 2001.

²¹ Rossiskaya gazeta, November 30, 1996.

²² *Zhongguo tongji zhayao, 2002*, p. 38.

²³ The total is calculated from the migration and population data in *Statistical Bulletin*, Moscow: Goskomstat, 1999, 2000, and 2001.

²⁴ *Zhongguo tongji zhayao, 2002*, p. 160.

²⁵ In 1998, 473,100 Chinese went abroad for person reasons, representing 14.8 % of the total Chinese citizens going overseas; 447,600 or 10.5% in 1999; 493,800 or 8.8% in 2000; and 6.6% in 2001. (*Statistical Bulletin*, Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000, pp. 106, 108; 2001, pp. 109, 111; and 2002, pp. 100, 102; and *Zhongguo tongji zhayao, 2002*, p. 160.

²⁶ See, for example, *Izvestiya*, May 23, 2002.

²⁷ Timchenko Svyatoslav, "Will 'Chinatown' be in Petersburg?" *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, June 7, 2001.

²⁸ Averbuch Victoria, "Common Misfortune," *Izvestiya*, February 16, 2001. Even E.L. Motrich, a Khabarovsk resident, refers to this information in her article in "Demographic Potential and Chinese Presence in the Russian Far East" (endnote 7).

²⁹ V.L. Larin, *China and the Russian Far East in the First Half of the 1990s*, pp. 74-75.

³⁰ <http://top.rbc.ru/index.shtml?news/policy/2002.06.06>.

³¹ V.L. Larin, "The Skies Envoys in the Far East: Answers to Alarmists," *Diaspora*, vol. 2, no. 3 (2001), p. 87.

³² Migration Service's data. See V.G. Gelbras, *Chinese Realities of Russia*, p. 38; A.N. Bogaevskaya, www.crime.vl.ru/docs/books.html.

³³ Larin, *Diasporas*, vol. 2, no. 3 (2001), pp. 77-78.

³⁴ Rinat Sagdiev, "The Weight is Taken. The Government Is Preoccupied with 'Shuttle' Traders," *Izvestiya*, December 19, 2001.